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FIXING THE NATIONAL SECURITY STATE: 
COMMISSIONS AND THE POLITICS OF DISASTER AND REFORM 
 
 
Christopher Kirchhoff 
 
 
In the U.S. federal system, “crisis commissions” are powerful instruments of social 
learning that actively mediate the politics of disaster and reform.  Typically endowed 
with the legal authority to establish causes of dramatic policy failures and make 
recommendations to prevent their recurrence, commissions can prompt major 
governmental reorganizations.  Yet commissions are also frequently accused of being 
influenced by dominant interests and faulted for articulating incomplete or politically 
expedient narratives of failure.  Even when commission conclusions are accepted, the 
reforms they propose are not always adopted.  
 
Using the 9/11 Commission as a conceptual backdrop, this dissertation explores the 
relationship between disaster, public investigation, and reform by undertaking a 
detailed study of the Space Shuttle Columbia Accident Investigation Board and Iraq 
Study Group.  Together, the cases constitute a study of the national security state 
seeking to correct failures across different domains of state power: border security, 
war-making capability, and dominance in space. 
 
I argue that commissions, as one-shot diagnostic and therapeutic instruments, are 
more effective than standing political institutions at confronting entrenched ways of 
seeing and knowing in complex systems of the national security state, which are 
defined by the interaction of ideology, large bureaucracies, and advanced 
technologies.  The ability of commissions to see critically for society itself is not 
given but rather constructed through investigative and deliberative processes that 
must overcome the action of political interests.  Commission credibility is therefore 
not an essential trait that derives a priori from the inherent stature of its members, but 
is rather the output of the investigative phase as commissions identify, compile, and 
publicize errors made by the state.   
 
In this adversarial process, an aggressive professional staff emerges as a determinant 
of commission success, leading to an important distinction between investigative 
commissions with “super staffs” and advisory commissions that lack them. Process 
tracing recommendations over a multi-year period nevertheless reveals dynamics of 
agency and resistance at play between commissions and the institutions they attempt 
to reform, highlighting the partial success commissions are likely to achieve at 
coercing entrenched institutions to implement their recommendations. 
 
Key Words: commissions, disaster, reform, organizational learning, bureaucratic 
failure, 9/11 Commission, Columbia accident, Iraq Study Group. 
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“But what is government itself, but the greatest of all reflections on 
human nature? If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If 
angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on 
government would be necessary. In framing a government which is to be 
administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must 
first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place 
oblige it to control itself.” 
 
James Madison 
Federalist Paper No. 51, January 6, 1788 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Crisis Commissions and the National Security State 
 
 
September 11, 2001 was a singular shot across the bow of an American nation 
that until one clear autumn morning had sailed confidently as the world hegemon into 
a new century, even perhaps the end of history.1  Whatever Americans thought before 
September 11th, the events of that day ushered in a profound sense that everything 
thereafter would be different, that as at Pearl Harbor the nation’s territorial integrity 
had been shockingly breached.2  While the remains of the World Trade Center 
smoldered, the American people and their elected representatives began to ask how 
such a calamity occurred, seemingly without warning, on American soil.  Drawing on 
a tradition of independent inquiry begun in 15th century Britain, and carried over to 
America with George Washington’s appointment of a commission to defuse the 
Pennsylvania Whisky Rebellion, members of both parties called for an outside 
investigation of the attacks as early as September 12th.3   
After more than a year of resistance, the White House acceded to the demands 
of survivor families and in late 2002 created a bi-partisan commission with an 
independent budget, formidable staff, and subpoena powers.4  The National 
Commission on the Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, popularly known as the 
9/11 Commission, launched an intrusive investigation into how the government, and 
the American people, had been caught off guard.  Dozens of investigators descended 
                                                 
1 Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Harper Collins, 1993). 
2 John Dower argues powerfully about the connections between Pearl Harbor and 9/11 in “Cultures of 
War: Pearl Harbor, Hiroshima, 9/11,” lecture, Harvard University, September 23, 2005. 
3 Senator Robert Torricelli called for a Presidential inquiry on the Senate floor on September 12, 2001.  
See Kenneth Kitts, Presidential Commissions & National Security: The Politics of Damage Control, 
Boulder: Lynn Publishers, 2006), 132. 
4 See Public Law 107-306, 107th Congress, and “Statement by the President,” The White House, 
November 27, 2002. 
 
upon government agencies, interviewed witnesses, collected documents, and seized 
computer records.  Even the President and Vice-President were questioned.5 
As the investigation proceeded, its examination of circumstances surrounding 
the hijackings, thought initially to have been unforeseeable, soon painted a more 
complex picture of blame and responsibility.  Commission hearings brought into 
public view facts that contradicted earlier official accounts.  As more information 
about overlooked warning signs emerged, sharp questions arose as to what could 
reasonably have been done to prevent the attacks. 
The 9/11 Commission report, issued in the middle of the 2004 Presidential 
campaign, provided a stunningly detailed chronology of the attacks.  It found that the 
national security system failed at multiple levels.  Border security did not stop the 
attackers from entering the country.  Aviation security did not prevent them from 
gaining control of wide-body jets.  Bureaucratic competition between rival 
intelligence and law enforcement organizations stifled the flow of information and 
kept critical data about the attackers from the hands of decision-makers.  Ways of 
seeing the world also mattered.  Deep-seated political frames, such as viewing 
terrorism as a state-sponsored activity, prevented an earlier recognition by the 
government of the threat posed by loose networks of Islamic extremists.6   
The report ultimately cited intelligence failures as the primary reason why the 
attacks succeeded.  To correct bureaucratic deficits in information sharing and to 
enable a coherent response to emerging threats, the Commission recommended the 
appointment of a Director of National Intelligence.7   
                                                 
5 Two book length studies of the commission have been published, the first written by its co-chairs, the 
second by the New York Times journalist who covered its proceedings.  See Thomas H. Kean, Lee H. 
Hamilton and Benjamin Rhodes, Without Precedent: The Inside Story of the 9/11 Commission (New 
York: Knopf, 2006), and Philip Shenon, The Commission: The Uncensored History of the 9/11 
Investigation (New York: Twelve, 2008). 
6 The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon 
the United States, Government Printing Office, July 22, 2004.  W.W. Norton simultaneously published 
an authorized version. 
7 For scholarly commentary on the commission’s rationale for this framing, see Amy B. Zegart, 
“Through the Looking Glass: September 11th and the Adaption Failure of American Intelligence 
Agencies,” paper delivered at the Miller Center for Public Affairs, April 2, 2004.  
www.americanpoliticaldevelopment.org/ townsquare/print_res/in_progress/zegart.pdf; See also Amy 
B. Zegart, Flawed By Design: The Evolution of the CIA, JCS, and NSC  (Palo Alto: Stanford 
University Press, 2000), William W. Newmann “Reorganizing for National Security and Homeland 
Security” Public Administration Review Vol. 62 (Sept 2002), 126-137, Anthony H. Cordesman, 
“Intelligence Reform as a Self-Inflicted Wound: Asking the Right Questions [working draft] 
September 16, 2004, Center for Strategic and International Studies Working Paper, and Charles 
Perrow, “Organizational or Executive Failures,” A Symposium on the 9/11 Commission Report, 
Contemporary Sociology Vol. 34, No 2. p 99-107. 
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The administration’s response to the 9/11 Commission report became a 
leading issue in the unfolding presidential campaign.  Both incumbent President 
George W. Bush and Democratic nominee John Kerry (D.-Mass.) embraced its 
findings and vowed to implement its recommendations.  After a contested beginning, 
the 9/11 Commission emerged as a potent political actor, achieving a stature that 
temporarily rivaled the President’s own.  In the assessment of one scholar, the 
Commission “broke President Bush’s monopoly on the political windfall generated by 
the September 11 attacks” at a time when “no other entity of post-9/11 American life 
was capable of mounting a credible challenge to the President’s leadership in the war 
on terror, including the U.S. Congress.”8  Legal commentators similarly hailed the 
commission as a powerful instrument for unearthing information from the executive 
branch and suggested that in times of crisis commissions can better hold the state 
accountable for past actions than common law or statute.9  Not in recent memory had 
a commission so forcefully transformed a tragic disaster into a roster of potent 
reforms whose enactment seemed inevitable. 
 
The 9/11 Commission’s Rise and Fall 
 
In the aftermath of disaster or dramatic policy failure, crisis commissions have 
become a standard remedy in the U.S. federal system for establishing what went 
wrong and for restoring the integrity of government.  Commissions are typically 
equipped with the legal authority to build a record of evidence, establish definitive 
causes, and propose reforms designed to avoid a recurrence.  Through holding public 
hearings and issuing investigative reports that contradict possibly self-serving 
accounts, commissions have tremendous power to refocus the public’s attention.  The 
revisionist histories they build can lead to new public understandings of blame and 
culpability.  In this way, commissions help build shared experiences of events and 
their causes that fuel political action.10  Visibly holding public institutions 
accountable enables commissions to cultivate a legitimacy of their own, untarnished 
by mistrust of government. 
                                                 
8 Richard A. Falkenrath “The 9/11 Commission Report: A Review Essay” International Security Vol 
29, No. 3 (Winter 2004/05), 190. 
9 Mark Fenster, “Designing Transparency: The 9/11 Commission and Institutional Form,” Whitepaper, 
12-15.  Available online at: http://works.bepress.com/mark_fenster/6/, accessed November 23, 2008. 
10 Molly Patterson and Kristen Renwick Monrow  “Narrative in Political Science,” Annual Review of 
Political Science, 1998 1:315-31. 
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As motors of reform, commissions wield singular power.  Commissions 
frequently drive changes in official policy and issue recommendations that become 
benchmarks for the reorganization of government agencies.  They operate in, and help 
define, what scholars term the “policy window” that opens when crisis has reordered 
political priorities in ways that make possible dramatic realignments.11  With public 
attention focused, commissions are able—at least for a time—to move Congress, the 
White House, and federal agencies in significant ways, unilaterally altering the culture 
in which policies are devised and executed.12  Commissions can become crucial 
instruments in policy shifts.    
Commissions, however, are not without limitations.  Far from serving as a 
policy panacea whose erudite reports cure government of all that ails it, crisis 
commissions have increasingly become embroiled in the failures of reform as much 
as its successes.  The experience of the 9/11 Commission in this regard is typical of 
other high-profile inquiries whose recommendations did not achieve all of the lasting 
impact their supporters had hoped. 
After its report was published, critics contested the 9/11 Commission’s 
position as the dominant authority for interpreting the cause of the attacks and as the 
arbiter of how the government should organize itself to prevent them in the future.  
The most provocative criticism concerned what the report identified as the “failure” 
that caused the attacks.  Framing an attack by salafist Islamic terrorists as the result of 
an inability of intelligence agencies to “connect the dots” left the Commission open to 
criticism that it had insufficiently explored the root causes of the terrorist threat it was 
tasked to investigate.13  In the view of critics, the report minimizes U.S. policy 
choices in the Middle East and South Asia as relevant factors in the attacks.14  To 
some, this omission constitutes an insufficient explanation of the “why do they hate 
us” question, reducing the response to 9/11 to a “fix the bureaucracy” problem rather 
than a deeper reckoning with U.S. entanglement with the Muslim world.  Others 
wondered whether the Commissioners’ reticence to “state the obvious” connection 
                                                 
11 John T. S. Keeler, "Opening the Window for Reform: Mandates, Crises, and 
Extraordinary Policy-Making" Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 25, No. 4 (1993), 
433-486.  
12 Eric Stern, “Crisis and Learning: A Conceptual Balance Sheet,” Journal of Contingencies and Crisis 
management, Vol. 5. No. 2 (1997), 69-86. 
13 David Mednicoff, “Compromising Toward Confusion: The 9/11 Commission Report and American 
Policy in the Middle Easy,” Contemporary Sociology: 34(2): 107-15. 
14 See 9/11 Commission Report, 375-77. 
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between terrorism and U.S. interests in Middle Eastern oil was the product of political 
and corporate ties.15 
Terrorism analysts, furthermore, disagreed with the Commission’s implicit 
assumption that it is possible to deter a determined group of attackers.  In their 
reading, the Commission’s post-hoc determination of the attack’s preventability was 
the product of ingrained American optimism in the ability of government to secure the 
homeland.  “Too often,” one expert wrote, “assessments of failure focus on the 
mistakes of the victim rather than on the skill of the adversary.”16  Libertarian and 
conservative commentators objected to commission recommendations on ideological 
grounds.  In their view, centralizing power in a new synthesizing institution atop the 
intelligence bureaucracy, rather than pursuing more local measures such as 
strengthening border controls and airport security, would lead to the aggrandizement 
of the state without real security gains.17  
Still others found fault with the report’s reluctance to blame specific officials, 
attributing this “no fault” theory of government to the Commission’s bipartisan 
composition and structure.  The consequence of working in a context that prioritized 
consensus above all else appeared to be a refusal to affix blame to high-ranking 
figures in either party.  The Commission’s senior advisor, writing in The New 
Republic, noted that “the report is probably too balanced… Individuals, especially the 
two presidents and their intimate advisers, received…indulgent treatment.”18  In 
response, the Commission’s executive director acknowledged that “avoiding the 
appearance of partisan tilt sometimes required muting interpretation.”19  The political 
function of a commission to “bind up the nation’s wounds,” and bring closure to a 
traumatic event through bipartisan consensus, may have constrained the 
investigation’s rigor and accountability. 
                                                 
15 Diane Vaughan, “The Social Shaping of Commission Reports,” Sociological Forum, Volume 21, 
Number 2, June 2006, pp. 291-306. 
16 Daniel Byman, “Strategic Surprise and the September 11 Attacks,” Annual Review of Political 
Science 2005 8:145-70 
17 Sheila Jasanoff, “Restoring Reason: Causal Narratives and Political Culture,” in Bridget Hutter and 
Michael Power, eds. Organizational Encounters with Risk (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press, 2005);  Richard Posner, Preventing Surprise Attacks: Intelligence Reform in the Wake of 9/11 
(New York: Roman and Littlefield, 2005). 
18 Ernest May, “When Government Writes History: The 9/11 Commission Report,” The New Republic, 
June 27, 2005. 
19 Ernest May and Philip Zelikow reply “Sins of Commissions? Falkenrath and his critics” 
International Security Vol 39, No. 4 (Spring 2005), 208-211.  
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Whatever the merit of these critiques, challenges to the 9/11 Commission’s 
diagnosis of what caused the attacks, and what corrective measures were necessary to 
ensure they would not be repeated, lessened the momentum behind implementing its 
recommendations.  As reform bills ground through the notoriously inelegant U.S. 
legislative process, the Commission’s vision of a unified intelligence command fell 
prey to entrenched agency interests and their congressional patrons.  The House 
Armed Services Committee in particular remained un-swayed by the Commission’s 
arguments that anyone other than the Secretary of Defense should wield statutory 
authority over intelligence community functions that provide line of battle 
intelligence.  The final measure, signed into law on December 17, 2004, largely 
withheld from the newly established Director of National Intelligence means of 
control of more than 80 percent of the intelligence budget allocated to the Department 
of Defense.20    
Though commentators have noted gains under the legislation, Commission 
members and the activist survivor families remained critical of the reforms.  A series 
of reports issued under the aegis of a non-profit group the Commissioners established 
to lobby Congress after the investigation’s official disbandment call attention to 
inadequacies in the new intelligence framework.  Despite the novel attempt at 
extending their influence through a private body, the 9/11 Public Discourse Project’s 
final “report card” found flaws in the existing system and noted that a number of the 
Commission’s other recommendations had not been implemented.   A year and a half 
after issuing its 567-page report, the Commission’s impact was decidedly mixed.21  
Its ability to frame what caused 9/11, and to install its own vision of reform in th
national security system, remained partial.   
e 
                                                
 
Commissions and the National Security State  
 
 The National Commission on the Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States 
embodies the very model of a crisis commission.  It was empanelled with senior 
members of both parties to examine the largest breakdown of the national security 
state in more than a generation.  For nearly two years, it investigated the diverse 
 
20 Instead, the Director was granted limited personnel powers and the ability to unilaterally re-program 
5 percent of agency budgets. 
21 9/11 Public Discourse Project, “Final Report on 9/11 Commission Recommendations,” December 5, 
2005. 
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failures that occurred inside the government and imagined how to remake national 
security institutions to prevent future attacks.  Yet its findings and 
recommendations—including its framing of why 9/11 happened—were contested on 
multiple levels.  The commission’s influence was ultimately diluted, and Congress 
failed to enact many of the reforms it recommended.  Five years after its final report 
was issued, what can be said about the 9/11 Commission attempt to fix the national 
security state?  What, more generally, does its experience reveal about the ability of 
crisis commissions to diagnose, and remedy, the causes of catastrophic national 
security breakdowns?   
Commissions are presumed to be ideal vehicles to investigate disaster and 
promulgate reform precisely because of their independence from vested interests.  
Conceived as truth machines that stand above politics, their use implies a linear model 
in which disaster is investigated, understood, and reforms to prevent a recurrence are 
issued and adopted.  By overcoming the ability of government officials to stonewall 
or deflect blame, commissions speak “truth to power” in a way that can create 
moments of honest democratic reckoning.  Their dispassionate rationality and 
political independence allow them to see the world more clearly than the actors they 
investigate, and thereby to devise fair and prudent correctives that rebalance the 
functioning of government in the public interest. 
The 9/11 Commission illustrates many of these attributes of commissions even 
as it highlights vulnerabilities of the commission process and the linear model of 
investigation and reform it is predicated upon.  Commissions are undeniably powerful 
diagnostic instruments, but they are also instruments whose vision, agency, and 
understanding are rooted, to varying degrees, in the political culture that creates them.  
This rootedness leaves commissions susceptible to certain imperfections.  They can 
become captive to culturally dominant ways of seeing the world.  Their investigations 
can be restricted by political concerns.  At worst, powerful interests can employ 
commissions as instruments of damage control to avoid the very public accounting 
they are chartered to bring.   
Lurking behind the image of the “crisis commission,” and commissions more 
generally, are thus two possible incarnations: the “ideal” commission and the “co-
opted” commission.  Commissions are of course rarely one or the other, but rather 
display a mix of attributes.  Understanding how commissions are susceptible to 
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political interests, and the ways in which they can resist co-option, is of analytic 
interest. 
In addition to being subject to political influence, a second paradox lurks.  
Commissions are by definition temporary entities that operate with a minimum of 
structure and procedure.  At the same time, they are entrusted in times of crisis with 
effecting far-reaching changes among entrenched interests that remain in place long 
after commissions themselves disband.  Except in rare cases, commissions have no 
formal authority to see through their own recommendations or to evaluate, at a later 
date, whether the failures they pinpointed have been corrected.  As one-shot 
diagnostic and therapeutic instruments, there is a mismatch between commissions and 
the institutions of government they seek to influence, raising the question of how 
something so evanescent can catalyze enduring change.   
Commissions, then, face structural obstacles in both their diagnostic and 
therapeutic functions.  More than of passing interest, these obstacles constrain their 
use as democratic mechanisms to understand, and learn from, disaster.  Studying the 
nature of post-disaster inquiry is thus an important step in mapping how 
organizational and social learning occurs in advanced technological democracies, 
whose complex systems are inherently disposed to breakdown.   
In order to study the politics of disaster and reform as they exist in the first 
decade of the 21st century, this dissertation examines the attempts of two crisis 
commissions—the Space Shuttle Columbia Accident Investigation Board and Iraq 
Study Group—to fix breakdowns in the national security state.  The 9/11 
Commission, which is not studied in-depth, is used as conceptual backdrop to these 
two cases.   
Despite the seminal role that crisis commissions play in addressing failures of 
state institutions, comparatively little work has been done to probe their inner 
workings, or understand how the conduct of their investigation relates to the long-
term impact of their recommendations.  In order to trace the “democratic re-
engineering” that commissions underwrite, this dissertation will examine the sources 
of agency and constraint in the diagnostic and therapeutic phases of a commission’s 
life.  Questions driving the inquiry include: 
 
x What is required for a commission to produce a framing that is accurate and 
powerful? 
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x Are crisis commissions able to translate the moment of democratic reckoning 
they stand for into long-lasting reform?   
x What are the dynamics of investigation and reform, and what are the 
limitations to structural change, in the complex socio-technical systems of the 
national security state? 
 
By using commissions as a vehicle to explore larger processes of social 
learning, the dissertation will reach conclusions about the governing of advanced 
technological democracies as well as the prospects for achieving higher levels of 
reliability in state institutions that maintain our security.  Through studying the nature 
of modern politics and the complex systems of modern statecraft, the dissertation 
aims to contribute to democratic theory and to our understanding of modernity. 
 
Case Selection: Three Disasters, Three Commissions  
 
 The 9/11 Commission is without question the most prominent crisis 
commission in over a generation.  In the first decade of the 21st century, two other 
events also prompted the establishment of nationally visible crisis commissions.  The 
trajectories of all three commissions exhibit striking parallels.  
Sixteen months after 9/11 a less cataclysmic though still shocking jolt to the 
national consciousness occurred when the nation awoke to the loss of its second space 
shuttle.  The unmistakable signature of the orbiter Columbia disintegrating high in the 
east Texas sky on February 1, 2003 shattered the confident assurances given in the 
aftermath of the shuttle Challenger accident in 1986 that new safety practices meant 
American astronauts would never again come to grief.22   
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) had already laid 
provisions for an outside investigation to account for the loss of a shuttle, and a 
standing board of nonpartisan government officials arrived on scene the following 
day.  The accident board hired an immediate staff of 140 and launched what became 
the largest accident investigation in history.  News of the investigation’s undertakings 
often joined coverage of the 9/11 Commission on the front page of newspapers 
                                                 
22NASA headquarters officials trumpeted a five-fold improvement in safety due to post-Challenger 
reforms.  Columbia Accident Investigation Board Final Report (Washington, D.C.: Government 
Printing Office, 2003), 101. 
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nationwide, turning 2003 into a signal year for inspecting the mechanics of 
governmental institutions that so often remain unseen. 
Like the 9/11 Commission, the Columbia investigation reached conclusions 
about what caused the accident at several causal levels.  The investigation cited a 
chunk of falling foam that struck a hole in Columbia’s left wing as the physical cause, 
but saw this technical breakdown as the last link in a chain of causes that included 
Richard Nixon’s 1972 electoral calculus of backing funding for spaceflight and the 
legacy of Apollo in NASA’s organizational culture.  Also like the 9/11 Commission, 
the Columbia investigation’s impact was mixed.  The space shuttle returned to flight 
twenty-three months later, but shortly after blasting off from Cape Canaveral a chunk 
of insulating foam tore loose from the external tank and cart-wheeled within inches of 
the orbiter Discovery’s right wing.  The foam debris was strikingly similar to the 
piece that caused the loss of Columbia two years before.  Later analysis showed that 
NASA’s first post-accident launch escaped catastrophe by only seconds.23  The exact 
accident NASA and the Columbia Board labored to prevent nearly reoccurred, and for 
the second time in three years NASA indefinitely grounded its shuttle fleet.24   
A third high profile inquiry arose in 2006, and it too promulgated its 
recommendations with limited success.  The Iraq Study Group, appointed by 
Congress to review the Bush administration’s war policy and to chart a new strategy, 
became the first commission to contemporaneously access the intelligence 
assessments of a sitting President.25  The study group effectively constituted a parallel 
foreign policy apparatus whose staff and volunteer advisory teams were equivalent in 
size to the National Security Council’s own Iraq team.  When its report was released, 
more Americans approved of the Iraq Study Group’s prescriptions than the 
President’s policies, with an astonishing seventy-nine percent of the public supporting 
its key recommendation to gradually withdraw troops and reorient the U.S. mission to 
train Iraq’s security services.26   
                                                 
23 Had the foam debris flaked off earlier in the ascent, higher atmospheric pressure would have 
transported it directly into the fragile carbon panels that compose the wing’s leading edge.  For a 
technical discussion of the debris incidents on the ascent of STS-114, see NASA, “External Tank Tiger 
Team Report—Part I: Preliminary Status and Data Package,” October 7, 2005. 
24 “NASA Grounds Shuttle Fleet,” CNN, July 28, 2005. 
25 Although formed in response to a policy failure that amounted to a disaster rather than a disaster per 
se, the study group is nevertheless an exercise in investigating a breakdown in the national security 
state and for that reason can be treated as a post-disaster inquiry. 
26 Peter Baker and Jon Cohen, “Americans Say U.S. is Losing War,” The Washington Post, December 
13, 2006. 
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Despite its power to capture the public attention, the study group’s most 
important recommendations—much like the 9/11 Commission—were soon 
superseded by the President’s own plan, an escalation of force known as the 
“surge.”27  Congress, however, wrote into law some of the study group’s other 70-
plus recommendations, while the administration adopted still more—yielding a 
complex verdict on the commission’s ultimate influence on U.S. policy.   
In order to deepen our understanding of the politics of disaster and reform, this 
dissertation embarks on an empirical study of the Columbia investigation and Iraq 
Study Group, neither of which has yet been subject to extensive academic analysis.28  
Once developed, these cases are then put into conversation with the already 
substantial literature on the 9/11 Commission in order to yield, in the dissertation’s 
conclusion, a broader comparative analysis of the role of crisis commissions in 
reforming the entrenched structures of the national security state.  
The selection of the Columbia investigation and Iraq Study Group as objects 
of comparative study is driven by several considerations.  First, each meets the 
definition in the literature for a crisis commission, which is defined as an ad hoc panel 
constituted to study and report upon extraordinary policy failures, scandals, or 
disasters of national significance.29  Each carried out investigations at the highest 
levels of government, as well as programs of reform that subsequently dominated 
Congress and the Executive branch.  In this way each constitutes what historians call 
a site of memory, or contested space in the social consciousness where collective 
learning and public policy making occur.30 
                                                 
27 White House Press Release, “Fact Sheet: New Way Forward in Iraq,” January 10, 2007; and 
National Security Council, “Highlights of the Iraq Strategy Review,” January 2007, 11. 
28 One popular book has a partial account of the investigation, Michael Cabbage and William 
Harwood, Comm Check: The final Flight of the Shuttle Columbia, (New York: Free Press, 2004). 
29 Here, I follow Amy Zegart and Jordan Tama’s definitional work.  Tama defines a commission as “an 
ad hoc advisory panel with two more people—including at least one private citizen—mandated by an 
official act of the federal government to produce a report within four years.  The commission must be a 
corporate body with a public identity, but must not be a standing or continuing panel, and must not 
have formal or proposal or policymaking power.”   Tama further defines crisis commissions as those 
that arise in response to prominent public controversies or events.  Jordan Tama, “The Policy Influence 
of U.S. National Security Advisory Commissions,” Conference Paper, American Political Science 
Association Annual Meeting, September 1, 2007, 3.  Zegart is careful to differentiate ad hoc 
investigatory commissions from other policy-making bodies that are also called commissions, such as 
the Federal Trade Commission.  See Amy B. Zegart “Blue Ribbons, Black Boxes: Toward a Better 
Understanding of Presidential Commissions,” Presidential Studies Quarterly 35 No. 2 (June 2004), 
368. 
30 Historians employ the term “site of memory” to reference places, both real, in discourse, and 
imagined, such as works of literature or art, where communities repose and reify their memories of 
significant past events.  Sheila Jasanoff notes that “the construction of memory is integral to the 
11  
Indeed, by almost every measure, the 9/11 Commission, Columbia 
investigation, and Iraq Study Group constitute the three largest, most visible, and 
most consequential inquiries in the first decade of the 21st century.  The 9/11 
Commission, which received more television news coverage than the Iraq war 
between July and December 2004, employed a staff of 87 and cost $15 million.31  The 
Columbia investigation is the single largest accident investigation in history.  It 
employed 140 staff, 400 supporting engineers, and 10,000 debris searchers that 
together cost half a billion dollars.32  The Iraq Study Group, while numerically 
smaller in budget and personnel, occupied just as prominent a position in the national 
consciousness.  Its report, which shaped the Iraq debate for more than a year, became 
a New York Times bestseller.33 
Deeper parallels exist among the three commissions that enable broader 
theorizing about the nature of governance in modern technological states.  Border 
security, war-making capability, and space launch and recovery are fundamental to 
U.S. national identity and important sources of political power, both domestically and 
abroad.  Breakdowns in each of these areas threatened the American state’s standing 
as a sovereign power capable of wielding sophisticated technology in the national 
interest.  Moreover, investigations these breakdowns set in motion cut to the heart of 
the organs of executive power that control the institutions of national security.34   In 
the U.S. federal system, the institutions of the national security state are characterized 
                                                                                                                                           
process of learning, and that public policy—which is often based on an authoritative analysis of past 
events—therefore can be seen as an important site of memory in modern societies.”  Jasanoff, 
“Restoring Reason: Causal Narratives and Political Culture,” in Bridget Hutter and Michael Power, 
eds. Organizational Encounters with Risk (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005. 
31 Amy Zegart, Spying Blind: The CIA, the FBI, and the Origins of 9/11 (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2007), 179. 
32 Columbia Accident Investigation Board Final Report (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing 
Office, 2003), Appendix B. 
33 The report was ranked number five for non-fiction paperbacks in January 2007.  Dan Ephron, “Iraq 
Study Group: The Forgotten Men: Bush Ignored Many of the Key Baker-Hamilton Recommendations, 
But They’re Not Dead Yet,” Newsweek, January 29, 2007. 
34 Following its use in the historical and political science literatures, I use the term “national security 
state” to reference the complex of government institutions designed to safeguard the homeland, protect 
American interests abroad, and project military power.  These institutions, originally codified in the 
National Security Act of 1947, have grown to encompass not only the armed forces and intelligence 
community, but also law enforcement agencies with an international outlook or mandate, bureaus in the 
Departments of Justice, Treasury, and Commerce concerned with security related matters, FISA and 
National Security Courts, and the administrative and legislative organs that oversee them.  I also 
consider NASA as part of the National Security State, given the historic and contemporary ways in 
which power in space is related to diplomacy and national security.  The term “national security state” 
arose to described the concentration of security related power and surveillance in the post-World War 
II American government, and is often used to caution against creating an Orwellian dystopia in the 
name of protecting freedom.  
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by a high degree of centralization and political autonomy, organizational features that 
were accentuated with the arrival of the nuclear age, when command and control 
systems became more tightly coupled to the executive than ever before.35  
Commissions investigating the national security state are thus confronting historically 
singular centers of executive power whose means of control over both foreign and 
domestic policy pose new challenges to the governance of advanced democracies.36  
Commissions have emerged as one of the few credible counterweights to this 
concentration of power, heightening the imperative to understand their potential as a 
democratic tool for investigating the national security state. 
The aspects of state power associated with the national security state are 
furthermore characterized by complex systems in which ideology, large 
bureaucracies, and advanced technologies interact.  As will become clear, the national 
security state is, at its heart, a technological system, but one in which politics and 
ideology penetrate deeply.  It is this unique combination of political and material 
technologies, which extend far beyond the typical incorporation of social factors in 
technological systems, that gives rise to most breakdowns.37   
The three crisis commissions discussed in this dissertation are thus directly 
comparable to each other as democratic mechanisms confronting similar failures, and 
thus similar questions about the nature and regulation of risk, expertise, and oversight 
in the national security state.  Studying the three together—two in great detail, with 
conceptual reference to the third—will foster a deeper understanding about how 
advanced technological democracies govern the complex systems through which state 
power is increasingly exercised. 
 
Methodology and Research Design 
 
                                                 
35 For a recent historical analysis of the connection between nuclear command and control and 
executive power, see Gary Willis, Bomb Power: The Presidency and the Modern National Security 
State (New York: Penguin Press, 2010). 
36 For a historical overview, see Michael J. Hogan, A Cross of Iron: Harry S. Truman and the Origins 
of the National Security State, 1945-1954 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998).  For a 
liberal critique, see Jack Nelson-Pallmeyer, Brave New World Order: Must We Pledge Allegiance? 
(Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1992) and Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Secrecy: The American 
Experience (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999).   
37 See Sheila Jasanoff, “Restoring Reason: Causal Narratives and Political Culture,” in Bridget Hutter 
and Michael Power, eds. Organizational Encounters with Risk (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press, 2005. 
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How to study the process of post-disaster inquiry is an area of open debate in 
the literature.  Crisis commissions regularly appear on the American political scene, 
but variations in their structure, authority, and purpose introduce challenges to 
comparative analysis.  Most scholars studying commissions have therefore relied on 
case-study methods that emphasize qualitative research approaches.38  However, 
case-study research, on commissions as elsewhere, is often conducted in so specif
manner as to produce findings that cannot be easily generalized.
ic a 
                                                
39  As Charles Ragin 
and Howard Becker note, methodological clarity can be lacking unless the boundary 
of the case is well defined and its role in the larger study understood.40  As is further 
discussed in the literature review, few scholars apply the same categories and 
classifications to differentiate between types of commissions, their subject matter, and 
their function.41   
In contrast to the purely case-base approach, two scholars, Jordan Tama and 
Amy Zegart, have augmented qualitative studies of commissions with quantitative 
analysis of large-sample data sets.42  While their results help establish broad empirical 
regularities between select variables and the policy influence of commissions, the 
level of generality at which their work is situated is above many of the more subtle 
causal mechanisms that influence the investigation and reform phases of commission 
life.  Commissions are inherently unstable institutions.  Studying how they work, 
reach conclusions, and advocate for their views is to examine the intricacies of power 
struggles and the way knowledge fits into them.  Broad scale quantitative research is 
not well suited to capture this level of detail. 
Since the object of this dissertation is to examine the highly contextual 
environment in which crisis commission work and transmit their recommendations, 
employing a qualitative case study methodology attentive to the micro-politics of 
power is an appropriate choice.43  As Peter Hedstrom and Richard Swedberg suggest, 
 
38  Grounded theory and comparative analysis are the two most common methodological approaches.  
See Barney G. Glaser and Anselm L. Strauss, The Discovery of Grounded Theory: Strategies for 
Qualitative Research (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1967). 
39 Darin Weinberg, ed., Qualitative Research Methods (London: Blackwell Publishers, 2001). 
40 Charles Ragin and Howard Becker, What is a Case: Exploring the Foundations of Social Inquiry 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992). 
41 Amy B. Zegart “Blue Ribbons, Black Boxes: Toward a Better Understanding of Presidential 
Commissions,” Presidential Studies Quarterly 35 No. 2, (June 2004), 368. 
42 Tama and Zegart’s research are described at length in Chapter 1. 
43 The levels of analysis the dissertation seeks to elucidate are very much within Robert Merton’s 
middle range.  Robert Merton, “On Sociological Theories of the Middle Range,” Social Theory and 
Social Structure (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949, 1996). 
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social mechanisms are often best studied through small-n comparisons.44  This 
dissertation thus focuses in detail on two cases in order to establish, through thick 
description, an empirical basis for making larger claims about the dynamics of 
disaster and reform.  In this way the two commission histories are assembled not for 
their own sake, but in service of sociological and political theorizing.45 
 Emphasis on the identification and tracing of causal mechanisms in small-n case 
studies places the dissertation firmly within the methodology of process tracing.46  
Process tracing attempts to link possible causal mechanisms with observed outcomes 
by traveling back in time to identify key events and dynamics and then to show how 
these hypothesized causal mechanisms account for a case’s particular trajectory.47  
The method’s goal is to validate or discover certain causal mechanisms while ruling 
out others.48  Process tracing is ideal for capturing the unfolding of social action over 
time, where unobserved contextual variables shape thought and action in significant 
ways.49 
 Timothy Ruback and others have established criteria for building case studies 
using the process tracing method.50  In an elegant metaphor relating the case narrative 
                                                 
44 Peter Hedstrom and Richard Swedberg, eds., Social Mechanisms: An Analytical Approach to Social 
Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). 
45 James Mahoney, Comparative-Historical Methodology, Annual Review of Sociology 2004 30:81-
101. 
46 Hillel David Soifer  “The Implications of Process-Tracing for Case Selection in Comparative 
Research Designs,” Paper prepared for presentation at the 2006 Meetings of the American Political 
Science, Association, Washington DC, 
http://www.asu.edu/clas/polisci/cqrm/APSA2006/Soifer_Process_Tracing.pdf. 
47 See George, Alexander L. and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social 
Sciences. (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005) and Alexander L. George and Timothy J. McKeown, 
"Case Studies and Theories of Organizational Decision Making." Advances in Information Processing 
in Organizations 2: 21-58, 1985. 
48 Tulia G. Falleti, “Theory-Guided Process-Tracing in Comparative Politics: Something Old, 
Something New,” American Association of Political Science Newsletter, Fall 2006, 
http://www.polisci.upenn.edu/~falleti/Falleti-CP-APSANewsletter06-TGPT.pdf, 5. 
49 The method emerged to study social phenomena in which causality is opaque or characterized by 
complex interaction effects, and cannot be easily addressed by selecting cases that control for some 
factors but not others—the classic principle of comparative analysis as laid out by J.S. Mill.   In this 
way process tracing emphasizes the identification of causal mechanisms rather than correlation of 
causal effects between cases. See James Mahoney, "Path dependence in historical sociology." Theory 
and Society 29 (4) (2000) 507-548 and Tulia G. Falleti, “Theory-Guided Process-Tracing in 
Comparative Politics: Something Old, Something New,” American Association of Political Science 
Newsletter, Fall 2006, http://www.polisci.upenn.edu/~falleti/Falleti-CP-APSANewsletter06-TGPT.pdf. 
50 Ruback’s six criteria of process tracing are: 1. Theoretical and methodological choices cannot be 
hidden in the narrative.  Reasons for focusing one’s gaze on one actor rather than another, for 
following one trail of evidence rather than another must be self-conscious and explicit.  2. Narratives 
should proceed from a clearly bounded, theoretically and practically defensible beginning to a clearly 
bounded, theoretically and practically defensible end point.  3. Narratives should not allow for 
disruptions in narrative time, or significantly shift their focus. 4. A good narrative will make clear what 
sort of supporting evidence it requires. 5. A good narrative should provide enough detailed evidence, 
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to its theoretical explanation, Ruback states that “process-trace should be to historical 
narrative what the Centre Pompidou is to architecture—a construction in which the 
inner workings are on the surface, for all to see.”51  Making theorizing explicit is the 
method’s key imperative.  Doing so enables other researchers to confirm or refute 
hypothesized causal mechanisms, and thereby to independently replicate the study, a 
critical methodological goal of social science research. 
  With process tracing as its dominant methodology, the dissertation confronts 
the question of how to structure the cases and collect evidence in a way that 
maximizes within-case theorizing and comparative analysis between the cases.  To 
facilitate both objectives, the empirical review of the Columbia investigation and Iraq 
Study Group will separately analyze each inquiry’s diagnostic/investigative phase and 
the therapeutic/recommendation phase that follows.   
Each case thus begins with the event that prompted the crisis commission and 
moves to the formation of the investigation—its staff, leadership, resources, 
procedures, and outlook.  It continues through the duration of the diagnostic phase—
how the commission framed what failed, established the failure’s causes, and 
conceived of remedial actions.  Evidence collection in this phase is geared toward 
illustrating how the political environment from which the commission arose, as well 
as the expertise it employed, shapes its diagnoses of failure and hence attribution of 
cause.  Attention is also paid to how the commission conceived of its own ability to 
shape events and how this awareness feeds back into investigative practice and the 
formulation of recommendations.   
The second half of each case traces the commission’s therapeutic phase by 
following the implementation of its recommendations for 18 to 24 months.  The 
extent to which recommendations are taken up, either by Congress or by the 
Executive branch, as well as the degree to which they catalyze desired policy ends, 
constitute crucial tests of the ability of government institutions to implement 
                                                                                                                                           
with “covering law” connections to its hypothesis, that the reader would not be plagued by nagging 
doubts about other untold but possibly equally convincing narratives.  6. Consequently, a good 
explanatory narrative is a preframed narrative.  The choices made above presume a chooser who 
determines the limits of the narrative through a logic of conceptualization that is in place prior to and 
independent of writing.  See Timothy Ruback, “Let Me Tell the Story Straight On: Middlemarch, 
Process-Tracing Methods & the Creation of the Political Subject.” presented at the 48th annual meeting 
of the International Studies Association, Chicago, Illinois, 2007, 
http://www.timothyruback.net/middlemarch.pdf. 
51 Timothy Ruback , “Let Me Tell the Story Straight On: Middlemarch, Process-Tracing Methods & 
the Creation of the Political Subject,”11. 
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corrections.  The analytic focus in tracing the therapeutic phase is to examine how 
recommendations feed back into policymaking, and to take measure of the 
commission’s ultimate impact over time.  Together, the two-part case studies enable 
broader theorizing about the social mechanisms that drive disaster investigation and 
reform. 
 
Data Collection 
 
 Data collection included the gathering and analysis of primary and secondary 
documentary sources, interviews with key participants, and opportunistic collection, 
including ethnography, conducted during two stints of government service.  My data 
gathering process, as well as the circumstances of the opportunistic collection that 
forms much of the basis for each case, is further detailed in Appendix A. 
The commission reports, which constitute unusually rich primary sources, 
were consulted first.  Scholarly commentary and journalistic coverage of the 
commissions themselves and the subsequent reform efforts they launched provided 
important contextual information.  Interviews with key participants, including 
commission members and staff, government officials, reporters, and policy analysts, 
constitute the third and in many ways most important source of information.  To 
identify interviewees and critical documents, I employed a snowball methodology in 
which participants referred me to other relevant people and sources of information.   
Fieldwork was undertaken in stages.  Research for the Columbia case, as 
described in the appendix, is substantially based on an ethnography drawn from my 
service, from March to October 2003, as editor of the Columbia investigation’s 
official report.  I wrote the ethnography and conducting research on the Return to 
Flight Task Group in 2005 and early 2006.  The Iraq Study Group case draws in part 
on my experience serving on staff of the Special Inspector General for Iraq 
Reconstruction from April 2006 to February 2009.  Research on the Iraq Study Group 
began informally in 2006 but was largely completed after I left government service in 
2009.52  For validation purposes, two subject matter experts reviewed the case 
studies.53  
                                                 
52 My early impressions of the Iraq Study Group are no doubt influenced by my contemporaneous 
service at the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, where I was the lead writer of a U.S. 
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Disasters and dramatic policy failures are an enduring feature of the modern 
world.  This dissertation attempts to chronicle the life and aftermath of two of the 
commissions that study them, and to relate these case studies to the existing literature 
on the 9/11 Commission, all with an eye towards building an account amenable to 
deeper theorizing.  Through original empirical research and comparative analysis, the 
dissertation seeks to extend our understanding of the relationship between disaster, 
investigation, and the reform of institutionalized power.  It affords the opportunity to 
advance our understanding of how societies collectively learn—and fail to learn—
from disaster.   
 
official history entitled Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience (Washington, D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, 2009). 
53 Dr. Dwayne Day, a space historian with the National Academy of Science, reviewed the Columbia 
case study.  Dr. Jordan Tama, a Princeton scholar who studies national security commissions, reviewed 
the case study on the Iraq Study Group. 
 Chapter 1 
 
Commissions: History, Theory, Social Learning 
 
 
Despite the seminal role crisis commissions play in social learning about 
disaster and policy failure, the literature on their use as instruments of government is 
notably thin.  No consensus exists on whether or how they shape policy.  Especially 
when compared to the well-developed literature on executive and legislative behavior, 
the body of research on commissions, and the reform process they trigger, is 
comparatively modest.    
 
1.1 Literature on Commissions 
 
Historians have long recognized the role of commissions in the Anglo-
American tradition of government.54  Royal commissions given writ by the British 
crown date to at least 1494, and have proved instrumental in tasks as disparate as 
developing the civil service system to examining the country’s response to mad cow 
disease.55  The use of commissions crossed the Atlantic to the new American republic 
soon after its founding.  Ever since George Washington named a commission to 
investigate the Whisky Rebellion of 1794, American Presidents and legislatures have 
empanelled them to address a wide array of thorny political dilemmas, often in the 
aftermath of a traumatic event.  More recently, Congress moved to regularize 
procedures for certain types of commissions in the Federal Advisory Committee Act, 
which has been updated several times since its original passage in 1972.56  
                                                 
54 Two useful reviews of existing literature include Ronald C. Moe, Administrative Renewal: 
Reorganizations Commissions in the 20th Century (New York: University Press America, 2003) and 
Amy B. Zegart, “Blue Ribbons, Black Boxes: Toward a Better Understanding of Presidential 
Commissions,” Presidential Studies Quarterly 35 no. 2 (June 2004). 
55 Jonathan Simon, “Parrhesiastic Accountability: Investigatory Commissions and Executive Power in 
an Age of Terror,” Yale Law Journal, Vol. 114, 1427.  Book-length studies of the history of royal 
commissions include Charles J. Hanser, Guide to Decision: The Royal Commission (Totowa, NJ: The 
Bedminster Press, 1965), Richard A. Chapman, ed., The Role of Commissions in Policy-Making 
(London: George Allen and Unwin, 1973), Gerald Rhodes, Committees of Inquiry (London: George 
Allen and Unwin, 1975), and TJ. Cartwright, Royal Commissions and Departmental Committees in 
Britain (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1975). 
56 Mark Fenster, “Designing Transparency: The 9/11 Commission and Institutional Form,” Whitepaper, 
10.  Available online at: http://works.bepress.com/mark_fenster/6/, accessed November 23, 2008. 
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Commissions have so proliferated in Britain that the House of Commons recently 
undertook a “public inquiry of public inquiries” to appraise how Parliament could 
become a more skilled user of them.57   
Sociologists first considered the impact of commissions more than a century 
ago. Max Weber singled out the effectiveness of investigatory commissions in his 
seminal work on public institutions.  “The bureaucracy, out of a sure power instinct,” 
Weber wrote, “fights every attempt of the parliament to gain knowledge by means of 
its own experts or from interest groups.  The so-called right of parliamentary 
investigation is one of the means by which parliament seeks such knowledge.”58  
Since Weber’s analysis, a small number of scholars have broadened our 
understanding of commission behavior.  Most of the literature on their use in the U.S. 
system concerns presidential or congressional commissions that address controversial 
public policy topics or political scandals rather than catastrophes or policy failures.  
This literature, furthermore, remains divided on fundamental points, such as whether 
commissions are best conceived as a delay tactic used by the President or Congress to 
preserve the status quo or are an effective avenue of governmental transformation.59   
More celebratory strains of scholarship emphasize the ability of commissions 
to see for the public and to reach consensus unconstrained from ordinary political 
interests.  Thomas Wolanin’s foundational 1975 analysis found presidential 
commissions to be instruments of “innovative presidential leadership” that generally 
facilitated government reform.60  Wolanin concluded that, at their best, commissions 
operate from “above the political fray.”  As one legal scholar writes, “a commission 
can reach—or can appear to reach—conclusions that are unaffected by the powerful 
private interests, personal self-interests, and ideological biases that influence 
politically-driven policy decisions.”61   
Ronald Moe’s 2003 study of administrative reorganizations, which traces the 
attempts of eleven commissions to improve bureaucratic control and management, 
                                                 
57 “Government by Inquiry,” First Report of Session 2004-05, Vol. I, Public Administration Select 
Committee, House of Commons, United Kingdom, HC 51-1 (February 3, 2005). 
58 Max Weber, “Bureaucracy,” in H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (trans. and ed.), From Max Weber 
(New York: Galaxy, 1946). 
59 See Kenneth Kitts, Presidential Commissions & National Security: The Politics of Damage Control 
(Boulder: Lynn Publishers, 2006) and Kenneth Kitts, Presidential Commission and National Security 
Issues, Ph.D. Dissertation, University of South Carolina, 1995. 
60 Thomas R. Wolanin, Presidential Advisory Commissions: Truman to Nixon, (Madison: University of 
Wisconsin Press, 1975), 28. 
61 Mark Fenster, “Designing Transparency: The 9/11 Commission and Institutional Form,” whitepaper, 
45.  Available online at: http://works.bepress.com/mark_fenster/6/, accessed November 23, 2008, 7. 
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generally echoes Wolanin’s optimistic assessment of their instrumental value.62  Moe 
describes the pivotal role commissions play in mediating competition for control 
between Congress and the Executive branch.  Similarly, Colton Campbell’s 2002 
study of congressional commissions concludes they help achieve consensus on 
controversial bills.63  Like interest groups, commissions produce expert research and 
testimony that, as Kevin Esterling documents in his 2004 study on the political 
economy of expertise, help legislatures enact policies more likely to succeed.64    
Alongside this more celebratory strain of commission scholarship, studies 
have also traced commissions’ limitations, including the ways in which they become 
politically co-opted.  One of the earliest book-length treatments of investigatory 
commissions documents the relationship between a commission and its political 
environment.  Edward Jay Epstein’s 1966 study Inquest: The Warren Commission 
and the Establishment of Truth establishes how external pressures frequently subvert 
the process of fact-finding and analysis that is a commission’s marquee feature.  
Because “a government inquiry does not take place in a vacuum,” Epstein writes, but 
instead faces a number of countervailing pressures, the resulting investigation is often 
partial, producing what Epstein terms “political truth,” a step-child of factual truth.65  
In their detailed case study of the Kerner Commission on civil disorder, Michael 
Lipsky and David Olsen similarly document how the affiliations of commission 
members and the commission’s own political needs constrain commission behavior.  
Chief among the constraints was the need to maintain good relations, during the 
investigative phase, with political and civic officials who will implement the 
commission’s recommendations after its disbandment.66 
 Other scholars question whether commissions can be ultimately efficacious 
given all the constraints they face.  Daniel Byman points to the short window of 
impact commissions have and the ease with which entrenched interests can withstand 
                                                 
62 Ronald C. Moe Administrative Renewal: Reorganizations Commissions in the 20th Century (New 
York: University Press America, 2003).  For cogent criticism of Moe’s methodology, see Michelle L. 
Chin’s review of it in Presidential Studies Quarterly, September 2004, 704-706. 
63 Colton C. Campbell, Discharging Congress: Government by Commission (Westport, Conn: Praeger 
Press, 2009). 
64 Kevin M. Esterling, The Political Economy of Expertise: Information and Efficiency in American 
National Politics (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2004).  
65 Edward Jay Epstein, Inquest: The Warren Commission and the Establishment of Truth (New York: 
Viking Press, 1966), xvi, 153. 
66 Michael Lipsky and David J. Olson, “Riot Commission Politics,” Transaction 6 (July/August 1969), 
9-21 and Commission Politics: The Processing of Racial Crisis in America (New Brunswisk, NJ: 
Transaction Publishers, 1977).  See also Lipsky and Olson, “Sins of Commission,” The American 
Prospect Online, June 17, 2001.  
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called-for changes.67  Ken Kitts, while extolling their virtues, sees national security 
commissions primarily as damage control devices through which Presidents manage 
the political consequences of unforeseen events.68  This use of presidential 
commissions became a minor issue in the 2008 presidential campaign when John 
McCain, the Republican candidate then struggling to demonstrate his command of 
economic issues, called for a commission to study the unfolding financial crisis.  
"We're going to need a '9/11 Commission' to find out what happened and what needs 
to be fixed," he said.69  In response, then-Senator Barack Obama’s campaign accused 
McCain of trying to practice damage control.  "The last thing we need is a 
commission to study a problem that everyone but John McCain knows is the result of 
the failed economic policies he has championed for the last 26 years," an Obama 
campaign statement said.70  The future President characterized McCain’s call for a 
commission as “the oldest Washington stunt in the book.”71 
Yet another strain of scholarship examines commission form and function.  
Given the wide variety of tasks that commissions perform, one legal scholar likened 
them to “political stem cells” that emerge from every organ of government, yet 
develop into very different shapes.72  Several scholars have derived specific 
typologies.  David Flitner, writing in the mid-1980s, argues that commissions fall into 
three broad categories: procedure-oriented commissions, which examine government 
organization and process; situation-oriented commissions, which address 
controversial social phenomena; and crisis-oriented commissions, which respond to 
specific events.73  Building on Flitner’s taxonomy, Amy Zegart traces how 
Presidential commissions on domestic issues differ from those on foreign policy.  
Zegart’s 2004 study classifies commissions into three types: agenda commissions, 
which generate support for presidential initiatives among a mass audience; 
information commissions, which seek to transform the views of other government 
officials by presenting new facts and analysis; and constellation commissions, which 
                                                 
67 Daniel L. Byman, “Even the Wise Men Can’t Save Us in Iraq,” Washington Post, December 3, 2006. 
68 Kenneth Kitts, Presidential Commissions & National Security: The Politics of Damage Control 
(Boulder: Lynn Publishers, 2006). 
69 Rick Klein, “McCain Blames Greed for Wall St. Crisis; Obama Blames GOP.” ABC News, 
September 16, 2008. 
70 “McCain divided over $85B AIG bailout.” USA Today (AP), September 17, 2008. 
71 Terence Hunt and Glen Johnson, “McCain’s Call for Crisis Commissions “Oldest Washington stunt 
in the book,” Associated Press, September 16, 2008. 
72 Jonathan Simon, “Parrhesiastic Accountability: Investigatory Commissions and Executive Power in 
an Age of Terror,” Yale Law Journal, Vol. 114, 1427. 
73 David Flitner, Jr., The Politics of Presidential Commissions: A Public Policy Perspective (Dobbs 
Ferry, NY: Transnational Publishers, 1986). 
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are designed to foster consensus among competing interests.74  In his study of 
national security commissions, Princeton doctoral candidate Jordan Tama redu
typology to either “agenda commissions” or “crisis commissions.”
ces this 
                                                
75   
Scholars have also examined the norms and processes through which 
commissions conduct investigations and organize their deliberation.  The legal scholar 
Mark Fenster notes that they serve as both an agent of their creator and also as an 
administrator in their own right.  In this way commissions are not passive agents but 
rather frequently determine their own structure, which in turn shapes their norms of 
practice and worldview.  Commissions, in Fenser’s analysis, are thereby endowed 
with a great deal of independence in carrying out their mandate.76  Fenster also notes 
that the success of a commission is not predicated solely on the credibility of its 
findings or influence on policy debate.  Equally important is the extent to which 
commissions embrace in their operations the normative and procedural values 
common to public institutions.77  A commission’s influence, in Fenster’s view, is the 
product of its ability to demonstrate expertise, due process, and procedural 
independence. 
Building on Fenster’s insight that how commissions operate is as important as 
what they find, the legal scholar Adrian Vermeule suggests four core values of 
democratic constitutionalism apply to a commission’s investigative process: 
impartiality, accountability, transparency, and deliberation.78  Commissions able to 
demonstrate their adherence to these values achieve “democratic success,” and along 
with it the legitimacy that enables their recommendations to be taken credibly.  
Vermeule’s analysis suggests that successful commissions strive to demonstrate their 
commitment to these values.  Few studies, however, have explored how these values 
are instantiated in commissions’ internal processes and whether adherence to them 
actually enables commissions to resist political pressure or bolster their policy 
influence.  As the sociologist Diane Vaughn writes in an article on the “Social 
 
74 Amy Zegart, “Blue Ribbons, Black Boxes: Toward a Better Understanding of Presidential 
Commissions,” Presidential Studies Quarterly 34, No 2 (June, 2004), 366-393. 
75 Jordan Tama, “The Policy Influence of U.S. National Security Advisory Commissions,” Conference 
Paper, American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, September 1, 2007, 11.  Cited with 
permission. 
76 Mark Fenster, “Designing Transparency: The 9/11 Commission and Institutional Form,” whitepaper, 
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Shaping of Commission Reports,” “little comparative work has been done on their 
internal processes and report construction.”79 
 
The Struggle for Policy Influence 
 
How commissions influence branches of government they sit outside is 
another question the literature addresses.  Scholars have long noted how being 
constituted outside the mechanisms of policy-making frequently leaves commission 
recommendations in political limbo.  Commission authority typically extends only to 
issuing a report, after which it disbands.  Except in the rarest of circumstance, 
commissions hold no direct authority for implementing the fixes they propose.  As a 
result, the products of their investigation do not easily articulate with the usual 
mechanisms of governmental enforcement.  Failure to effect desired change is a 
central theme.   
Although the literature identifies many impediments to commission influence, 
few political scientists or sociologists have systematically evaluated how successful 
commissions are at altering the operation of public institutions and the policies that 
guide them.  A 2009 study by Jordan Tama that examines fifty national security 
commissions issuing findings between 1981 and 2005 is the first to undertake a large-
scale statistical analysis of commission policy influence.  Tama specifically examines 
how the political context and structure of a commission correlates with the adoption 
of its recommendations.80  His findings suggest that roughly half of commissions’ key 
recommendations are adopted within two years.  By Tama’s count, nearly twice as 
many recommendations of crisis commissions are adopted as agenda commissions—a 
finding that is the first to quantify how a scandal or disaster accentuates policy 
influence.  His analysis further indicates that commissions are more successful when 
chartered to tackle problems of narrow scope and have fewer members with more 
prestigious reputations.81   
From his three-year study, Tama concludes commissions function as “a 
distinct form of political credibility” that enable the construction of policy “focal 
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points.”82  In Tama’s view, political credibility, as generated by the independence, 
stature, and ideological diversity of commissions members, is the primary source of 
their influence, not the ability to serve as a mediator of expertise. In perhaps his most 
striking claim, Tama advances the view that most commissions merely synthesize 
existing information and analysis.83  Tama accounts for this departure from settled 
wisdom by arguing that the proliferation of expert bodies such as the National 
Academy and RAND, a global policy think tank, means lawmakers are increasingly 
unlikely to call upon commissions to mediate expert knowledge.  
Although Tama’s research suggests commission recommendations are adopted 
at a high rate, adoption is not always synonymous with successful implementation.  
The study of commissions’ ultimate policy influence brings into focus the more 
general topic of how governmental reforms are implemented, a process first studied in 
detail by the political scientist Aaron Wildavsky.84  Rather than viewing 
implementation as the straightforward, unproblematic fulfillment of technocratic 
ends, Wildavsky sees it as a continuation of politics by other means.  The issuance of 
commission recommendations or passage of a reform bill does not constitute reform 
itself but rather marks the beginning of a new political struggle.  The true test of 
reform will occur as bureaucratic agents begin assembling the infrastructure that a 
reform calls for, a process frequently undercut by special interests, internal 
bureaucratic resistance, tokenism, and delay.  The reasons for resistance are easy to 
grasp.  To many individuals in a bureaucracy, organizational change entails a 
decrease in authority or historical prerogatives.  Resistance takes many forms, from 
appearing to acquiesce to the new policy but not carry out intended changes, to 
hijacking new resources for different ends.85  
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The political scientist Erik Patashnik expands upon Wildavsky’s scholarship 
by noting how the implementation process is predicated not merely on the 
construction of new policy regimes, but also on the disassembly of existing systems.86  
Patashnik has found that the continuing actions of elected officials, not just 
bureaucrats, matters tremendously to the success or failure of reform.  The literature 
on implementation further suggests that reform will occur differently in those 
agencies that have been cobbled together from once-independent units.  “Making a 
new agency from old cloth,” according to Peter May and Walter Williams, leads to a 
“fiefdom problem” in which powerful internal actors function as “dukes” and the 
agency head as “king.”87  Under this schemata, a number of agencies of the national 
security state, including the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and 
NASA, are candidates for the “fiefdom problem.”  The literature also suggests that 
external monitoring is a crucial variable in successful implementation.88  
 
1.2 Theories for Why Commissions Fail 
 
 Political scientists are not the only students of the failure of implementation.  
Commissions often find themselves studying why prior policy reforms failed to take 
hold or why the government was unable to anticipate new circumstances before 
disaster struck.  Commissions even frequently end up examining why prior 
commissions failed to achieve their aims. 
The prevailing explanation for governmental inaction in the face of looming 
catastrophe, proffered to an extent by investigations themselves and also articulated in 
the social science literature on organizational learning, is that a combination of 
bureaucratic inertia and structural impediments present barriers to organizational 
change.89  On one hand, studies in political science emphasize how powers of divided 
government and incentives of political actors rarely enable programs of reform to be 
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fully implemented.90  The inherent need for legislative compromise, narrow interests 
of elected officials, and weak oversight tools impose limitations on the rational 
redesign of government agencies.  Studies in organizational sociology in turn 
highlight resistance to change within organizations, showing how the internal 
dynamics of large institutions militate against large-scale realignments in which 
power, turf, and function are at stake.91  The literature’s conclusions are succinctly 
distilled in the Washington aphorism that it usually takes two disasters to fix 
institutional problems.   
Not all scholars assent to prevailing theories of governmental inaction.  
Academics in management studies often sound more hopeful notes about the capacity 
of individuals and institutions to respond to changing circumstances .92  Still other 
scholars posit deeper critiques of how knowledge about public disaster and policy 
failure is generated and received.  Constructivist critiques of accident investigations 
from sociology and science and technology studies suggest that investigations are 
motivated by political imperatives and the psychological effect of hindsight bias to 
overstate the degree to which disasters might be prevented.93  Sociologists studying 
technological systems add still a further caveat, viewing disasters as inherent 
consequences of risky technology and the complex organizations created to manage 
it.94  In this view, disasters are ‘normal.’95  To believe otherwise, normal accident 
theorists argue, is to fundamentally mischaracterize the nature of modern 
technological systems.  Commissions, according to this line of critique, often 
misunderstand the nature of the problem they face. 
Still other scholars argue that the very process by which disaster investigations 
gather evidence and frame issues dispose them to certain conclusions.  Science studies 
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scholar Sheila Jasanoff notes that the process of public truth-seeking is itself 
profoundly formed by habits of thought and ideological preferences that operate at the 
level of the nation-state.96  In her research, Jasanoff explores how nation-states offer 
competing models of rationality and judgment in their investigation of disaster.97  
Striking differences exist in standard operating procedure of Britain and U.S. 
commissions.  They include the form of inquiry (judicial vs. bipartisan commission), 
how authority is constituted (state-embodied, service based vs. pluralist, interest 
based), the way evidence is interrogated (assumption of trust vs. assumption of 
distrust) and how judgment is based (common sense empiricism vs. formal analytic 
methods).98   
Jasanoff terms “civic epistemology” the public expectations about the 
institutions and procedures through which policy-relevant knowledge is produced, 
framed, and evaluated.  Taking on board an understanding of civic epistemology 
enables a greater reflexivity about how assumptions and power relations are 
embedded in knowledge claims and institutional arrangements.  To grasp the styles of 
reasoning operating in a political culture or specific institutions, such as commissions, 
is to come to terms with how public knowledge is made and therefore how it can be 
used.  More reflexive institutions leverage their awareness of how they generate 
knowledge to identify weaknesses and blind spots, thereby preventing catastrophic 
outcomes before they occur. 
Constructivist scholars thus argue that post-hoc narratives of preventability 
that have become standard fare in commission investigations are encouraged by the 
ideology of science, public aversion to fatalism, and political expectation of arriving 
at a definitive cause.  A straightforward admission that most accidents are simply 
impossible to prevent is politically unpalatable, this line of critique argues, as is 
concentrating blame in the hands of powerful political actors.   
As a result of these rigidities, investigations tend to look elsewhere for cause, 
often finding it lodged deep inside institutions in the banality of bureaucratic 
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behavior.  The managerial and structural failures that investigators come ineluctably 
to finger take hold in the public mind not only because they are politically palatable to 
entrenched interests, but also because they meet deeply seated expectations about how 
disasters happen.99  Extreme proponents of this line of argument contend that the 9/11 
Commission recommendations are a reflection of the American public’s steadfast 
anti-fatalism in the face of terror attacks and received preference for centralizing 
control.  Similarly, in the case of the Challenger and Columbia shuttle investigations, 
the space shuttle’s totemic status as an emblem of national power, and the public’s 
need to believe that astronauts are not at serious risk, leads inevitably to the judgment 
that space accidents are preventable.100 
Constructivist scholars further note that the preferred way to address these 
bureaucratic failures is reorganization.  As the sociologists John Meyer and Brian 
Rowan argue in their classic work on symbolism and institutional organization, 
tremendous pressure is exerted on organizations to correspond to symbolic norms that 
may bear little relation to particular instrumental ends.101  Reorganization, in this 
view, is a cultural ritual that reaffirms sacred beliefs in efficiency and the ability to 
order human affairs, even if the actual reorganization achieves few material gains.  As 
James March and Johann Olsen articulated more than twenty years ago, 
reorganization “is part of the process by which a society develops an understanding of 
what constitutes a good society without necessarily being able to achieve it, and how 
alternative institutions may be imagined to contribute to such a world.”102 
Anthropologists take the symbolic analysis of post-disaster investigation still 
further.  Extending work first undertaken by Victor Turner on the ritualistic nature of 
conflict resolution, anthropological commentators highlight how political institutions 
work to rebuild social order in the aftermath of catastrophe.  Following Turner’s 
elucidation, disasters initiate a “social drama” in which obligations that underwrite the 
existing social order have been violated.103  In Turner’s four-part taxonomy, a breach 
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in the social order precipitates a crisis calling for redressive action, through which 
offending parties are reintegrated into the social hierarchy.  The subsequent crisis of 
authority calls for putative measures to be taken, which takes the institutional form of 
a public inquiry.   
When viewed as part of an unfolding “social drama,” the function of post-
accident inquiries is seen as part of a larger negotiation carried out in order to redress 
societal breakdowns.  The swinging into action of formal judicial and legal machinery 
whose work is conducted before the public eye functions to heal a breach in the social 
order.  Only after the performance of this public ritual can society bring closure to the 
trauma it experienced and begin the phase of reintegration and renewal. 
An important consequence of this view is the possibility that commissions are 
epiphenomenal to the process of reform.  Rather than conceived of as solely remaking 
government institutions and policies, commissions may instead be participating in a 
repair of the social order, a process that services other fundamental symbolic and 
democratic needs.  When viewed in this light, the frequent failure of commission 
recommendations to be implemented is more readily understood. 
Turner’s symbolic perspective is echoed by Stephen Hilgartner’s work, 
Science on Stage: Expert Advice as Drama.104  Hilgartner treats expert advice as 
performance, examining the social machinery used to resolve and close controversy 
as well as the techniques through which credibility is produced.  Routines, props, and 
procedures of self-presentation that are part of the stagecraft of public inquiry figure 
prominently in Hilgartner’s analysis, as does information control.  He charts how 
commissions selectively deploy these instruments to gain credibility and ensure the 
promulgation of expert consensus that ultimately holds public respect.  In Hilgartner’s 
estimation, successful commissions make full use of the performative dimensions of 
their operation. 
Other dramaturgical analyses take account of the multiple forms of testimony 
and public display in commission proceedings.  Jonathan Simon, for instance, notes a 
recent trend toward a mode of truth-telling in which affected individuals speak out 
using the power of their first-hand experience.105  Drawing on Foucault’s concept of 
“fearless speech,” or parrhesia, Simon analyzes the role victims of the 9/11 attacks 
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played in its public inquiry.106  He argues that the presence of victims transformed the 
9/11 Commission from merely prosecuting the “analytics of truth” into a more 
powerful assemblage in which emotional laden, frank testimonials and lobbying by 
the victims and their families greatly enhanced the commission’s political power.  
Because victims and lay people often lack expertise in the matters they seek to 
influence, critics contend that mixing parrhesia with traditional forms of inquiry 
constitutes an “amateurism run wild” that risks a perversion of the commission 
process.107 
 
1.3 Commissions and Social Learning 
 
 Whatever the symbolic functions of investigative commissions, employing 
them and implementing their recommendations is by its very nature a process of 
collective learning.  To trace the politics of disaster and reform is, in essence, to 
examine how societies learn.   
Learning is a central focus of social science, and also one of its most 
methodologically challenging subjects of inquiry.  The literature primarily defines 
learning as generating new knowledge, skills, ways of thinking, or modes of social 
organization.108  Debates about learning concern its ontological nature, including who 
or what learns; the mechanisms by which it occurs; and how change driven by 
learning can be differentiated from change driven by other factors.109 One scholar 
went so far as to describe the cluster of conceptual issues involved in studying 
learning as a “conceptual minefield.”110   
Sociologists and political scientists studying learning in organizations are 
forced to confront the level of social aggregation at which learning occurs.  Some 
view learning as a process that is rooted primarily in individuals, while others posit 
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that systematic learning also occurs in organizations, or even large-scale structures, 
such as the nation-state or international system.111  Scholars of public policy and 
public administration typically study learning at more intermediate levels.  Policy 
formulation and political action typically occur within smaller-scale social structures 
where individuals are interacting collectively in organizations or through networks.112  
Units of learning within political structures have been a particular focus of inquiry.  
The notion of an “epistemic community” has emerged to describe the network of 
experts involved in a policy enterprise who share normative beliefs, causal models, 
and notions of empirical validity.113  Disaggregating institutions into causal units, and 
understanding their relation to each other and to dominant ideologies, is a vital task 
both of commissions and those who seek to study their effects.  Commissions thus 
study processes of learning in organizations even as they participate in social learning 
at the societal level. 
Closely connected to studies of organizational learning is the more general 
question of how ideas are transmitted into politics.114  One causal mechanism that has 
proved particularity powerful to the study of political science and sociology is the 
idea of frames.  Frames are more than angles of visions.  They are entire schemes of 
interpretation that shape how situations are viewed.  Frames in this way embed 
assumptions about the world and the way it is supposed to work.115  Organizations 
come to embody frames and the ideas and assumptions they comprise at many levels.  
Commissions, then, must be attentive to the frames that reside in institutions and the 
individuals who work within them.  Sociologists from Weber onward have studied 
how frames, ideas, and behaviors are inculcated in institutions through processes of 
group socialization, routinization, and standardization.  All of these social processes 
have been shown to be active in causing disasters and shaping the learning that occurs 
in their aftermath.116 
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What motivates learning also helps determine how it will occur.  Diane 
Vaughan argues that the process of institutional learning after a disaster is 
fundamentally experienced-based learning in which the future is anticipated based on 
past history.117  In this way, risk and the rules and procedures designed to avert it 
become “memory bumped forward,” in the words of Sheila Jasanoff.118  Memory, 
however, is often lost in this process.  A defining feature of institutions is that the 
very process of adapting to new risks often renders invisible the events that motivated 
the adaptation.  Institutional memory embodied in new routines thus may remain 
hidden from future employees who lack knowledge of their originating event.  
Institutions forget even as they learn, “black boxing” particular lessons and processes 
in order to focus on other tasks.  An organization’s history, and what of it is 
transmitted to new employees, is therefore often a key reservoir of clues to what 
caused disaster.  Only by investigating the social processes of organizational learning 
can commissions help societies learn. 
Commissions, then, are simultaneously taking part in social processes even as 
they explore their causal effects.  They help societies learn by understanding how 
learning functions in organizations and individuals, but also by being aware of the 
functions they themselves fulfill in the political and social order.  In this way, the 
practices employed during the investigation that determine how commissions 
themselves learn shape the way public knowledge is created and received.  Yet in 
spite of studying all of these things, scholars have yet to reach consensus on when and 
how commissions influence policy.  The case studies that follow attempt to draw 
these threads together by reconstructing the history of two crisis commissions and 
process tracing the causal mechanisms acting on their investigation and reforms. 
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Chapter 2 
 
The Columbia Investigation 
 
At 9 a.m. on the morning of February 1, 2003, while traveling 12,000 miles an 
hour above Dallas, the Space Shuttle Columbia came apart, raining debris over 300 
miles of Texas and Louisiana prairie.  All seven astronauts aboard were lost.  As the 
television news network CNN played video of the shuttle break-up to a waking 
nation, NASA officials reached for a black binder they had hoped never to open.  
Labeled “Agency Contingency Action Plan,” the binder contained procedures for 
what to do in the event of a catastrophic accident, including emergency telephone 
numbers for a pre-established board of military and civil officials who stood ready to 
begin an investigation.119  When NASA confirmed the shuttle’s loss, managers 
activated the plan, setting in motion what became the largest accident investigation in 
history.120 
As the primary instrument used to diagnose what brought the space shuttle to 
grief, the Columbia Accident Investigation Board produced the officially accepted 
understanding of the accident’s cause, a judgment about whether it was preventable, 
and issued recommendations to prevent a reoccurrence.  This chapter links an 
examination of the unfolding investigation to a more general analysis of the politics of 
disaster and reform, focusing especially on three pivotal elements that drove events. 
First, the scope of the investigation’s 248-page report was markedly different 
from what was envisioned in its original charter.  The striking redefinition of mission 
that occurred inside the investigation from the activation of NASA contingency plans 
to the issuing of its report in late August 2003 suggests it could have assumed a wide 
variety of forms, with attendant differences in causal findings.  A major question is 
how the investigation broke free from its initial framing as a strictly technical 
investigation under NASA control.   
Second, by separately identifying physical and organizational causes, the 
Columbia investigation articulated an understanding of accident causation unique in 
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the history of official investigations.  To understand why the investigation made 
intellectual history, this chapter examines the ways in which the investigation 
constructed its analytic capacity, independence, and legitimacy, and how the deep 
interrelation of these elements led to the specific notions of cause the Board adopted.  
The comprehensive understanding of causation embraced by the investigation, as will 
become apparent, was the product of congressional directives, culturally-based 
clashes between expert groups on the investigation’s staff, and an unusual trafficking 
in ideas between academic experts and Board officials.   
Third, and most critically, this account shows how the Board’s thought and 
action was shaped by its awareness that prior expert reviews had failed to achieve 
organizational reform in the shuttle program.  NASA’s history of resisting 
commission-mandated reforms catalyzed internal strategizing about how the 
Columbia investigation’s recommendations could be styled to avoid a similar fate.  
Investigators and Board members wrestled with what they took to be the limits of 
their ability to shape the internal culture and structure of NASA.  Tracing how this 
reflexivity shaped the Board’s recommendations as well as its relationships with the 
media, Congress, and NASA itself, is crucial to understanding how commissions can 
use the dynamics of investigation to their advantage.   
 
2.1 The Investigation’s Initial Framings 
 
Disaster plans, the sociologist Lee Clarke convincingly argues in his book 
Mission Improbable, are best thought of as rhetorical attempts by managers to 
persuade themselves and the public that control can be maintained in unforeseeable 
circumstances.121  These “fantasy documents,” as Clarke calls them, reveal far more 
about organizationally-based ideologies of control than they do the ability of 
institutions to manage crisis situations.  In light of Clarke’s analysis, it is striking to 
note that for the first six years of the shuttle program, NASA had no plan for what to 
do in the event of a serious accident.  Shuttle program managers considered the 
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vehicle they operated to be so safe that NASA need not anticipate the loss of an 
orbiter or crew.122  
The idea of a risk-free shuttle shattered on the cold morning of January 28, 
1986, when the shuttle Challenger exploded 73-seconds after launch.  The failure of 
an O-ring seal in a right solid rocket booster joint led to the loss of six astronauts and 
their educator colleague Christa McAullife.  NASA managers were caught unprepared 
and badly managed the subsequent investigation, harming NASA’s image as a “can-
do” government agency.  
In the absence of a NASA plan to determine what caused the Challenger’s 
loss, Ronald Reagan appointed a presidential commission chaired by former Secretary 
of State William Rogers.  The Rogers Commission, as it came to be known, initially 
worked in cooperation with an internal NASA investigation.  On February 9, 1986, 
however, the New York Times reported the existence of a longer history of concern 
about O-ring performance than NASA admitted in public.123  In ensuing days the 
commission determined that NASA officials had not been fully forthcoming with 
information and documents.  Strikingly, NASA neglected to tell investigators that 
engineers from Morton Thiokol, the O-ring manufacturer, initially recommended 
against launch during an emergency teleconference held the night before the fatal 
accident.  In light of these revelations, the Rogers Commission began treating shuttle 
program personnel as hostile subjects.  Special agents from the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation joined the investigation.  NASA’s betrayal of trust left feelings of ill-
will in Congress and the public that reawakened in the Columbia investigation’s 
initial days.124 
Following the Challenger accident, NASA officials created a contingency 
plan that outlined procedures to be followed after a mishap, as accidents are known in 
NASA parlance.125  The plan, later extended to cover operations of the International 
Space Station, anticipated that NASA, rather than a presidential commission, would 
remain in control.  It went on to prescribe the investigation’s structure and scope and 
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specified that a standing board of seven experts chosen from across government 
would conduct it.  The NASA Administrator would name an investigation chairperson 
at the time of the accident.  The officials included: 
 
x Head of the Air Force Safety Center 
x Representative from Space Command 
x Representative from U.S. Material Command 
x Director of the Federal Aviation Administration’s Office of Investigation,  
x Commander of the Naval Safety Center 
x Director of the Aviation Safety Division of the Department of 
Transportation’s Volpe Center  
x Director of a NASA Field Center or NASA Program Administrator not 
directly involved in the mission.126 
 
Members with policy and organizational risk analysis as their primary skills 
were conspicuously absent from the pre-drawn investigative board.  Nor did NASA’s 
contingency plan envision this type of expertise as essential to understanding what 
caused a shuttle accident.  Drawing language from formal definitions used by accident 
investigations, the draft charter described a strictly technical mandate: “Determine the 
facts, as well as the actual or probable causes of the shuttle mishap in terms of 
primary cause(s), and potential cause(s) and recommend preventive and other 
appropriate actions to preclude recurrence of a similar mishap.”127  
 
NASA and the National Security State 
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The exclusive selection of technical experts to serve on the standing 
investigatory committee reflected not only the technocratic mentality of NASA, but 
also the firm belief, grounded in NASA and public opinion, that the primary purpose 
of shuttle investigations is to determine the accident’s technical cause, rather than to 
undertake a more fundamental examination of the human exploration program.  
Though the scientific community argues that robotic exploration is far more cost 
effective and less risky than human exploration, NASA has always conceived of 
human space exploration as its primary mission.  
The Challenger accident, rather than serving as an occasion to re-evaluate the 
reasons behind human spaceflight, prompted official reaffirmations that NASA’s 
mission in space would continue.  On the night of the Challenger accident President 
Ronald Reagan was to deliver the State of the Union address before a joint session of 
Congress.  Instead he eulogized the Challenger astronauts in a nationally televised 
speech delivered from the Oval Office.  Reagan left no ambiguity about whether the 
space program would continue.  “The future,” he said, “doesn't belong to the 
fainthearted.  It belongs to the brave….We’ll continue our quest in space.  There will 
be more shuttle flights and more shuttle crews and, yes, more volunteers, more 
civilians, more teachers in space.  Nothing ends here; our hopes and our journeys 
continue.”128 
Reagan’s unhesitating commitment to the shuttle program reflected the 
tremendous popularity of human spaceflight.  As Howard McCurdy argues in Space 
and the American Imagination, public support for NASA arises from deeply seated 
cultural ideals that align with the symbolic meanings of space exploration.  Though 
NASA’s ventures in space are often rationalized in the language of scientific 
experimentation, space flight recalls favored American motifs of the heroic explorer, 
the limitless frontier, and progress through technology.129   
NASA actively cultivates this cultural fascination.  Among its missions are 
outreach and education.  A considerable portion of NASA sees to it that the American 
public becomes involved in its activities.  NASA formerly sponsored science fairs and 
offered experimental space on shuttle flights to elementary, middle and high school 
science students.  Alone among government agencies, NASA runs a 24-hour 
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television channel carried by most commercial cable providers, piping coverage of 
spaceflight as entertainment into millions of American homes.130  The contractors that 
perform much of the work on the shuttle program underwrite the production of 
popular IMAX movies about space exploration, as well as ad campaigns on television 
and in print media.131  Even astronauts are selected in part for their capacity to 
conduct media interviews and carry a message to the public; those motives animated 
the “teacher in space” program that placed Christa McAuliffe on the ill-fated 
Challenger.   
Public favor for the shuttle program, moreover, cannot be separated from 
larger ideological and political commitments that bind a polity to the state.  In The 
Descent of Icarus, Israeli political scientist Yaron Ezrahi argues that science itself, 
like religion before the enlightenment, is a crucial political resource that modern 
technological states employ to construct and legitimate their political power.132  In 
Ezrahi’s analysis, the space shuttle serves as a lodestar for national identity—a 
machine that becomes a metaphor reinforcing the legitimacy of the state.  Through 
exploring the heavens, the space shuttle helps reinforce order on earth.   
Historically, the shuttle program is an outgrowth of the Cold War era in which 
space exploration served as an explicit proxy for superpower competition.  The 
rationale for an American presence in space was linked to notions of military 
necessity, views of space as a battlefield to be controlled, and the close connection 
between space rockets and ballistic missile technology.133  The early history of 
NASA, as well as its forerunner, the National Advisory Committee For Aeronautics, 
embodies the nascent post-World War II alliance of science and the state.  Apollo 
rockets, and later the shuttle, served as visual demonstrations of the supremacy of 
democracy and the market over dictatorship and collectivist systems of production.   
Illustrating the connection between space exploration and the state helps frame 
the context of the Columbia investigation.  The investigation of the nation’s second 
shuttle disaster, like the investigation into its first, began only after the President 
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himself left little doubt that the U.S. mission in space would continue.  In his address 
on the afternoon of the Columbia accident, President George W. Bush told the nation 
that there were no survivors.  He then remarked, “The cause in which they died will 
continue. Mankind is led into the darkness beyond our world by the inspiration of 
discovery and the longing to understand. Our journey into space will go on.”134  The 
political boundaries of investigation were thus established even before the 
investigation board gathered on the day of the accident. 
 
2.2  Establishing Independence 
 
Though styled in NASA’s contingency plans as a methodical, dispassionate 
search for technical failure, the Columbia investigation in fact lay in a vortex of 
political concerns, chief of which was whether the Board was sufficiently independent 
to investigate the agency that chartered it.  A fundamental reconsideration of the 
investigation’s structure and purpose eventually proved necessary.  How the Board 
chose to balance the competing demands placed on it by NASA and by Congress 
shaped the analytic capacities it developed, as well as the ultimate conclusions it 
reached.  Tracing this relationship reveals a powerful connection between the 
capacities of disaster investigations and their political context.  
Control of the investigation was contested at the outset.  Still stung by NASA 
stonewalling after the Challenger accident seventeen years before, members of 
Congress initially assailed the accident board’s credibility, asking reasonably enough 
how NASA could be trusted to investigate itself.135  Before settling into its offices the 
Board was besieged by critics calling for its replacement by a presidential 
commission.136  With few sources of credibility other than its association with NASA, 
which proved to be a liability, Board members began to realize that the integrity of 
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their undertaking was under threat.137  Just as the Board needed to construct an 
airtight scientific case for what caused the Columbia accident, so too it needed to 
construct its own political credibility.  Steps had to be taken to achieve both a 
measure of independence and the appearance of independence, or else Congress 
might end the investigation almost before it began.   
Admiral Harold Gehman, a tall, willowy Navy veteran, agreed to chair the 
investigation when asked by NASA Administrator Sean O’Keefe on the morning of 
the accident, per provisions in the contingency plan for the Administrator to select a 
chairman.138 A four star admiral who had ascended to the military’s sixth-ranked 
position, Gehman was no stranger to Washington politics.139  He found NASA’s off-
the-shelf contingency plan overly restrictive and immediately moved to ensure he 
would wield greater control over the investigation’s direction and staffing.  His first 
assertion of authority, made on the day after the accident, was to change its name 
from the ungainly “International Space Station and Space Shuttle Mishap Interagency 
Investigation Board” to the “Columbia Accident Investigation Board,” or CAIB.  He 
also took note of the investigation charter’s narrow language when it was faxed to 
him hours after the accident.  After consulting with the other Board members, 
Gehman asked to have the word ‘root causes’—accident investigation vernacular for 
organizational factors that contributed to a technical failure—added to the 
investigation’s scope.140 
As Board members began to agitate against their narrow charter, members of 
Congress expressed additional concerns, widely given voice to in media 
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commentary.141 First, they remarked that the shuttle program was in need of an 
overall review that extended beyond safety of flight issues.  NASA was perennially 
experiencing cost overruns.  Problems existed with its strategic management and, 
members of Congress suspected, a whole lot else.  Key committee chairmen urged 
Gehman to ignore the narrowly-drawn NASA mandate and to instead undertake a 
broad review of the shuttle program that would address their questions.142   
Members of Congress also told Gehman that the Board needed to gain greater 
independence from NASA, and recommended specific steps Gehman could take to 
bolster the Board’s credibility.  “The words of the charter simply do not guarantee the 
[investigation’s] independence and latitude,” the chairman of the House Science 
Committee said.  “The charter’s words need to match everyone’s intent now to avoid 
any problems later on.”143  These concerns moved Gehman and the other seven 
original Board members to write into their charter provisions that increased 
transparency in the Board’s operations and introduced a more extensive set of checks 
and balances between the investigation and NASA.144  The final charter, ratified by 
NASA Administrator Sean O’Keefe on February 18, 2003, waived requirements 
mandating the Board pursue its investigation in accordance with standard NASA 
mishap procedures and instead left its direction entirely to Gehman’s discretion.145 
Admiral Gehman ultimately took more than a dozen steps to address concerns 
raised by Congress.  The Board, at first an entity under NASA’s authority, gained 
administrative control over its own budget and staff, developed the capacity to keep 
independent records and conduct physical tests separate from NASA, and removed 
NASA officials involved with the Columbia mission from any liaison duties.146  The 
Board moved to independent office space outside the Johnson Space Center.  Board 
members announced their right to voice dissent in minority opinions and rejected out 
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of hand the demand by NASA Administrator Sean O’Keefe that only a portion of the 
investigation report be made public.  Not only would the full report see the light of 
day, Admiral Gehman declared, but the Board would release it simultaneously to the 
White House, NASA, and the public.  Gehman also resolved to hold a series of public 
hearings and press briefings, bringing the investigation’s transparency to the public in 
line with the presidential commission that investigated the Challenger accident.  
In breaking free from the procedural constraints imposed by NASA, the 
investigation illustrates how it was able to draw agency from emerging congressional 
concerns and how adherence to norms of impartial procedure buttressed its 
legitimacy.  Administrative independence alone, however, was a necessary but not 
sufficient condition for the Board’s broad public acceptance.  Gehman also took the 
step of adding additional Board members who would bring substantive expertise in 
areas where the Board was deficient.  His first appointment was Roger Tetrault, 
former head of Electric Boat, a major Navy contractor; his second, Sheila Widnall, 
Chairwomen of the Massachusettes Institute of Technology’s Department of 
Aeronautics and Astronautics.147  Eventually, former Astronaut Sally Ride, Nobel 
Laureate physicist Douglas Osheroff, and space policy expert John Logsdon joined 
the Board.148  By drawing new members from outside government, Gehman further 
underwrote the Board’s credibility among those who questioned the wisdom of 
drawing exclusively upon government employees.  
Demonstrating one way in which commissions can bolster their credibility, the 
Board methodically selected its new members.  Meetings were held to identify the 
types of expertise the Board most needed, and resumes of potential candidates were 
then evaluated in relation to the “credibility gap” they would fill.149  Ride was a major 
public figure, member of the Rogers Commission that investigated the Challenger 
accident, and the Board’s only astronaut.  Osheroff enhanced the investigation’s 
scientific credibility, and ended up filling the scientist-iconoclast role Richard 
Feynman played on the Rogers Commission.  Logsdon, a political scientist and head 
of George Washington University’s Space Policy Institute, balanced the technical and 
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managerial backgrounds of other Board members with a policy analyst’s knowledge 
of the space program. 
As the Board selected new members and established control over its staffing 
and budget, it waged a separate campaign to influence key constituencies in the media 
and Congress—a hallmark of successful commissions.  On February 18th the Board 
announced the opening of a governmental relations office in Washington, D.C to 
ensure smooth relations with congressional and Executive branch officials.150  In an 
explicit effort to build a supportive coalition around the investigation, Gehman began 
educating his staff on the importance of cultivating trust among constituents who 
would be vital to the Board’s success.  “Remember,” Gehman would repeat in 
morning staff meetings, “Congress and the media are our friends.”151  Once the 
Board’s work was done, Gehman said, they would be the ones who remain to pressure 
NASA to see through Board recommendations.   
The initial controversies surrounding the investigation demonstrate how the 
Board’s ability to conduct an impartial investigation was not presumed by the public 
or Congress.  Rather, the Board’s credibility had to be constructed by shaping its 
investigative structures and practices to match time honored principles of American 
government.  In a recurring theme in disaster investigations, its credibility was 
constructed in situ.  The process of responding to demands for its independence and 
impartiality allowed the Board to break free of control by NASA and ultimately 
establish a more robust investigation than would have been possible under the original 
contingency plan.  These demands became a source of agency the Board moved to 
exploit, transforming a minimalist technical investigation into a far broader review of 
NASA and U.S. space policy. 
 
2.3 From Physical to Social Cause 
 
Tracing the Board’s remarkable growth in analytic capacity as it matured from 
the organization outlined in NASA’s contingency plan into the largest accident 
investigation in history requires a familiarity with the particulars of the accident and 
the expertise required to understand it.  Space shuttles are astonishingly intricate 
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creations, 2.5 million working parts apiece, each one necessarily designed with only 
the narrowest margin of safety.152  Ninety percent fuel by weight, the shuttle is in 
essence a large controlled explosion that hurls humans into space.  Blown upwards by 
a duo of solid rocket boosters and three main engines, the shuttle accelerates from 
zero to 18,000 miles an hour in eight minutes flat.   
During its flight a thin armor of silicone tiles on its underside and reinforced 
carbon-carbon (RCC) panels on its wings shield the orbiter from the acoustic stress of 
launch and blistering heat of re-entry.  So effective at insulating the aluminum skin 
underneath, they can be held by hand as a blowtorch is applied.  Yet these tiles and 
the adjoining RCC panels that line the wing’s leading edge, like many other shuttle 
components, are so fragile that the touch of a fingernail leaves its mark.  For this 
reason some investigators took to comparing the shuttle to a flying Ming vase, with 
room enough inside for a school bus and crew of seven.153 
To grapple with this astonishing flying machine, the Board soon grew into an 
enormous enterprise, showcasing the enormous resources made available to its 
investigation.  The chairman and twelve members directed an immediate staff of 140.  
Over 400 NASA engineers drawn from across NASA centers were assigned in 
support, while 4,000 debris searchers, mostly off-season U.S. Forest Service wildfire 
fighters, scoured the Texas and Louisiana ground.  Two hundred government agencies 
assisted the investigation in some way, as did private consultants and several federally 
funded research institutes.  All of this was created from scratch, loosely based on 
never-before tested contingency plans that did not foresee recovering debris over an 
area the size of the state of Connecticut.154  These resources would give the Board 
power in its confrontation with NASA, illustrating the importance of large staffs as a 
determinant of commission success. 
Resources alone, however, were no guarantee of success.  As seasoned 
accident investigators gathered in Houston, what was left of the Columbia lay 
scattered across two states.  No direct radar images of its re-entry existed, and only a 
few photographs and videos taken by amateur observers had surfaced.  Though 
mission control captured telemetry from shuttle sensors, critical gaps in data existed, 
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particularly toward the end.  Further, unlike commercial airplanes, the shuttle had no 
black box that would preserve a record of flight in the event of a crash.  The most 
comprehensive set of flight data, routed to onboard recorders, was presumed lost with 
the crew module.  Some investigators doubted a definitive cause would be found.155 
From the beginning, speculation swirled around a piece of foam that smashed 
into Columbia’s left wing 81.9 seconds after launch.156  The briefcase-sized 1.67 
pound chunk of insulating foam tore away from the external tank’s “bipod ramp” 
while the shuttle was ascending through 65,000 feet, and collided with the left wing a 
fraction of a second later.157  The impact was equivalent to throwing a basketball 
crosscourt at 500 miles per hour.158  Surveillance cameras stationed south of the 
launch pad captured grainy images of the foam coming detached, cart-wheeling 
through the air, and then shattering into a fine mist that enveloped both sides of the 
wing.  A brain trust of imagery experts from the intelligence community later spent 
weeks enhancing the camera data to the point where Board members audibly gasped 
the first time it was played onscreen at a noon investigation meeting.159  NASA 
engineers did not have the benefit of so crisp a video clip at the time.  Nevertheless, 
their estimates of the size and speed of the debris proved accurate.  How much 
damage had been caused to the shuttle’s wing and underside and whether this 
imperiled Columbia’s safe return became a matter of debate inside NASA.160   
Though the foam strike certainly caught the attention of investigators, the 
video of its impact, no matter how dramatic, was not sufficient to establish the 
accident’s cause.  Corroborating lines of evidence had to be found from debris and 
sensor data, and other possible causes ruled out.  Given that most of the shuttle was 
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thought to have vaporized in the seconds after break-up, investigators had braced for 
the worst, expecting almost no useable debris to be recovered.  A breakthrough in the 
physical investigation would be necessary before broader questions about NASA 
could be explored. 
 Investigators were elated when fragments of the left wing eventually 
materialized.  What began as a trickle of pieces and parts soon grew into an 
evidentiary goldmine.  Search teams eventually recovered an astonishing 39 percent 
by weight of the shuttle’s remains.161  By far the search team’s biggest find was the 
MADS recorder, a VCR-like device that stored critical sensor data not down-linked to 
mission control.162  The MADS recorder included temperature and pressure readings 
from the leading edge of the left wing.163  When combined with existing sensor 
readings recovered from mission control, data from the MADS recorder lent weighty 
evidence to the foam strike hypothesis.  
After weeks of analysis engineers assembled a workable timeline showing 
how sensors malfunctioned in a telltale order that progressed during re-entry from the 
exact spot struck by the foam through the rest of the left wing cavity.  This could 
mean only one thing: a breach in the wing existed at the time Columbia began its 
return to earth.  The breach allowed superheated atmospheric gas to enter the left 
wing, melting the shuttle apart from the inside out.  
By late spring the technical story became clear, prompting the Board to issue a 
“working scenario” of the accident’s cause.164  Falling foam pierced the left wing 
during launch.  Because Mission Control did not appreciate the severity of damage at 
the time, a repair or rescue was not attempted.  Columbia’s astronauts unknowingly 
sealed their fate the moment they initiated the re-entry burn.  Their now irreversible 
decent into the atmosphere led Columbia into the thick of a molecular soup that began 
removing all the energy the shuttle’s rockets imparted during launch.  As the crew 
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inside was awed by the luminous display around them, hot gases shot into the 
breached wing, snaking a path that can be precisely mapped by cascading sensor 
failures and the forensic analysis of debris.165  It took just minutes for the left wing to 
melt from the inside out.166 
 
Debating Organizational Cause 
 
Honing in on the accident’s technical cause took hundreds of engineers 
months to achieve.  Yet it only deepened the mystery of why Columbia fell from the 
sky.  Investigators in Houston were left wondering why shuttle managers decided that 
no threat to flight safety existed in the face of so violent a foam strike.  Given the 
fragile thermal protection system and video of foam hitting the wing, how could 
NASA engineers not have sounded the alarm?  A second question immediately arose.  
A small army of safety officials are responsible for stopping launches before danger 
occurs.  Did this layer of institutional guardian angels fail to exercise their duties 
properly?  Could safety engineers have reasonably foreseen shedding debris causing 
an accident, or was the detachment of the bipod ramp the technical equivalent of a 
lightning bolt flung by the gods, with no warning and without hope of escape?   
What causes an accident, and how far causes should be traced back through 
organizational processes and in history, is a matter of debate within accident 
investigation circles and one of the most debated issues in disaster investigations.167  
As will become clear, how commissions conceive of causation in the institutions of 
the national security state is one of the most important determinants of their success.   
Experts note that causation is too often conceived of in terms of mechanical 
failure and operator error alone.  In standard accounts, a widget fails, and those 
standing closest—the line operator or supervisor, occasionally a low-level manager—
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are saddled with blame for failing to act in time.  When failure is viewed in such 
narrow terms, the solution is typically limited to fixing the local malfunction and 
firing the operator who “erred.”  Such a model of causation averts the investigator’s 
gaze from other factors, including the culpability of higher officials, that created the 
situation in the first place.   
Over the past two decades accident investigations have become more attentive 
to the subtle dynamics that shape how people think and act on the job.  Advances in 
the study of organizational design and psychology of error have improved the 
understanding of complex technical systems.168  Especially relevant to NASA, 
sociologists have examined how politics and budget shape the behavior of managers 
and line workers inside large institutions that operate risky technologies.169  
Identifying broader political and organizational factors that may have contributed to 
the Columbia accident would mark a departure from traditional accident 
investigations, which tend to focus their examination primarily at the technical level.  
At stake in the Board’s movement beyond physical cause was the possibility that it 
would identify not only a mechanical failure, but also indict NASA itself, an 
institution bound up with national pride.  
The Columbia investigation now confronted a question that all disaster 
investigations face.  Debates within the Board about how far the investigation should 
peer beyond technical matters took shape early.  The engineers who composed the 
largest professional group in the Board’s employ brought an especially strong 
devotion to technical factors that was predictably opposed by the investigation’s 
policy analysts and accident investigators, who were trained to examine human and 
organizational factors.  Board members themselves held different views.  Sally Ride 
and Sheila Widnall were especially conscious of the powerful effects organizations 
exert on individual behavior.  Ride, who also served on the Rogers Commission, 
came to suspect that the problems plaguing NASA’s safety system were structural in 
nature and dated from the Challenger accident and before.170  
Admiral Gehman’s early conversion to the view that “complex systems fail in 
complex ways,” as he often repeated, was among the most powerful factors driving 
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the Board’s adoption of a wider understanding of cause.171  The potential breadth of 
the investigation became clear during morning brainstorming sessions held in his 
office in March and April.  By working backward from a template of questions 
Gehman knew had to be answered, these sessions, ostensibly held to draft the report 
outline, soon turned into a forum for plotting the investigation’s ongoing shape.172  As 
the sociologist Diane Vaughan discusses in an article in the American Journal of 
Sociology, it was through this iterative process that the Board’s novel framing of 
social cause, and its subsequent elevation of the human, organizational, and policy 
antecedents to disaster, first matured.173   
As the investigation turned to why individuals in NASA behaved almost 
casually in the face of what Board investigators viewed as a threat to flight safety, the 
Board hired more personnel with social science training.  That the Board was free to 
follow its intuitions and add expertise as needed, unlike other disaster investigations 
that lacked the budgetary independence to do so, is a development with larger 
implications for what makes commissions effective.  The newly formed group of 
historians, sociologists, and risk analysts who joined the staff soon began to influence 
how the Board viewed the accident.  The battle over expanding cause unfolded over 
weeks, in a series of debates that took place not only in noon investigative meetings, 
but also in the hallway and over dinner.174  The Board’s embracement of a wider 
sociological framing was thus the result of sustained negotiations between 
professional groups who held differing views of how far the Board should venture 
beyond a strict examination of physical cause.   
Still another element of the Board’s composition drove this new framing.  
Many of the investigators brought an outsider’s vision to the practice of human 
spaceflight.  Most of Board staff had never before worked for NASA.  Lacking a 
socialization to the agency’s routines and beliefs that its employees take for granted, 
                                                 
171 William Langewiesche, “Columbia’s Last Flight,” The Atlantic Monthly, November, 2003. 
172 Personal notes, Columbia accident investigation, March-May 2003. 
173 Diane Vaughan, “NASA Revisited: Theory, Analogy, and Public Sociology,” American Journal of 
Sociology, Vol. 112, No. 2, September 2006, 353-93. 
174 The Board’s meeting minutes contains a full record of this debate as it unfolded.  News media 
accounts also chronicle it.  See, for example, Matthew Wald, “Panel Examines Whether NASA Was 
Out of Touch with Shuttle Fleet Safety Problems,” The New York Times, March 26, 2003, Jonathan 
Schwartz and Matthew Wald, “Failings at NASA Extend Well Beyond Foam Hitting Columbia, Panel 
Reports,” The New York Times, June 7, 2003.  By mid-July, Gehman is quoted as saying, ''We have 
what we're now calling either the physical or mechanical failure, and then we have the systemic 
failures. And we're now putting them at equal weight.” See Matthew Wald and John Schwartz, “NASA 
Management Failings Are Linked to Shuttle Demise,” The New York Times, July 12, 2003.  
 50
many members of the Board’s staff harbored a natural suspicion of the protocols 
NASA developed to run the shuttle program as well as the supposed benefits of space 
flight used to rationalize the risk calculus it employed.   As one of the investigators 
later put it, most of the Board staff were not space buffs, and as such, “were not 
drinking NASA’s kool-aid”—a reference to the American religious cult in Jonestown, 
Guyana that committed mass suicide by lacing the popular drink with cyanide.175   
Investigators found NASA’s tendency to institutionally deny the risks of 
human spaceflight to be one of its defining features.  It was frequently left to Board 
member John Logsdon, director of George Washington’s Space Policy Institute, and 
NASA Ames Director Scott Hubbard—the two Board “insiders”—to “make the case 
for space” or communicate the reasons behind particular NASA arrangements.176  The 
investigation’s culture, then, was marked by an organized skepticism to NASA’s 
mission and way of doing business that led investigators to frame issues in different 
ways than NASA’s own employees would or even could.  It is this “outsider” vision, 
and the healthy, “generative” tension it enabled when joined with the perspective of 
insiders within the Board, that is characteristic to the ability of commissions to see 
and know in clearer ways than the agencies they investigate.. 
 
Echoes of Challenger 
 
As in other disaster investigations, the relevance of history to understanding 
organizational behaviors soon became apparent.  Making this connection, however, 
would require the enrollment of outside expertise.  Investigators were mindful that the 
Challenger accident occurred when engineers wrongly extrapolated the performance 
envelope of a single component, the solid rocket booster joint O-ring.  The joint failed 
when hot gases blew-by the rubber gaskets that fill the gap between booster segments.  
Blow-by should never have occurred.  A redundant O-ring existed in case the first 
failed.  Yet O-rings from several prior shuttle flights came back singed by hot gases, a 
finding that engineers investigated for its potentially catastrophic implications.  
Rather than interpret this deviation from design as a signal that catastrophe was 
imminent, analysis led engineers to view this anomaly as a tolerable, if not desired, 
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aspect of joint behavior.  In NASA parlance, the O-ring anomaly became classified as 
an “accept risk,” one of hundreds on the shuttle.  Even as work began on a design fix, 
this deviation became integrated into the database of performance expectations, or 
flight rules, that govern the shuttle’s readiness to launch.  To top managers situated 
far away from line engineers, the observed phenomenon of blow-by was not a 
warning sign that something was amiss, but rather confirmation that the joint was 
performing within expected limits.177  
In the aftermath of the Challenger accident, sociologist Diane Vaughan set out 
to explore why NASA had seemingly played Russian roulette with the shuttle by 
launching it with a known technical flaw.  Vaughan’s analysis, The Challenger 
Launch Decision: Risky Technology, Culture and Deviance at NASA is celebrated as 
the most comprehensive account of a technical disaster ever penned.178  During the 
Columbia investigation, Vaughan’s book ended up serving as a Rosetta stone, 
allowing investigators to connect their observations of the behavior of NASA officials 
with a theory of decision-making grounded in empirical sociology. 
What Vaughan noticed is that NASA built the shuttle to function like a 
business, with rigid cost and schedule expectations, which is unlike how it had 
approached the experimentally focused Apollo program.  The shuttle’s experimental 
technology, however, did not so neatly conform to congressional wishes for a 
smoothly running space airline.  NASA managers, imprisoned by their agency’s 
image of the shuttle as an operational “space plane,” were under constant pressure to 
perform on schedule and under-budget, even when the shuttle’s unruly technology 
presented novel problems at every turn.   
In such an atmosphere, unhealthy competition arose between launching the 
shuttle on time and launching the shuttle with all known technical problems fixed.  
Safety came to compete with cost and schedule demands, and safety increasingly lost 
out.  Having internalized the economic and political imperatives placed on NASA by 
Congress and the White House, shuttle managers unconsciously allowed accepted 
definitions of risk to balloon, choosing to launch shuttles before fully investigating 
anomalies in component performance.  Vaughan described this gradual but continual 
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expansion of safety margins as the ‘normalization of deviance.’179  The result of this 
technical corner-cutting on January 28, 1986 was NASA’s first fatal space launch. 
Vaughan’s conclusions moved significantly beyond the account given by the 
Rogers Commission of how political and economic imperatives acted upon NASA.  
By viewing the flawed decision to launch primarily as the result of errors in the 
process NASA used to certify the shuttle for flight, the Rogers Commission 
concluded that bad individual decisions and an imperfect structure for safety oversight 
were to blame.  Such a framing failed to take account the agency’s political 
environment and the ideological mindset its officials worked within.  This 
reductionist explanation for why the technical fault occurred led the Rogers 
Commission to focus its recommendations primarily on technical and organizational 
factors close in to the machine. 
Vaughan’s revisionist account of the Challenger accident proved to be 
essential for understanding what happened to Columbia.  In what Board member Sally 
Ride evocatively called “echoes of Challenger,” similarities between the two 
accidents became pronounced as the CAIB investigation continued.180 Investigators 
unearthed evidence that falling foam, like O-ring charring, was not an exceptional 
phenomena but rather an accepted part of routine shuttle operations.  In a pattern that 
mimicked how the shuttle program’s safety oversight office treated O-rings, falling 
foam was initially viewed with grave concern.  After Columbia’s first flight in 1981 
engineers openly speculated that debris shedding would permanently ground the 
shuttle.  Soon, however, program managers came to be comfortable with the amount 
of damage caused by debris.  Though the shuttle would sustain hundreds of debris 
strikes every mission, most were small and those that were not were written off as 
anomalies that were unlikely to recur.181  
Decisions taken one at a time led to what Vaughan termed an “incremental 
descent into bad judgment,” the end result of which was that an organization known 
for its engineering cool came to hold as an article of faith that falling foam did not 
pose a danger to the shuttle’s flight.  Engineers certified the next mission as ready for 
launch even when a massive chunk of foam came flying off the shuttle shortly before 
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Columbia’s last mission and struck the solid rocket booster attachment ring within 
inches of a vital communications rely box.  They did not mandate a fix to the problem 
before placing the next crew of astronauts at risk.182 
As the Board’s investigation focused in on NASA decision-making about 
foam debris, Vaughan’s book became a fixture on investigators’ desks.  A more 
accessible encapsulation of Vaughan’s thesis published in the California Journal of 
Management was circulated even more widely, as busy investigators were not 
accustomed to digesting long academic manuscripts.183  In time, Vaughan was invited 
to testify in front of the Board and even join as a consulting investigator.184  Her 
theory of the normalization of deviance resonated with investigators because it 
provided a language in which to articulate phenomena they were beginning to see in 
the data.    
More than crisp phrasing, Vaughan’s language was linked to a theoretically 
rigorous sociological framework accepted by academic experts and risk managers as 
the prevailing explanation for NASA’s other fatal shuttle accident.  By providing both 
scholarly legitimacy and a vocabulary in which to speak of NASA’s pathologies, 
Vaughan enabled investigators trained in human factors to take yet another step down 
the road of social causation, linking seemingly inexplicable and safety-averse 
behaviors they observed among managers and engineers to budgetary and political 
pressures placed on NASA.  The insights of an external academic provided a 
breakthrough to the staff of a disaster investigation.185 
As a parade of visiting experts echoed Vaughan’s message to examine the 
social and organizational context of risk management, investigators grew comfortable 
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with elevating social cause to a co-equal position with physical cause.186  The Board 
eventually elected to include an “organizational cause” statement alongside the 
obligatory “physical cause” statement that is part of every accident report.187  
Vaughan’s integration into the investigation was so complete that by mid-summer, 
Admiral Gehman asked her to draft a concluding chapter articulating how both the 
Challenger and Columbia accident stem from the same set of unfixed organizational 
causes.  Vaughan titled it “History as Cause.”188  In so doing, the Columbia report 
moved beyond the analysis laid down by the Rogers Commission, which did not trace 
the causal chain so deeply into NASA’s economic and political environment.  By 
separate identifying accident causes at three levels—ideology, organization, and 
technology—the Columbia Board displayed a sophistication common to other disaster 
investigations that succeed in addressing the inherent complexity of the national 
security state. 
 
2.4  A Reflexive Approach to Reform  
 
As the Board explored NASA’s safety oversight organization, so, too, did 
Board members and staff come to reckon with the recommendations of previous 
expert reviews and their attempts—most often unsuccessful—to foster organizational 
change inside the shuttle program.  This reflexivity about the limitations of disaster 
investigations would prove tremendously important to the success of some of its 
recommendations.   
The Board’s first significant foray into the history of risk management at 
NASA came at a public hearing held in early March 2003.  The hearing addressed the 
findings of the Shuttle Independent Assessment Team, a high-level review of shuttle 
operations undertaken after a serious in-flight malfunction on the Columbia in 
1999.189  Testimony by study chair Henry McDonald made the Board aware that 
serious concerns existed about post-Challenger safety practices long before the 
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Columbia accident.  The Board soon thereafter assigned staff to undertake a 
systematic review of the recent history of the shuttle program, paying particular 
attention to the evolution of the safety oversight organization and to the findings of 
past expert reviews.  NASA, never a stranger to external review, had submitted the 
shuttle program to no less than 50 examinations of various kinds from the Rogers 
Commission forward, five of which produced lengthy reports.190  The Board came to 
view the story that emerged as one of institutional recidivism. 
The review compiled by investigators detailed a history of non-compliance 
with safety recommendations from the Rogers Commission onward.191  As shuttle 
flights resumed without incident after the Challenger accident, the initial enthusiasm 
for adopting safety reforms proposed by the Rogers Commission soon waned.  The 
program’s newly centralized safety office was never actually vested with the called-
for authority and budget.  A robust, independent and centrally integrated safety 
system never developed, nor did the capacity within it to conduct trend analysis on 
low frequency hazards.  No less than five post-Challenger reports by external 
committees called attention to this lack of an independent safety function.192   
The institutional foundation for safety at NASA took a turn for the worse at 
the end of the Cold War, when the absence of superpower competition in space 
lessened Congress’s appetite for funding NASA.  The Board’s analysis of NASA 
budgets revealed that the initial post-Challenger injection of funds given by Congress 
was pared back at the Cold War’s end, leading to financial shortfalls despite 
expensive new missions, including the international space station.  To make up the 
shortfall, NASA management responded by cannibalizing the very safety system it 
was mandated to strengthen in Challenger’s wake.193  The institutional flow charts 
that neatly demarcated a reformed safety organization began to increasingly diverge 
from on-the-ground reality, so much so that by 2003 Admiral Gehman borrowed from 
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Gertrude Stein to describe NASA’s withered safety bureaucracy as having no “there, 
there.”194   
On the basis of its review of failed reform inside NASA, the Board developed 
a social and ideological dimension to its critique of shuttle operations.  A distinct 
element of NASA’s troubled history, according to the Board’s own historical 
research, is that external criticism seemed to have little effect on its insulated 
organizational culture, whose own self-image as a “perfect place,” as one 
anthropologist theorized, served to resist alteration until tragedy struck.195  The legacy 
of NASA’s Apollo triumphs, together with its privileged place in the national psyche, 
produced a workforce particularly unable to recognize and correct deficits in its 
operations, even when external actors singled them out.  The shuttle program, then, 
illustrates how being part of the national security state and its myth-making practices 
can be detrimental to organizational reflexivity and produce inherent resistance to 
outsider critique. 
The history of institutional reform at NASA thus served in the Board’s eye as 
a cautionary tale.  The shuttle program’s slide backward after the Challenger accident 
ultimately reproduced earlier organizational flaws, setting the scene for a virtual 
repeat of disaster.  Failing to display institutional reflexivity about safety practices, 
shuttle managers remained mostly unaware of their own organizational deficits.  As a 
result, the Board noted that “by the eve of the Columbia accident, institutional 
practices that were in effect at the time of the Challenger accident—such as 
inadequate concern over deviations from expected performance, a silent safety 
program, and schedule pressure—had returned to NASA.”196  Seven more lives and 
NASA’s second shuttle were lost in a burning inferno, sacrificed, in the Board’s 
assessment, on the altar of failed reform.  
 
Board Counter-Strategies 
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NASA’s betrayal of the Rogers Commission recommendations and apparent 
disregard for subsequent expert assessments, almost all of which called for NASA to 
reconstitute a robust system of safety oversight, was viewed inside the investigation 
as an indication that proposed reforms would not be easily achieved.  Rather than 
imagining that its recommendations would instantaneously transform the shuttle 
program’s policies and procedures, the Board anticipated internal resistance at each 
step, especially after the shuttle had resumed flying safely and the Board had 
disbanded. In confronting this dynamic, Admiral Gehman and other Board members 
were determined that their investigation would be different from those that came 
before.  Gehman wanted to try and “outsmart” NASA by thinking through how they 
could design their report and recommendations for maximum effect.  He wanted the 
Board to be reflexive about its own ability to exert influence not only during the 
investigation, but also in the years to come.   
Gehman pushed this notion of reflexivity in various ways.  At one noon 
investigation meeting, he had the full board view a documentary he had seen on PBS 
about the Concorde investigation.  The film chronicled how the Concorde accident 
report became the subject of controversy that continued for years afterward.  In 
introducing the video, Gehman said he wanted the Board to see what happens when 
an investigation’s report does not bring closure and itself becomes the subject of 
subsequent investigation. 
In May the Board decided on three strategies to maximize its influence.  The 
first was to issue preliminary recommendations.  Rather than wait until the end of its 
investigation to make recommendations known, as is traditionally done, the Board 
elected to issue them as soon as consensus existed among Board members.  This not 
only gave NASA a “head start” on changes it would need to make in any case, but 
also brought to bear public scrutiny while the Board’s investigation was ongoing.  
The Board issued two preliminary recommendations on April 17, 2003, and two more 
on June 17 and July 1.197  The second strategy was to differentiate between those 
recommendations the Board saw as essential to complete before the shuttle’s return to 
flight and those that should be implemented over the medium and long term.  By 
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ordering its recommendations by the timescale of implementation, the Board 
attempted to ensure that NASA could not indefinitely drag its feet, as had seemingly 
happened in other instances.   
The third strategy concerned its final report.  Having led investigation into the 
U.S.S. Cole bombing, Gehman appreciated the difficulty of assembling a report that 
would make a persuasive case to the audience of decision-makers most likely to 
address the accident’s underlying causes.198  Organizing the investigation staff to craft 
the official report with clarity and force was an early decision Gehman took to 
maximize the Board’s effect on NASA.199  Now he pushed the Board to carefully 
consider to whom it was writing.  After much coaxing, the Board decided that its 
intended audience was not the professional accident investigation community to 
which many of its members and staff were disposed to write, but rather Congress.  As 
such, the Board vowed to produce a readable report written with a minimum of 
technical terminology.  The 24,500 acronyms in NASA’s human spaceflight 
dictionary were banished from the report.  Only one was regularly used: NASA.200 
  The Board’s strategizing about how to maximize its influence also extended to 
ongoing investigation matters, including which parts of the evidence base it wanted 
investigation staff to assemble and which parts it would delegate to NASA engineers 
supporting the Board.  In one particularly weighty matter, shuttle program managers 
continued to maintain after the accident that even if damage to the left wing had been 
discovered during Columbia’s flight, nothing could have been done to save the orbiter 
or crew.  The Board, however, suspected that NASA could have attempted a rescue 
mission.  Rather than have the investigation determine whether an in-flight rescue or 
repair was feasible, the Board assigned the shuttle program to undertake its own 
study, thinking it would be best for the agency itself to come to the conclusion that 
options were available.201  NASA ultimately agreed that a rescue would have been 
possible and should have been attempted.   
Yet another controversial decision the Board took was whether to go through 
with a final foam debris impact test in which a piece of foam the size of the bipod 
                                                 
198 For a record of Gehman’s early thoughts on report structure, see Christopher Kirchhoff, notes, 
“Meeting with Admiral Gehman,” March 3, 4, and 11, 2003. 
199 Lester Reingold and Christopher Kirchhoff, who worked as Lead Editor and Editor respectively, 
were hired three weeks into the investigation and began work in the beginning of March. 
200 For an overview of editorial considerations faced by the Board, see Lester Reingold and Christopher 
Kirchhoff, “Final Report Structure and Format: A Decision Brief to the CAIB Board,” March 19, 2003. 
201 Board decision at noon investigative meeting, May, 2003. 
 59
ramp would be shot at actual shuttle wing hardware, rather than a mock-up.  In May, 
the Board had initiated a series of forensic test shots to verify that a piece of foam the 
size that struck Columbia could break an actual RCC wing panel. 202  Bizarrely, 
NASA at first proposed using the tests to shoot small pellets of foam in order to 
validate a debris model used by managers during the mission.203  It was as if the 
model, in NASA’s eyes, was more relevant to validate than the physical experience of 
the accident’s cause.  The Board, however, was not interested in NASA’s debris 
model, but rather wanted to replicate the Columbia foam strike as closely as possible.   
NASA eventually acceded to the Board’s insistence and initiated a series of 
tests using actual flight hardware.204  The final foam shot ended speculation by 
completely shattering an RCC panel that had flown approximately the same number 
of flight cycles as the one that was struck on Columbia.205  Video of the test was the 
lead story on the evening news, providing NASA as well as the nation with a striking 
visual demonstration of the Board’s hypothesis for how the Columbia was lost.  The 
foam shot functioned as the investigation’s closing argument before the public, firmly 
establishing a model of how the accident happened in the minds of viewers.  The 
effectiveness of this public demonstration of NASA’s error has wider ramification for 
the study of disaster and reform.  It suggests that the credibility of disaster 
investigations is built on the basis of investigative output—that successful 
investigations not only establish facts but also must demonstrate them.  The Board 
released its final report a month and a half later.   
 
Board Recommendations 
 
August 25, 2003 was an unusually beautiful evening in Washington, D.C.  Just 
after dinner a small convoy of government vehicles departed from unmarked offices 
in Arlington, Virginia, en route to a government hanger at Washington-National 
airport.  As the sun set, a small NASA jet taxied to a stop.  On the tarmac, Admiral 
                                                 
202 See CAIB press releases, “Shuttle Leading Edge Foam Impact Test Update,” and “Foam Impact 
Test Breaks Reinforced Carbon-Carbon Panel,” The New York Times, June 6, 2003. 
203 William Langewiesche, “Columbia’s Last Flight,” The Atlantic Monthly, November, 2003. 
204 Acrimony over the tests fueled public controversy.  See, for example, John Schwartz and Matthew 
Wald, “Mock-Up Wing Is Torn by Foam In Shuttle Test,” The New York Times, May 30, 2003, and 
John Schwartz, “NASA's Foam Test Offered a Vivid Lesson in Kinetics,” The New York Times, June 5, 
2007. 
205 Matthew Wald and John Schwartz, “Tests Show Foam was Likely Cause of Shuttle’s Loss,” The 
New Work Times, July 8, 2003. 
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Gehman and a handful of staff unloaded its cargo of investigation reports into idling 
vans destined for Congress, the White House, NASA, and members of the press.206    
The report’s release the next morning marked a critical juncture in the 
shuttle’s return to flight.  The responsibility to implement changes called for in the 
248-page report fell now to NASA and to Congress.  The swing of attention away 
from the Board would be almost total.  In transmitting its final report, the Board 
relinquished the public stature it had commanded for seven months.  Its power now 
lay in the words left behind for others to follow.  In celebration of their 
accomplishment, Admiral Gehman uncorked champagne for a collective toast back at 
the Board offices.  Glasses were raised all around to the shuttle’s safe return to flight.   
 The Board’s final report made twenty-nine separate recommendations meant 
to address the investigation’s technical, organizational, and political findings.  Twenty 
technical recommendations—by far the largest single group—concerned the shuttle’s 
thermal protection system, imaging systems used to detect debris strikes, orbiter 
sensor data, risk methodologies for foreign object and orbital debris, and several 
specific components, including wiring and bolt catchers.  The Board designated most 
of them to be implemented before the return to flight launch.    
On the organizational front, the Board’s most dramatic recommendation called 
for a separate technical authority inside the shuttle program to assume responsibility 
for safety verification.  Delegating the safety function to an office independent of 
shuttle management was meant to ensure that a NASA manager responsible for 
schedule and budget pressures would no longer be forced to also adjudicate safety 
issues.  Because a new division of authority would be required between the program 
office and safety organization, the Board anticipated NASA could not implement the 
recommendation by the return to flight launch.  It did, however, require that NASA 
produce a plan showing how the transition would be achieved.207 
 The Board’s most dramatic political recommendation was a directive to retire 
the shuttle as soon as possible and to devise a new mission for NASA in space.208  
The RCC panel on the Columbia that shattered when struck by foam had been 
weakened by age.  Like many of the shuttle’s components, it had been designed to fly 
a particular number of mission cycles over a short period, rather than designed for 
                                                 
206 Personal account, August 2003. 
207 See Recommendation 9.1-1. 
208 Columbia Accident Investigation Board Final Report (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing 
Office, 2003), Vol. 1, 208-211. 
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chronological longevity.  No one imagined when the shuttle was being designed in the 
mid-1970s that it would still be flying in the 21st century.  With no firm conception of 
its retirement date, shuttle managers were unable to make informed decisions about 
age-related maintenance programs and safety upgrades, and had not developed a 
comprehensive effort to monitor chronological aging.  
Alongside its call to retire the shuttle as soon as possible, the investigation 
prodded the Congress and White House to develop a new mission for human 
spaceflight.  In the Board’s judgment, U.S. space policy had been largely un-
addressed—expect in symbolic ways—by three successive administrations.209  The 
Board’s goal in pushing the nation to develop new goals in space was to eliminate 
ambiguity over how long NASA intended to rely on the shuttle as its primary space 
vehicle.  Its conclusion that the ambiguous policy architecture then in place threatened 
the safe functioning of the shuttle is an acknowledgement by the Board of how 
NASA’s broader political and ideological environment impact line-engineering 
decisions.  The Board, in short, viewed NASA as a complex system in which 
political, organizational, ideological, and technical dynamics all interact.  The final 
report illustrated how far its members had moved beyond the Board’s original 
mandate to determine only the accident’s technical cause. 
 
2.5 Columbia Investigation and the Politics of Disaster 
 
 The catastrophic loss of the orbiter Columbia was perhaps the most visible 
breakdown in the national security state in the four years between 9/11 and the Iraq 
occupation’s descent into violence.  The image of the shuttle’s breakup, played 
repeatedly on television news, prompted an international outpouring of sympathy.  
Because the shuttle was not merely a scientific instrument but rather a symbol of 
national power, discovering the accident’s cause and returning the shuttle to flight 
became a national imperative.  The President immediately announced that the U.S. 
                                                 
209 It has become a truism that presidential aspirations in space do not always manifest themselves.  
Their implementation depends in part upon the political standing of the President and in part upon the 
coincidence of the development of space technology with other political and military interests, both of 
which vary over NASA’s history.  For an overview of Administration attempts to define NASA’s 
mission, see Roger D. Launius and Howard E. McCurdy eds., Spaceflight and the Myth of Presidential 
Leadership (Campaign-Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1997).  See also Walter McDougall, 
Heavens and the Earth: A Political History of the Space Age (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1985, 1997). 
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mission in space would continue.  It fell to a crisis commission to oversee the 
investigation and to propose recommendations for reform.  
The experience of the Columbia investigation yields three general lessons 
about the politics of disaster and reform.  The first is that commission independence is 
a precept for success, and that commissions have several sources of agency to achieve 
it.  The Columbia investigation began its institutional life under NASA control.  Its 
initial framing as a search for technical failure reflected the long-standing tendency to 
conceive of accidents primarily in terms of mechanical breakdowns.  In the eyes of 
the Board itself and the Congress to which NASA ultimately answered, the off-the-
shelf contingency plan provided too little independence and too many restrictions on 
what could be investigated.  The ensuing public controversy about the Board’s 
impartiality ultimately enabled it to break free from NASA control.  Congress’s desire 
for the investigation to produce an overall evaluation of the shuttle program as well as 
the need for it to conform to democratic norms became sources of agency the Board’s 
chairman harnessed.  
The second lesson is that the Board’s organizational independence enabled its 
epistemic independence.  The imperative to broaden its investigative focus led the 
newly independent Board to assemble powerful diagnostic tools.  Within its staff, the 
Board established a capability to independently evaluate analysis and data provided 
by NASA as well as a stable of experts to help the Board understand the 
organizational and political causes of Columbia’s loss.  The investigation’s policy 
analysis and engineering resources ultimately rivaled the resources NASA dedicated 
to its own internal investigation, ensuring that the Board would not be outmaneuvered 
by the agency on the technical or analytical front. 
The Board quickly put these powerful diagnostic technologies to work, and it 
was this concentration of expertise that enabled the Board to critique NASA 
operations at multiple levels.  Prior investigations had not blamed history.  Yet as 
soon as the Board’s investigation of physical cause unearthed puzzling behaviors by 
NASA managers, members of the Board with social science training came to interpret 
those behaviors in a sociological frame.  Helped along by an academic sociologist, the 
entire Board came to see erroneous technical decisions as the product of flawed 
political, cultural, and institutional factors.  Its outsider gaze viewed the space 
program as a complex system whose position as part of the national security state 
introduced powerful ideological and symbolic dynamics.  The articulation of accident 
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cause that addressed each of these causal levels was unique in the history of official 
investigations.  
The third lesson to draw concerns the need for commissions to be highly 
instrumental.  The Board did not stop with its broader understanding of cause.  It also 
wrestled with NASA’s history of rejecting reforms recommended by outside groups 
and the agency’s resistance to investigation findings and actions.  In so doing, the 
Board probed the linkages between disaster and reform, becoming reflexive about 
how it could deploy resources to foster desired changes within NASA.  Outreach to 
the media and political leaders, mounting a visible demonstration of the accident 
hypothesis, and staging its recommendations by time of implementation were among 
the strategies the Board employed to leverage its influence.  Charting the Board’s 
instrumentality in this way highlights key divergences from the linear model of 
reform that underpins the use of commissions.  Simply issuing recommendations is 
not sufficient.  For reform to occur in desired ways, commission must deploy their 
resources and the dynamics of their inquiry to overcome agency resistance. 
Whether NASA would adopt the Board’s recommendations, and succeed in 
safely operating the shuttle in the future, was now out of the Board’s control. 
 
 Chapter 3 
 
Return to Flight 
 
Twenty-three months after the Columbia Board issued its final report, a subset of the 
investigation’s staff gathered at the Kennedy Space Center’s Banana Creek viewing site.  
Sitting together on bleachers three miles from pad 39B, the staff awaited NASA’s return to 
flight launch along with First Lady Laura Bush.  At 10:39 a.m. on July 26, 2005, the shuttle 
Discovery shot forth into clear blue sky, a thunderous boom signaling NASA’s triumphant 
return to space.  The elation was not to last. 
As the investigation staff sipped celebratory margaritas on Coco Beach pier, 
engineers reviewing digital images of the shuttle’s ascent made a startling discovery.  Just 
after solid rocket booster separation, a large chunk of insulating foam tore loose from the 
external tank and cart-wheeled within inches of Discovery’s right wing.  One foot by two feet 
in size, and nine-tenths of a pound in weight, the foam debris was strikingly similar to the 
piece that doomed Columbia more than two years before.   
Analysis later determined that Discovery escaped certain catastrophe by seconds.  
Had the foam debris from the external tank’s PAL ramp flaked off earlier in the ascent, 
higher atmospheric pressure would have transported it directly into the fragile reinforced 
carbon (RCC) panels that compose the wing’s leading edge.210  Only because Discovery had 
already climbed into ultra thin air did the foam debris tumble harmlessly away.  In addition to 
the PAL ramp, several other potentially fatal pieces of debris flaked off the shuttle, including 
a chunk of foam near the left bipod ramp.  The exact accident NASA and the Columbia 
Board labored to prevent nearly reoccurred.  For the second time in three years NASA 
grounded the shuttle fleet indefinitely.211   
In order to make sense of how disaster was virtually repeated, this chapter will 
examine technical and administrative decision-making in the shuttle program from the day 
the Columbia Board report was released until the shuttle Discovery was cleared for launch.  
                                                 
210 For a technical discussion of the debris incidents on the ascent of STS-114, see NASA, “External Tank Tiger 
Team Report—Part I: Preliminary Status and Data Package,” October 7, 2005. 
211 “NASA Grounds Shuttle Fleet,” CNN, July 28, 2005. 
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Because foam loss recurred, negating the goal of post-accident re-engineering, particular 
attention will be paid to External Tank project’s effort to reduce foam debris.  Understanding 
how the remedial measures ordered by the Columbia investigation ultimately failed to keep 
the shuttle safe requires analyzing how external political imperatives and NASA’s own sense 
of mission shaped the internal adjudication of technical judgments.  Tracing the relationship 
between investigation recommendations and decisions on what constituted sufficient margins 
of safety for foam loss will illustrate the dynamics driving the return to flight process, 
providing an empirical basis for theorizing how the agency failed to learn from disaster, 
despite the intervention of a disaster investigation.   
 
3.1 NASA’s Response to the Investigation 
 
The return to flight process began long before the Columbia Board issued its report, 
with NASA’s decisions about how to respond to the accident.  For the first two weeks after 
Columbia’s loss, shuttle program manager Ron Dittemore held daily press conferences at 
which he impressed observers with his forthright, even searching answers to media questions.  
The briefings struck a different tone than had happened after the Challenger accident 
seventeen years before.212  After the Columbia Board assumed responsibility for media 
briefings, corporate NASA faded from public view, remaining mostly silent in face of 
popular and official scrutiny.   
Behind this apparent calm NASA’s leadership formulated strategies for interacting 
with the investigation and the public.  The Administrator and his deputies debated how the 
agency would prepare to return the shuttle to flight and rebuild public confidence in its 
operations.  A key question was whether NASA would embrace the investigation as the 
arbiter of how it was to reform or reserve the right to reject its recommendations.  NASA’s 
response to the investigation thus took form quite early.  Decisions made within NASA 
headquarters in the spring and summer of 2003 shaped how NASA was to conduct itself after 
the investigation’s end.   
One of NASA’s first decisions was to begin a public relations effort.  Although for 
the most part the agency maintained a face of contrition and refused to comment on emerging 
                                                 
212 Eric Malnic, “Hot Seat Makes a Good Fit for NASA’s Shuttle Manager,” Los Angeles Times, February 6, 
2003. 
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investigation findings, on several occasions officials rose to defend NASA against mounting 
charges that its managers had acted irresponsibly before and during Columbia’s mission.  
Notably, as the Columbia investigation scrutinized mission control decisions, NASA released 
transcripts of key meetings in which the fatal foam strike was analyzed.213  The NASA public 
affairs office then arranged for mission managers implicated in the controversial decision not 
to deem the foam strike a safety of flight issue to defend their actions before a handpicked 
group of reporters.214 
In addition to ensuring that its side of the story was part of media coverage of the 
investigation, NASA commenced technical preparations for returning the shuttle to flight 
long before the scope of technical faults was known.  On March 12, 2003, NASA’s associate 
administrator for space flight assembled a team under the leadership of astronaut Col. James 
D. Halsee, Jr.215  As details of the accident became known, NASA formed a larger “Return to 
Flight Planning Team” in April 2003 in which engineers began exploring hardware fixes they 
anticipated would be necessary.  The Space Flight Leadership Council, NASA’s governing 
body for shuttle modifications, began adjudicating proposed engineering modifications the 
following month.216  
Among the more straightforward of its actions, NASA’s return to flight team began 
working on four interim recommendations passed down by the investigation before the 
publication of its final report.  The shuttle program eventually added fifteen “raising the bar” 
safety upgrades that went beyond what the investigation required.  To show its 
responsiveness to the investigation, NASA chronicled the steps it had taken in a “Return to 
                                                 
213 NASA Press Release, “Space Shuttle Mission Management Team Transcripts Released,” July 21, 2003. 
214 NASA,  “Transcript of NASA Press Conference with Linda Hamm, Phil Engelauf, and LeRoy Cain,” July 
23, 2003. Their sorrow at having overseen decisions that ultimately contributed to Columbia’s loss was the 
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215 NASA, “NASA’s Implementation Plan for Return to Flight and Beyond,” (August 15, 2003), 3-1 and 
(September 8, 1002) Appendix A, A-1. 
216 NASA, “NASA’s Implementation Plan for Return to Flight and Beyond,” (September 8, 1002) Appendix A, 
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Flight Implementation Plan.”217  The glossy document, meant for public and media 
consumption, was posted prominently on NASA’s website.218  
Not all of NASA’s actions were carefully linked to technical details emerging from 
the accident sequence.  As the Board disclosed its focus on managerial and organizational 
questions, NASA unveiled its own plan for a re-invigorated safety and mission assurance 
organization inside the shuttle program.  On Tuesday July 15, 2003, Administrator O’Keefe 
announced the creation of an independent engineering and safety center that would involve 
more than 250 employees across NASA headquarters and six field centers.219  The safety 
center was to provide independent assessment and testing support to projects and programs.  
O’Keefe tapped Ralph Roe, a shuttle program manager who had played a leading role in 
decisions during Columbia’s flight, to head the new safety office.220  
Many interpreted O’Keefe’s creation of the safety center as a deliberate pre-emption 
of the Board.  By ordering a major change in how NASA performed safety oversight just a 
month and a half before the investigation released its recommendations, O’Keefe entrenched 
expectations inside NASA as to what the new safety structure would be.  The Board went on 
to recommend a different model of technical oversight that the new NASA safety center was 
not designed to accommodate.221  A review panel later noted that the advent and staffing of 
the safety center announced by O’Keefe complicated NASA’s transition to the technical line 
authority ultimately recommended by the Columbia Board.222  
                                                 
217 Frequently updated versions of “NASA’s Implementation Plan for Return to Flight and Beyond” were posted 
at the agencies return to flight website from July 2003 through the launch of the Shuttle Discovery a year and a 
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O'Leary, and Mr. William Wegnerm Appendix A2, Return to Flight Task Group Final Report, August 17, 2005, 
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222 See the findings of the Organizational Review Subpanel, Return to Flight Task Group. 
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The safety center was not O’Keefe’s only act of resistance.  Though NASA had 
pledged the investigation full accountability and access, O’Keefe’s public comments during 
congressional testimony and elsewhere revealed deep ideological fissures between NASA 
leadership and the Board.223  At one press conference he lashed out at the theories of 
sociologist Diane Vaughan. “Book sales must be up,” O’Keefe commented, implying that 
Vaughan’s association with the investigation was motivated by financial gain.224  
Revealing a Janus-faced posture that would persist through the return to flight 
process, NASA was at once cooperating with and resisting the investigation and its findings.  
This dynamic of resistance, as corporate NASA struggled to control the shuttle program and 
its own image, is characteristic of the politics of disaster and reform.  How commissions and 
the institutions they investigate manage the tension between them affects how political, 
organizational, and ideological change occurs.    
After several early adversarial moments, O’Keefe discovered he was in no position to 
resist the investigation’s findings, either in public or with lawmakers.225  The Columbia 
Board had unearthed damaging information about managerial lapses and safety flaws inside 
NASA.  Most prominently, with its foam shot test, the Board visibly proved wrong 
O‘Keefe’s prediction that foam could not shatter an RCC panel.  O’Keefe not only led an 
organization that at first denied its culpability in the Columbia accident.  By loudly 
dismissing the investigation’s hypothesis, O’Keefe had been proven something of a fool.  In 
response, critics in the media and Congress increasingly assailed him and others at NASA for 
failing to take responsibility for the accident.  The Columbia investigation had made a 
forceful case both in public and to the lawmakers to whom NASA is accountable.  Like other 
successful disaster investigations, the Board had not only found damaging facts.  It had 
demonstrated NASA was wrong. 
It was from a position of damaged credibility in the summer of 2003 that O’Keefe 
announced his most significant return to flight policy: a pledge that NASA would “comply 
                                                 
223 The exchanges between Admiral Gehman and Administrator O’Keefe at the Senate Commerce Committee 
Hearing, May 13, 2003, are emblematic.  See Larry Wheeler, “Gehman, O’Keefe Spur Before Senate Panel: 
Pair at odds about Shuttle safety,” Florida Today, May 14, 2004 and William Langeweische, “Columbia’s Last 
Flight,” The Atlantic Monthly, November, 2003. 
224 Diane Vaughan, “NASA Revisited: Theory, Analogy, and Public Sociology,” American Journal of 
Sociology, Vol. 112, No. 2, September 2006, 353-93. 
225 Several of O’Keefe’s colleagues cite his fall in political standing as the reason behind his announcement of 
an overarching policy for how NASA would respond.  Interviews with Return to Flight Task Group members 
and staff, March and April, 2006. 
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fully and without equivocation” with Board recommendations.226  O’Keefe’s unconditional 
acceptance of pending Board recommendations became known as the “embrace and comply” 
policy—a policy whose full significance did not manifest itself until months later.  When the 
report was released, he repeatedly told the press, “we get it.”  The official line, aired in 
numerous public appearances, was “to accept those findings and to comply with the 
recommendations, embrace this report, and go about diligently implementing all those 
recommendations to improve it.”227  The complete supplication was a stunning reversal from 
NASA’s earlier stance, and also an acknowledgement of how badly the agency’s reputation 
had been damaged by the investigation.  The Columbia investigation had succeeded in 
turning a piece of foam into an indictment of NASA, illustrating in the process the role that 
public and official opinion plays in the receptivity of agencies to reform. 
 
Return to Flight Task Group  
 
O’Keefe soon bolstered his “embrace and comply” by agreeing to submit his agency’s 
implementation of report recommendations to external verification.  The job of assessing 
NASA’s compliance with the Board’s fifteen return to flight recommendations, plus 
additional “raising the bar” measures identified by the shuttle program, fell to a 26-member 
committee chartered at O’Keefe’s behest.  The Return to Flight Task Group grew out of an 
existing NASA advisory group co-chaired by Thomas Stafford, a Gemini and Apollo 
astronaut, and four-time shuttle astronaut Richard Covey.  The full Task Group, which 
operated with its own staff and under the provisions of the Federal Advisory Committee Act, 
was formalized in mid-July.228 
                                                 
226 John Schwartz, “Critics Question NASA on Safety of the Shuttles,” The New York Times, February 7, 2005. 
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Members of the Board, media commentators, and some in Congress viewed the 
Return to Flight Task Group as a promising development.  Although O’Keefe selected 
agency insiders to chair the review, its membership was unusually varied.  Experts on risk 
management, organizational sociology, and public administration, including the former 
director of the Congressional Budget Office, a professor from the Maxwell School of Public 
Affairs, and the former Under Secretary of the Navy, joined astronauts and aeronautical 
engineers on the panel.229  The fully augmented Task Group met even before the Board 
issued its final report and continued their evaluation of NASA until just before Discovery’s 
launch in July 2005.230   
Announcing an independent panel of experts to certify NASA’s implementation of 
investigation recommendations appeared to be a critical commitment.  How reforms 
proposed by commissions are actually implemented, and who oversees the process, is a 
crucial determinant to how organizational change happens.  Given NASA’s record of letting 
safety recommendations languish, commentators hailed O’Keefe’s move as a sign that the 
agency was finally reckoning with its troubled history.  The diversity of expertise on the 
Return to Flight Task Group was seen to signal NASA’s commitment to organizational and 
cultural as well as technical change.  The Task Group was however a weaker mechanism than 
used to verify the implementation of the Rogers Commission recommendations.  The ensuing 
congressional debate over its authority reveals that the battle for control over the shuttle 
program was very much alive even after the Columbia report was issued.   
After the Challenger accident, a panel from the National Research Council was 
endowed with the power to reject technical modifications proposed by NASA.231  When the 
National Research Council proposed to also oversee post-Columbia changes, O’Keefe 
rebuffed the offer in favor of constituting the Task Group, which would not have the power to 
veto modifications suggested by the shuttle program.232  Skeptical congressmen contested 
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O’Keefe’s decision, and two bills in Congress nearly overturned the process O’Keefe’s had 
set in place.233  The committees with jurisdiction of NASA ultimately voted the bills down, 
allowing O’Keefe’s Return to Flight Task Group to continue. 
Despite lingering congressional concerns that the return to flight process had no 
binding mechanism, NASA seemed poised to rehabilitate itself.  Administrator O’Keefe had 
publicly committed to “embrace and comply” with the Board’s recommendations and 
chartered a committee to independently verify the shuttle program’s compliance.  Though 
members of the investigation viewed with skepticism NASA’s claim that the shuttle would be 
ready for launch by spring 2004, no one doubted that NASA would return to flight in the 
medium-term.  All the ingredients for a successful reformation of the shuttle program seemed 
evident.   
Only one question posed by the investigation remained to be answered: how long 
would the shuttle fly before being retired, and what was to be NASA’s post-shuttle mission in 
space.  The answer, which came as a new space policy architecture announced by the 
President, was to shape how NASA implemented the investigation’s technical 
recommendations.  As the return to flight process commenced, new tensions between mission 
goals and safety standards were about to arise, revealing how political imperatives placed 
upon NASA by the President, together with the agency’s own internal sense of mission, 
impacted the decision-making of engineers and managers inside the shuttle program.   
Tracing the source and action of these tensions reveal why recommendations of disaster 
commissions are often difficult to implement. 
 
3.2 A New National Space Policy  
 
Until the Columbia accident, the Bush administration’s most significant decision 
about NASA had been appointing Sean O’Keefe as Administrator.  O’Keefe, then a White 
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House budget aide, was given an explicit brief to bring the agency’s cost accounting systems 
under control.  After the Columbia accident, the White House could no longer ignore the 
question of when the shuttle should be retired.  Four and a half months after the investigation 
report was released, President Bush unveiled a new agency-wide mission at NASA 
headquarters.   
Against a backdrop rendering a manned mission to Mars, Bush called for NASA to 
return to the moon by 2020 and then to eventually mount an expedition to the red planet.  The 
event announcing the new “Vision for Space Exploration” included a video uplink with the 
International Space Station.  Bush spoke to Commander Mike Foale, jokingly regretting that 
he couldn’t shake his hand.234  
The President’s announcement of a new mission for NASA marked a shift in 
rhetorical justification for human spaceflight from science to exploration, two imperatives 
that have uneasily coexisted since the inception of the space program.  Bush couched his new 
initiative in economic terms, justifying it as an investment in technological innovation that 
“will be repaid many times over.”235  The close coupling between spaceflight and national 
power once again bound NASA to the national security state. 
The President’s vision, however, was not immediately linked to the long-term 
commitment of resources needed to carry it out.  In a classic Washington maneuver, Bush 
provided few details about how the administration would pay over the long term for its 
ambitious Vision for Space Exploration and instead announced the appointment of a 
presidential commission to develop options.236  A few things, however, were clear.  In order 
to make way for extra-planetary exploration, the space shuttle would be retired by 2010, at 
which time construction of the International Space Station would be complete.  To fund the 
plan’s initial stages, Bush proposed adding one billion dollars per year to NASA’s budget for 
five years, with $11 billion more being reprogrammed to the human spaceflight program 
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from existing NASA accounts.237  To replace the shuttle, a Crew Exploration Vehicle would 
be designed and built by 2014.  Lunar missions would commence in 2020, with a Mars 
mission following around 2030.  Implementing the President’s new policy would roil NASA 
for years to come.   
 The President’s plan was immediately contested on many fronts, triggering a political 
struggle over NASA’s future just as it was attempting to return the shuttle to flight.  Partisan 
critics assailed the initiative as a political stunt.  At a time when news of the growing 
insurgency in Iraq had lowered Bush’s approval ratings, White House advisors reportedly 
endorsed the plan “as a way of associating the President with a unifying and uplifting 
election-year goal that transcends politics.”238  Others viewed the announcement as Bush’s 
initial foray into the 2004 presidential campaign.  Space policy analysts noted the plan’s 
similarity to President George H.W. Bush’s soon abandoned call in 1989 for NASA to land a 
human on Mars by 2020.239   
The space science community was especially critical of the President’s stated 
intentions to prioritize the exploration of space over its scientific investigation.240  
Reprogramming such a substantial portion of NASA’s budget from science programs to 
human spaceflight led many scientists to conclude that the administration was in essence 
paying for its exploration initiative at the expense of research goals.241  One scientist opined 
in the New York Times that the President’s plan was “a poison pill” that amounted to “an 
impossible expensive and pointless program for some other administration to cancel.”242   
The Vision for Space Exploration soon introduced far-reaching organizational 
changes in the agency.  Immediately following the President’s address, NASA announced a 
new Directorate of Space Explorations Systems to develop technology to take astronauts to 
the moon and mars.243  A new Directorate of Aeronautics Research assumed leadership of the 
agency’s research and development activities.  After the release of the Aldridge report—the 
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commission called for by the President—NASA added two additional mission directorates.244  
All in all, the Vision for Space Exploration consolidated NASA’s seven divisions into four 
directorates, reorganizing the agency along functional rather than disciplinary lines.245   
Implementing the changes called for by the “Vision for Space Exploration” took a 
great deal of time, requiring O’Keefe to largely delegate management of the shuttle program 
to subordinates.246  The organizational and budgetary restructuring that was a necessary 
consequence of the President’s initiative soon introduced tensions into NASA’s efforts to 
return the shuttle to flight, raising questions about whether NASA would once again cut 
corners after being saddled with a mission that appeared to outstrip its available resources.247  
The first major test of NASA’s commitment to the Columbia Board’s recommendations came 
only two days after the President’s speech. 
 
Hubble Debate  
 
On January 16, 2004, O’Keefe announced that he was canceling a service mission to 
the Hubble telescope.  Choosing not to replace its ailing components dealt an effective 
deathblow to the publicly beloved instrument.248  O’Keefe’s remarks stunned Hubble 
scientists at the Goddard Space Flight Center and shocked a public who loved the stunning 
visages of the cosmos the telescope provided.249   
O’Keefe’s announcement caught Congress by surprise as well.  Within hours an 
outcry arose over NASA’s unilateral decision to cease telescope operations.250  Many 
immediately leapt to the conclusion that O’Keefe had canceled the billion-dollar repair 
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mission to help pay for the President’s new space plan.  Those that foresaw a coming tradeoff 
between space science and exploration seized on Hubble’s premature demise as further 
evidence that space science was getting short shrift.  Overnight, Hubble became a visible 
symbol of what NASA was losing under the President’s new space policy. 
Surprisingly, O’Keefe denied that budget constraints led him to prematurely retire 
Hubble.251  Instead of describing the cancellation as a cost-saving measure, he rationalized 
his decision in terms of shuttle safety, maintaining that recommendations passed down by the 
Columbia investigation forbade a Hubble repair mission.252  O’Keefe at first offered few 
details as to how exactly the Columbia investigation’s recommendations precluded sending 
the shuttle on a mission it had safely completed three times before.  His eventual elaboration 
hung on a novel reading of the Board’s provision that the shuttle have a safe haven at the 
International Space Station in the event of a breach of its thermal protection system.253   
O’Keefe buttressed this primary argument with a secondary line of reasoning.  He 
argued that reducing the overall number of shuttle missions was in line with the Board’s call 
to retire it as soon as possible.  Canceling the Hubble servicing mission would reduce flights 
by one.  Only by reading into the Board’s recommendation more than had been seen by 
nearly all other commentators, and by stretching the definition of safety to include “fewest 
flights,” was O’Keefe able to arrive at the conclusion that a Hubble mission could be 
canceled on safety grounds alone.  It would prove a critical juncture in the politics of 
implementation now at play between the Board, NASA, Congress and the President.  
O’Keefe’s novel reading of the Columbia Board’s recommendation on the need for a 
safe haven was not shared by others in Congress or at NASA.  Members of the accident 
board also refuted O’Keefe interpretation.254  Dissenting NASA engineers even leaked 
internal engineering documents that undercut O’Keefe’s position.255  As the controversy 
intensified, Barbara Mikulski (D-MD), in whose district the Hubble engineering division sits, 
asked Admiral Gehman for an impartial review of whether NASA should undertake the 
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mission.256  Calling back into service the chair of an investigation that had concluded months 
before illustrated the continuing relevance of the Columbia Board as an arbiter of NASA 
decisions about safety.   
In a personal letter to Congress, Gehman stated in unambiguous terms that the Board 
did not foreclose a mission to Hubble.257  His letter sheds additional light on the rationale 
behind several CAIB recommendations, definitely answering the question of what the Board 
meant in this instance.  The New York Times followed Gehman’s letter with an editorial about 
Mr. O’Keefe’s “Astronomical Exaggerations.”258 Dissent piled on still further when the 
National Academy’s Space Studies Board stated that the safety justification proffered by 
O’Keefe was bogus and that the scientific value of the telescope merited another servicing 
mission.259  These rebuttals placed enormous pressure on NASA to reverse course.  O’Keefe 
successor as NASA Administrator ultimately rescheduled the repair mission, which was 
successfully completed in May 2009. 
The Hubble controversy illustrates a number of dynamics of the politics of disaster 
investigation and reform.  O’Keefe’s decision to cancel the mission on what he stated as 
safety grounds illustrates NASA’s willingness to marshal technical engineering arguments in 
order to rationalize what by all accounts appeared to be a budgetary decision.  The inevitable 
intermingling of specialized engineering judgment with broader political concerns is a 
signature feature of the institutions of the national security state.  Yet reckoning with a public 
symbol, Administrator O’Keefe discovered, is no simple matter.  Congress’s ability to solicit 
independent analysis ultimately limited NASA’s ability to act unilaterally, separating in this 
case the technical issues at stake from the programmatic decision being made.260   
The Hubble controversy, however, would mark the last time Congress undertook a 
detailed review of NASA’s decision during the return to flight process.  Thereafter, NASA’s 
decisions largely fell below the public radar, even as the President’s Vision for Space 
Exploration continued to place enormous pressure on NASA to quickly return the shuttle to 
flight.   
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 Schedule Pressure Reappears   
 
The Hubble servicing decision was not the only controversy that unfolded during the 
implementation of the Board’s recommendations.  The second significant post-Columbia 
clash of imperatives at NASA materialized over whether the high rate of planned shuttle 
flights constituted a threat to safety.  Understanding the pressures acting on the flight 
schedule is crucial to linking how political decisions taken by the President and senior policy 
makers impacted engineering judgments within the external tank project.  It all began with 
the budget.   
The budget architecture of the Vision for Space Exploration was predicated on 
retiring the space shuttle by 2010.  Without being able to redirect funds consumed by the 
shuttle, NASA would be unable to pay for the construction and testing of NASA’s successor 
spaceship, the Crew Exploration Vehicle.  Yet retiring the shuttle by 2010 narrowed the 
window of opportunity for NASA to complete the construction of the international space 
station.   
In order to reach the desired, internationally agreed upon configuration of station 
modules and capabilities, NASA estimated that 28 dedicated shuttle flights would be 
necessary.261  After two post-Columbia flights to certify hardware modifications, NASA 
would need to maintain a flight rate of approximately five shuttle flights per year, plus a 
possible Hubble repair mission.  This would approach the highest post-Challenger flight rate 
that NASA had previously achieved with four orbiters, though now, after the loss of 
Columbia, it only had three.  Commentators, NASA employees, and former Board 
investigators raised concerns that the ambitious launch schedule would reintroduce the very 
same scheduled pressure cited by the investigation as a key factor in the Columbia 
accident.262   
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 The debate over schedule pressure refocused attention on the engineering efforts 
underway to meet the Board’s recommendations.  If engineering fixes proceeded quickly, 
NASA would have a better chance to complete space station construction before the 
mandated retirement of the shuttle.  However, in late February 2004, just a month after the 
President’s new policy was released, NASA associate administrator William Readdy 
announced that efforts to reduce foam debris and develop a repair kit for the thermal 
protection system were taking longer than anticipated.  Potentially dangerous corrosion on 
actuators in the shuttle tail rudder had also been discovered.  As a result, the shuttle program 
postponed the launch of its first post-Columbia mission from September 2004 to March 2005.  
The delay gave engineers a further six months to devise and test hardware modifications.263    
Further engineering setbacks emerged in summer 2004.  A new 50-foot inspection 
boom outfitted with laser and optical detection systems to find cracks in the thermal 
protection system would not be ready to fly on the first return to flight mission.264  Safety-
conscious engineers then leaked documents alleging that using the International Space 
Station as a ‘safe haven” in the event of a shuttle emergency—as required by the Columbia 
report—had high risk of failure.  “The employees who provided the documents,” the New 
York Times reported, “said the agency was cutting corners on cost and demanding that its 
schedule of space station construction continue, with safety as an afterthought.”265  
Behavioral Science Technology, Inc., an organizational culture consultancy, then 
issued a 145-page report suggesting that open communication is rarely realized within NASA 
and that employees do not feel comfortable raising safety concerns with management.266  
Employee surveys conducted at multiple NASA centers provided empirical confirmation for 
the critique of NASA safety culture laid down by the Columbia investigation.  NASA also 
released an internal review that found many of the Board’s findings and observations applied 
to the International Space Station program as well.267 In response, O’Keefe said, “we’ve got 
a lot of work to do.”268 
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The technical setbacks and reports of safety shortcuts left observers of the space 
program deeply troubled.269  The political imperatives being placed on NASA by the 
President together with the agency’s own interest in completing space station construction to 
a particular configuration appeared to create an environment antithetical to the rigorous, 
safety driven process that NASA managers had publicly committed themselves to in the 
embrace and comply policy.  Just months after the Columbia report positioned NASA to 
begin a new era of operations, the tide appeared to have turned against shuttle safety.   
 
3.3 Return to Flight Task Group  
 
Four days after O’Keefe announced he was canceling the Hubble repair mission, the 
Return to Flight Task Group issued its first interim report.  The report praised NASA for the 
significant work it had undertaken, but noted that few of the Board’s recommendations had 
been fulfilled.  “While the tone of this interim report is justifiably positive,” Task Group 
members wrote, “progress should not be mistaken for accomplishment.”270 The report also 
stated that “NASA has not been timely in some of their responses to Task Group requests for 
information.”271  The sentence struck an ominous note, leading outsiders to wonder whether 
shuttle program managers were willfully obstructing the Task Group in an attempt to conceal 
or play down technical problems. 
In what would prove to be a major shortcoming, and also an important determinant of 
success among disaster commissions, the Task Group differed greatly from the Columbia 
investigation.  More an advisory panel than an investigative commission, it was not endowed 
with the diagnostic tools that the Columbia Board wielded so effectively.  By design, it did 
not have operational control of the decision to launch.  Rather, it sole mandate was to 
produce a public report for the NASA Administrator.  Its larger membership made meetings 
unwieldy.  Unlike the investigation, the Task Group met only occasionally and was supported 
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by a small, mostly administrative staff.  Nevertheless, the Task Group followed in the 
investigation’s footsteps by planning a series of public hearings, fact-finding trips, and 
interim reports that would ensure media coverage of its activities.  The Task Group’s highly 
public role gave it a measure of coercive power over shuttle program decisions.  Launching 
against the advice of the Task Group would invite an unprecedented degree of media 
scrutiny.   
The Task Group’s members were initially excited about their role.  One member 
described their job as providing “an orthogonal look,” an outsider’s perspective that, fresh 
with new insight, would help NASA managers rigorously consider the difficult choices they 
faced.272  Realizing this goal would prove difficult.   
Despite its clear mandate, the Task Group was slow to establish a coherent framework 
for its inquiry.273  In a reprise of debates that took place on the Board, members of the Task 
Group differed on the extent to which management and organizational issues should be 
considered a part of their evaluation.  Not surprisingly, the co-chairs, both astronauts, 
preferred that the Task Group stick to a narrow technical assessment of the return to flight 
recommendations, whereas several NASA outsiders with expertise in organization and 
management took a more expansive view of the factors that belonged in the Task Group’s 
purview.274  In a development with broader implications for the reform of complex systems, 
the view that ideological, cultural, and organizational dynamics are as important as 
engineering decisions about the technology would ultimately lose out.   
 
Fixing the Foam 
 
The Task Group’s primary technical evaluation concerned NASA’s effort to prevent a 
catastrophic debris strike.  The investigation mandated a two-pronged approach.  Board 
recommendation R3.2-1 called on NASA to reduce external tank debris, while R3.3-2 
focused on hardening the orbiter so it could better withstand inadvertent strikes.275  NASA’s 
effort to implement these two recommendations, as well as the Task Group’s changing 
reception of its efforts, illustrate the competing pressures at play in the return to flight 
                                                 
272 Interview with Dr. Amy Donahue, March 22, 2006. 
273 Interview with Dr. Amy Donahue, March 22, 2006. 
274 Interview with Dr. Amy Donahue, March 22, 2006. 
275 See CAIB report, Chapter 3. 
 81
process.  It is here that schedule demands imposed from above collided most visibly with 
engineering demands emanating from below.  Understanding them can only occur by diving 
into the case’s details. 
The external tank is deceptively complex.  Dozens of protrusions stud its surface, any 
one of which could shed a sizable piece of foam.  The flat “acreage foam” that covers most of 
the tank is also problematic.  Large sections of it have broken free during launch for ill-
understood reasons.276  NASA and Lockheed engineers in the tank project knew a partial re-
design would have to be undertaken to reduce foam loss from the protrusions and acreage 
tile.  But they also knew that many accidents have been caused when added safety systems 
and modifications cause malfunctions on their own accord.277   
Establishing where the risk of re-engineering outweighed the danger of leaving things 
the same was often a difficult judgment.   Complicating matters still further, the root cause of 
foam loss was not well understood.  Several possible failure modes had been identified.  
Engineers working at NASA and the Board unearthed evidence that subsurface voids lead to 
failure.  In a so-called adhesive/cohesive debond, liquid nitrogen leaking from the tank—a 
process called cryo-pumping—or atmosphere that freezes deep within these voids—a process 
called cryo-ingestion—causes foam to pop off when it expands in response to the thermal 
stress of launch.278  Also suspected, but never definitely confirmed, was that larger pieces of 
foam separate when a sheer develops at the juncture of two layers, a fault termed knit-line 
failure.  A minority of engineers suspected that mechanical crushing due to cryogenic loading 
also played a role, given how radically the tank shrinks and expands while being fueled and 
pressurized for flight.  Lockheed engineers however vigorously denied the possibility of such 
a failure mode, claiming that any forces from mechanical crushing would remain under 1 
percent of the foam’s structural strength.279   
At one level, NASA faced a quite standard technical controversy involving competing 
engineering readings that were in principle resolvable.  A program of testing could in theory 
definitively uncover the mechanism for foam loss and thereby allow engineers to proceed 
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with modifications to the external tank protrusions and acreage tile that would end foam 
strikes to the shuttle with a high degree of confidence.   
But engineers on the tank project did not have unlimited resources at their disposal.  
They were constrained by schedule and budget pressures.  NASA’s desire to finish the space 
station and to fulfill the President’s Vision for Space Exploration placed a premium on the 
amount of time the external tank project could reasonably spend investigating mechanisms of 
foam loss.  Programmatic goals imposed by shuttle management placed limits on the re-
design effort from the outset.  In a decision that was to prove fateful, NASA tentatively slated 
the launch date of Discovery on mission STS-114 even before the Board’s report was 
released.280  Shuttle management then stuck to the March 2004 date they had selected after 
the investigation report called for more extensive modifications than anticipated.   
 
The Rush to Launch 
 
For engineers, the launch date functioned as a “line in the sand.”  Projects overseeing 
major shuttle components would need to complete re-engineering work and undergo a 
lengthy certification process before the flight readiness review, usually held one month 
before launch.  This initially gave engineers  in the tank project only six months in which to 
explore mechanisms of foam loss and redesign tank structures.  Designating a launch date 
before engineers assessed how long it might take to meet the new requirements constrained 
the possible solutions they could pursue.  It was here, in retrospect, that shuttle program 
management triggered a cascade of decisions that contributed to the potentially catastrophic 
foam loss on the return to flight launch.  
 Schedule pressure was the essential problem.  The near-term deadlines produced 
what Task Group member Dr. Charles Daniel calls a “very narrow trade space,” or matrix of 
engineering options that can be pursued in a given time limit.281  The result was that 
engineers could not undertake efforts to improve the tank’s safety that would take longer than 
six months to complete.  “The launch date drove us to a lot of very bad solutions,” said Task 
Group staff member Dennis Jenkins.  The modification chosen by engineers in the tank 
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project, Jenkins said, were “often the last solution on the list that they came up with but the 
only one they could get done.”282   
For the tank project, the launch date had two immediate consequences. First, a 
program of fundamental research to discover the mechanism of foam liberation could not be 
mounted in so short a time.  Members of the Task Group were disappointed with the decision 
not to further explore causes of foam loss.283  In particular, concern grew that the failure 
mode of the bipod ramp might be a knit-line sheer or mechanical crushing rather than 
adhesive/cohesive debond, which would entail different engineering modifications be made 
on the tank.  Task Group members proposed asking the Naval Research Labs to conduct an 
independent analysis to distinguish between the failure modes, but Task Group co-chair Dick 
Covey insisted that such an action was beyond the Task Group’s mandate.284  This decision 
would later take on significance when micro-cracks discovered on the external tank slated to 
lift shuttle Discovery to orbit, suggesting that mechanical crushing, not adhesive/cohesive 
debond, was the primary failure mode causing foam loss.285  Launching shuttles without 
understanding what caused foam debris unnerved Task Group members and tank project 
members alike, but unlike the Columbia investigation, Task Group members had no ability to 
explore the problem on their own.  Not providing a disaster investigation with its own staff 
and consulting resources handicapped its efforts. 
Second, the tight schedule precluded the tank project from re-engineering each of the 
areas and protrusions identified as at risk for catastrophic foam shedding.  Engineering 
reviews conducted by the tank project identified sixteen areas of foam liberation that could 
post a danger to the shuttle’s fragile thermal protection system.  To decide which to prioritize 
for redesign, the project undertook an analysis of the risk each posed and options for reducing 
it.  Only five of the sixteen could be redesigned in the time before the shuttle was to launch.   
To ensure commonality across the shuttle program, NASA program management 
devised a tiered scheme to prioritize re-engineering efforts.  Phase I activities were to occur 
before the launch of Discovery, phase II after the two post-Columbia “test flights,” and phase 
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III in the longer term.286  It was up to each project to determine, in coordination with program 
management, which modifications to pursue in each of the phases.  For the tank project, 
“phase I” areas included the bipod ramp, liquid oxygen line bellows, and the intertank.  The 
rest were slated for redesign in phases II and III, at unspecified future dates.  Importantly, the 
removal of the PAL ramp, one of the most dangerous potential sources of foam loss, was 
delayed until phase II.287   
As the tank project undertook its phase I modifications, the launch date started to slip 
once again.  With the scope of technical repairs becoming clear across the program, NASA 
announced in October 2003 that the return to flight launch would slip from March to 
September 2004.288  This would give engineers an additional six months to pursue their work.  
NASA announced a further delay in February 2004.  The return to flight launch, first 
scheduled for March 2004, would now slip to March 2005.289  
The problem for the tank project was that these launch extensions did not necessarily 
reopen the engineering “trade space” Daniel spoke of.  By the time the second delay was 
announced, work on existing modifications was far enough along that the tank project 
decided not to revert to technical course engineers would have preferred to follow had more 
time been available from the outset.290 “They were always six months away from a perceived 
flight day,” technical sub-panel member Dr. Charles Daniel explained, so that “all solutions 
were six month solutions.”291  With resources already committed, starting anew wasn’t 
possible.   
NASA eventually announced launch slips that amounted to over two years of 
additional time, but they came in increments that were too small to permit a fundamental 
reconsideration of the re-design effort.  “The slips were never long enough for them to go 
back and rethink things,” Jenkins explained.292  “If only we’d known we were down for two 
years we would have approached this very differently,” NASA engineers told the Task 
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Group.293  The tyranny of time had forced engineers into a highly imperfect sequence of 
decisions.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Chart Showing Slippage of Planned Launch Date294 
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The changing launch schedule was not the only dynamic affecting tank project efforts.  
Larger transformations at NASA also trickled down.  The announcement that the shuttle 
would be retired by 2010—made in conjunction with the President’s Vision for Space 
Exploration plan—led NASA to cancel phase III re-engineering efforts altogether. With the 
seemingly imminent retirement of the shuttle, it made little financial sense for the project to 
invest in exploring some of the fundamental issues regarding foam loss that had been 
relegated to Phase III.295  If the shuttle was to retire in 2010, resources would be better 
expended elsewhere.   
Work nevertheless continued diligently until January 2005, when the tank project was 
dealt a major setback.  A new engineering analysis revealed that the shuttle thermal 
protection system was more fragile than understood.296  Tests to determine debris strike 
vulnerability indicated RCC panels could fracture under in as little as 400 foot-pounds of 
stress, not a 1,500 figure initially determined by the Shuttle Integration Office.297  As a result, 
the tank project’s efforts to reduce debris were calibrated to an incorrect standard.  The tank 
project did meet its initial goal of reducing probable debris below an impact of 1,500-foot-
pounds, but as the Task Group commented in its final report, “these requirements were later 
perceived to be inadequate.”298 
 
Backing Away from “Embrace and Comply” 
 
NASA now faced a major crisis of credibility just four months before Discovery’s 
slated launch.  Would the shuttle program admit that the modified external tank did not meet 
the Board’s requirement to reduce debris below catastrophic levels and delay the return to 
flight launch to initiate a new effort to reduce debris?   Or would the program argue that it 
could not meet the Columbia standard but that efforts had yielded sufficient safety gains to 
proceed with launch?  The program did neither.  Instead, in the opinion of several Task 
Group members, it tried to “cook the numbers” so that Board’s standard could be “shown to 
be” upheld.  Shuttle management employed a little-used risk analysis tool to see whether a 
case could be built that existing modifications met the standard.  This “capabilities over 
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environment” analysis redefined the requirement from withstanding “worst-on-worst” 
impacts to only a “best-estimate” of the likely debris environment.  Because “worse on 
worst” impacts would still be possible in the real world, the change of assessment 
methodologies significantly reduced safety margins.299   
Critics saw the maneuver as a thinly-veiled attempt to “make the number come out 
right,” and indeed shuttle program managers admitted as much in private to Task Group 
members.300  When asked whether further modifications would be made to the external tank 
in light of the new analysis, the program’s answer, paraphrased in the Task Group report, was 
“no, that’s why we’re changing the models so we don’t have to change the tank.”301  The 
capabilities over environment analysis was, in the opinion of Task Group members, a classic 
case of “moving the goalposts” once it became clear that the original objective could not be 
met.302   
  On top of the revelation that the shuttle program was redefining standards, leaked 
internal documents fueled further speculation that NASA was indeed abandoning its 
commitment to a new ethic of safety.  One engineering assessment noted that “significant 
risks from further unknowns” would mar the return to flight launch because hardware 
modifications would not be complete in time.303  Another leaked document indicated that 
NASA managers were strategizing how to “beat” Board recommendations in the very ways 
noted by the Task Group.  The memo, written by manager of Systems Engineering and 
Integration John Muratore, outlined three ways to compensate for “overly conservative” 
assumptions that, if kept in place, would prevent NASA from meeting Board 
recommendations: 
 
1. Move from the traditional worst-case situation…to ‘our best estimate of actual 
conditions. 
2. Reduce safety rations 
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3. Relax standards304 
 
Attempts by the shuttle program to substitute less rigorous risk evaluation methods 
spurred a heated debate inside the Task Group over what constituted satisfactory fulfillment 
of the Columbia Board recommendations.  When the Task Group convened in February 
2005, three months before Discovery’s scheduled launch, shuttle managers increasingly 
proposed that the Task Group accept “best-effort” rather than “meet the standard” 
engineering fixes.  As a result, the Task Group found itself locked in a semantic argument 
with NASA officials over the definitions of verification and compliance.  A number of Task 
Group members accused NASA of having assembled something of a lawyer’s case—
construing the evidence in the best possible light rather then putting forward a dispassionate, 
balanced evaluation.305  To help referee the disputes that had broken out, the Task Group 
reached out to former Board members, including Admiral Gehman, but per their long-
standing policy to avoid making uninformed judgments from the sidelines, they declined to 
become involved.306  Congress also demurred.  The Task Group was left largely without 
allies to take on NASA itself.   
While internal arguments mounted within the Task Group, NASA began changing the 
tone of its public pledge to fulfill all of the Board’s recommendations.  As it became clear 
that required technical capacities could not be fully developed before the scheduled launch of 
Discovery, headquarters officials began to back away from Administrator O’Keefe’s pledge 
to unconditionally “embrace and comply.”  NASA spokesperson Allan Butel asserted that the 
investigation’s use of the word ‘practical’ “provided a degree of flexibility in fulfilling the 
recommendations.”307  Rather than fulfill Board recommendations unconditionally, NASA 
officials began stating in public that they would strive instead toward a substantial reduction 
of risk.  Embrace and comply, once a gold standard that NASA would hew to without fail, 
                                                 
304 John Schwartz, “NASA is Said to Loosen Risk Standards for Shuttle,” The New York Times, April 22, 2005. 
305 Interview with Dr. Charles Daniel, March 28, 2006, Dr. Amy Donahue, March 22, 2006, and Dennis Jenkins, 
April 6, 2006. 
306 Gehman and other Board members had long maintained a policy of distancing themselves from closely 
commentating on the return to flight process.  “One of the things the CAIB said when we released our report, 
and we've said it consistently since, we were not going to be sitting on the sidelines doing what we called 
'grading NASA's papers,’ Gehman said.  “I've been following this business, but not in great detail because our 
policy was that unless they just gaff us off, we weren't going to critique them. And they certainly are not gaffing 
off our recommendations. They certainly are making a try.” William Harwood, “Gehman: NASA is meeting 
intent of Columbia board: Interview with Admiral Gehman,” CBS News Online, February 10, 2005. 
307 John Schwartz, “Critics Question NASA on Safety of the Shuttles,” The New York Times, February 7, 2005. 
 89
gradually became a goal toward which NASA would merely work.  The therapeutic 
correctives specified by the Board began losing the inevitability that once surrounded their 
implementation. 
 
Revolt in the Task Group 
 
Despite growing reservations among some of its members, the Task Group as an 
official body initially did not object to NASA’s distancing from its “embrace and comply” 
policy.  The Task Group’s January 28, 2005 interim report conceded that if NASA did not 
follow CAIB recommendations to the letter, it would look favorably on NASA’s efforts so 
long as modifications contributed to a “reduced risk” on the shuttle.308  The Task Group, 
while still insisting upon a rigorous assessment of safety gains, was itself backing away from 
its earlier, absolutist stance on recommendation fulfillment. 
In March 2005, the Task Group assembled for what was then scheduled to be its last 
meeting.  Its members agreed that NASA had by now satisfactorily implemented thirteen of 
fifteen CAIB recommendations and one additional “raising the bar” measure.  But the group 
was split over the three recommendations that remained: external tank debris shedding, 
orbiter hardening, and thermal protection system inspection and repair.  
By now the push to launch had grown intense.  By moving Discovery from its hanger 
to the Vehicle Assembly Building and then rolling it to the launch pad, where further 
modifications could not easily be made, shuttle management signaled their intent to go ahead 
with a launch before all analytical disputes had been resolved.309  With engineering analysis 
still on-going, it looked as if the Task Group’s final assessment would be pushed to within 30 
days of Discovery’s schedule launch date, violating the original interim period NASA had 
committed to leaving between the end of the Task Group’s deliberations and the shuttle’s 
launch.  A confrontation between NASA and the Return to Flight Task Group loomed. 
In the tense atmosphere in which members tried to work through their evaluation of 
the final three recommendations, a disagreement broke out over information being supplied 
to the Task Group.  Members complained that responses to their requests for information, the 
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official system of correspondence between NASA and the Task Group, frequently arrived 
with out-of-date information.  Presentations given as evidence to the Task Group would have 
neither dates nor page numbers.  Some contained contradictory data.  It became clear to some 
Task Group members that NASA was not tasking its most knowledgeable officials to pull the 
data together.  Instead, less experienced staff had simply “gone off and data-mined.”  To 
some, this was a message from the shuttle program that Task Group requests were of 
secondary importance.  “They were polite, and business like,” Daniel commented, “but they 
knew the Task Group had no directive authority over them.  All we could do was serve and 
write a report and that was the end of it.”310   
The breakdown in the request for information process meant that Task Group 
members did not receive requested data in time for their last scheduled meeting.  The 
squabble spilled over into the press, with Task Group members accusing NASA of 
deliberately withholding analyses they needed to make a final assessment.311  After NASA 
did not deliver the data during two-days of fact-finding, the Task Group cancelled their 
public plenary.312  Out of public view, disagreements unfolded between the co-chairs and 
Task Group members who were dismayed at what they saw as NASA’s retreat from the 
standards set down by the Columbia Board.  The lack of technical rigor and engineering 
professionalism displayed by shuttle program officials concerned these members even more 
than the program’s inability to fulfill specific recommendations.   
The highly formalized manner in which the co-chairs ran Task Group meetings 
precluded an open discussion of their concerns, leading to a moment of high drama.  Dr. Dan 
Crippen, former director of the Congressional Budget Office, was among the first to break 
ranks.  Ignoring the meeting agenda, he initiated a discussion about the integrity of the 
process and the need to consider finding NASA in breach of Board recommendations.  
Several other Task Group members joined Crippen in airing their reservations.313  A revolt 
was underway in the Task Group. 
To resolve the impasse, the co-chairs moved to assemble a list of concerns that 
dissenting members could make known to NASA leadership offline.  The Task Group 
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members agreed that the chairs of the three subgroups would take their concerns directly to 
the NASA Administrator in a meeting joined by Stafford and Covey.  In addition, Crippen 
proposed the writing of a public dissent.  At this point, several people “who had relationships 
to protect,” in the words of one Task Group member, declined to formally join the 
dissenters.314  Several other members believed that these sorts of disagreements were best 
resolved “in-house” and stated their opposition to a public airing of disagreement.315 Six 
members, however, elected to join Crippen in the writing of a public dissent that would be 
attached to the Task Group’s final report.   
As the debate in the Task Group unfolded over the next several weeks, a change in 
leadership occurred at NASA.  Administrator Sean O’Keefe had resigned in late 2004 to 
become the chancellor of Louisiana State University.  His successor, the aerospace engineer 
and former NASA associate Administrator Michael Griffin, assumed leadership of the 
agency on April 14, 2005.316  In his first press conference, just weeks before the scheduled 
launch of Discovery, Griffin affirmed NASA’s backing away from “embrace and comply” by 
stating that current safety modifications were sufficient for launch.  Launching before 
satisfying all of Board’s recommendations, Griffin said, “is something I would consider.”317   
Griffin’s arrival nevertheless fostered a new dynamic between headquarters and rank 
and file engineers.  In contrast to O’Keefe, Griffin took “aggressive, personal leadership” of 
the shuttle program.318  In a story retold through the NASA ranks, Griffin quietly boarded a 
commercial flight to the Kennedy Space Center, rented a car, and then arrived unannounced 
and without entourage at a technical meeting on foam and ice held by the external tank 
project.  When offered a position at the table he refused and sat instead in the outer ring of 
chairs among lower ranking engineers.319   
The arrival of the new, technically-inclined Administrator appeared to exert an 
immediate effect on how the agency discussed safety of flight issues.  The meeting he 
attended was called to address a late-breaking concern that the tank project had not rigorously 
considered the danger posed by ice debris from re-engineered structures.  The risk appeared 
to be low but potentially serious—in other words, the exact kind of problem posed by o-rings 
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and falling foam that NASA in previous years might have relegated to further study but not 
delayed launch to address.  It was therefore a relief for many safety-conscious watchers of the 
shuttle program that on April 29, 2005 Griffin announced a two-month launch delay, from 
May to July 2005, to allow the tank project to conduct further analysis on the ice threat.320  
Griffin’s decision to roll Discovery off the pad and back into the hanger demonstrated the 
new Administrator’s receptivity to safety concerns.321  The spectacle of the shuttle rolling 
backwards from the launch pad after it had been declared fit for lift-off nevertheless 
confirmed for many observers that NASA was indeed gripped by a strong case of launch 
fever. 
Despite Griffin’s decision to halt the launch, dissenting members of the Task Group 
went forward with writing their minority report.  The details of their dissent took shape at the 
Task Group’s two final meetings in June.  Stafford and Covey wished to avoid discussing the 
dissent, maintaining the posture that the cultural and management issues concerning the 
dissenters “fell outside of the scope of looking at readiness for 114.”322  Media reports of the 
debate inside the Task Group thickened speculation that the Task Group would recommend 
against launch.323 STS-114 once again rolled to the pad as controversy brewed.324 
At the end of June, the Return to Flight Task Group published a ten page executive 
summary in advance of their final report in August.325  It concluded that NASA had not 
fulfilled three recommendations on orbiter hardening, debris reduction, and on-orbit repair, 
but recommended launch nonetheless.  “The remaining three recommendations were so 
challenging that NASA could not completely comply with the intent of the CAIB,” the 
summary stated.  “As with most accident boards, the CAIB set a high standard, perhaps one 
that was not achievable within the technology, funding, and schedule available to the Space 
Shuttle Program.”326  This summary did not contain the dissent written by Crippen and 
others, who did not feel the need to make it public before the return to flight launch.327  Their 
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blistering twenty-page analysis, written before the flight of STS-114, was eventually added in 
the final Task Group report only after Griffin prevailed on Stafford and Covey to include 
it.328   
Dissenting members of the Task Group contended that while NASA had improved 
shuttle safety, many of the institutional pathologies identified by the Columbia investigation 
were in evidence during the return to flight process.  In the view of the dissenters, a lack of 
engineering rigor, schedule pressure, and reliance on past experience rather than engineering 
judgment permeated the decisions of shuttle management.  The dissenters were particularly 
alarmed that Discovery’s intended launch date was not pegged to recurring evaluations of 
when safety modifications would be complete.  Instead, they were based primarily on 
programmatic goals that in turn forced engineers to forgo many of the modifications their 
calculations indicated were necessary, or to achieve them through less than ideal engineering 
means.   
The problem, in the dissenters’ assessment, was not a failure of working level 
engineers to communicate the challenges they were facing to management, but rather 
management’s finding what they were hearing as unacceptable to program goals.  “Everyone 
is being heard,” Task Group member Charles Daniel commented, but the “looming reality of 
burning money plus the hard cut off of 2010 put real fear in people that if they don’t fly in a 
finite amount of time, pressure will mount to cancel the program.”  In the face of this 
pressure, “they go to get the bird off the ground,” Daniel said.   
 
Decision to Launch 
  
 With the Task Group dissent not yet public, NASA cleared Discovery for launch on 
June 24, 2005.  The shuttle program officially ruled that the re-engineering efforts had 
reduced the probability of debris strikes to “acceptable levels.”329  Columbia investigation 
chair Admiral Harold Gehman concurred with NASA’s decision on grounds that he and his 
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Board colleagues never meant their report to be a “poison pill” that would prevent the 
shuttle’s flight if NASA made a concerted effort to improve safety flaws the Board identified.  
"We think that there is no reason they shouldn't fly," Gehman told reporters.  He noted that 
the safety upgrades would make Discovery’s flight less risky than any other shuttle mission, 
even though “by any measure of ‘safe,’ this is not safe.”330 
The first launch attempt on July 13 ended in an auspicious failure.  An electrical short 
likely caused by one of the tank’s safety modifications damaged a sensor that measures the 
rate of fuel consumption in the hydrogen bladder of the external tank.  Had the sensor and its 
counterparts failed in flight, the shuttle’s main engines could have exploded during their 
shutdown sequence.  The failure was typical of unexpected interactions that occur when any 
part of a complex system is modified. 
Discovery successfully launched at 10:39am on July 26, 2005, but the liftoff did not 
go as hoped.  Two and a half seconds into flight the external tank sustained a hit from a large 
bird.  Then just after solid rocket booster separation, a large chunk of foam detached from the 
PAL ramp, swung towards the orbiter, and just missed impacting the wing.331  At 24 to 33 
inches long, 10 to 14 inches wide, and several inches thick, it weighed about half as much as 
the piece of foam blamed for the loss of Columbia.332  Twenty seconds later another large 
piece of foam dislodged from near the left bipod ramp.  Both pieces likely exceeded the 
tolerance of the RCC panels.  If shed seconds earlier, thicker atmospheric currents would 
have transported them directly into the wing.333  A review of the launch film revealed that six 
other pieces dislodged from the acreage tile, several of which approached critical limits.  907 
days after Columbia fell from the sky, NASA indefinitely grounded the shuttle fleet once 
again. 
 
3.4 NASA and the Politics of Reform 
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With all the elements of reform at hand, how did NASA fail to safely return the 
shuttle to flight?  What accounts for the seemingly inertial capacity of the shuttle program to 
construct situations of failure, and what larger lessons about the dynamics of disaster and 
reform can be learned from the NASA case?  
To answer these questions, it is informative to contrast two opposing characterizations 
of the return to flight process.  Conventional wisdom at the time of launch held that several 
recommendations mandated by the Columbia investigation, including those for foam debris, 
tile repair, and orbiter hardening, proved unreasonable to fully implement in light of the time 
and resource constraints facing the shuttle program.  Although the Return to Flight Task 
Group categorized NASA’s implementation of these recommendations as unsatisfactory, 
shuttle management was justified in authorizing Discovery’s launch because the cost of 
fulfilling them outweighed the reduction in risk they would yield.  In the assessment of the 
NASA Administrator, a majority of Return to Flight Task Group members, and the former 
chairman of the Columbia investigation, existing re-engineering efforts made the shuttle safe 
enough. 
In this interpretation, the foam debris event experienced during launch is an inevitable 
consequence of operating the most sophisticated flying machine ever devised.  Rather than 
being the product of human error, flawed organizational practices, or external political 
pressure, the debris event that resulted from not removing the PAL ramp illustrates the 
inherent unruliness of complex technology, in which residual risks can never be fully 
eliminated.334  The NASA correspondent of the New York Times articulated this view when 
he wrote that “in the end, the old engineering maxim ‘If it ain't broke, don't fix it’ trumped 
vague misgivings about a part that had not shed any foam, as far as anyone knew, since 
1983.”335  
Against this narrative stands a more nuanced interpretation, one that emerges from a 
detailed history of the organizational and political pressures acting upon NASA during return 
to flight process.  This history, which includes the dissent by seven members of the Return to 
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Flight Task Group, highlights how NASA’s own sense of mission, together with external 
political imperatives associated with the President’s new space policy, hindered the 
application of rigorous engineering standards in the external tank project.336  
The shuttle’s return to flight is indeed a story of engineering at the limits, of NASA 
technicians at field centers collectively devising solutions to hazards identified by the 
Columbia investigation.  But the decision to certify the Discovery for launch did not occur in 
a vacuum.  In the quest for higher levels of safety, the shuttle workforce faced constraints 
imposed by both the limits of technical knowledge and by budget and schedule demands 
from above.  NASA’s rush to complete the International Space Station before the 
presidentially mandated 2010 retirement of the shuttle, along with the need to implement the 
Vision for Space Exploration, left tank engineers a small “trade-space” in which to work.  
The external tank project decided on technical modifications not on the basis of what would 
make the shuttle most safe, but rather on what could be completed and certified before the 
launch date mandated by NASA headquarters.  The launch date drove the safety process, 
rather than the other way around.  As Dr. Daniel said, “technical and programmatic solutions 
were often in conflict.”337   
These budget and schedule demands, far from being ordinary production pressures, 
were bound up with deeper symbolic and political ends of the national security state.  The 
shuttle is not merely a science experiment.  NASA’s human spaceflight program, as the 
Vision for Space Exploration underlined, is a national asset employed by the President for 
both domestic and international purposes.  The shuttle is a symbol of national power.  Not 
returning it to working order in the prescribed interval would further undercut U.S. 
technological prowess.   
A chronicle of the return to flight thus necessarily involves a layering of technical and 
political perspectives.  The view from the workshop floor at the Kennedy and Johnson 
spaceflight centers and Michaud assembly plant must be considered in concert with that of 
top officials at Headquarters, Congress, and the White House.  The interaction of all of these 
variables together with the symbolic and ideological meanings of the shuttle program 
influenced how programmatic concerns affected technical debates.  Ultimately, this larger 
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constellation of ideological beliefs explains why NASA forged ahead in the face of technical 
analysis showing the shuttle had not met safety goals established by the Columbia Board.   
The decision to launch in the face of outstanding safety concerns is even more 
striking when viewed in the context of the shuttle program’s ultimate viability.  A third fatal 
accident may well have triggered its end.  At the very least, a fundamental evaluation of our 
goals in space, and the degree to which we as a society will tolerate risk to achieve them, 
would have ensued.338  It is therefore striking that NASA did not display a greater amount of 
risk-aversion in its corporate decision-making.  The American imaginary of space, it seems, 
exerts a powerful effect over program managers and safety officials alike.   
 
The Limits of Accountability   
 
The twenty-five months between Columbia’s final flight and Discovery’s return to 
space constitute an extraordinary period of diagnostic and therapeutic intervention at NASA.  
The loss of NASA’s second shuttle opened a period of intense learning and reflection about 
the technical, organizational, and political dynamics that drive the shuttle program.  It was 
also a time characterized by resistance and antagonism as corporate NASA fought for control 
first with the Columbia Accident Investigation Board and then later with the Return to Flight 
Task Group. 
 After leading what became the largest accident investigation in history, the Columbia 
Board was ultimately successful at setting the terms under which the return to flight effort 
proceeded.  NASA publicly accepted the Board’s conclusions and geared its re-engineering 
effort to address the fifteen recommendations designated by the Board to be complete before 
the return to flight launch.  The President answered the Board’s call to devise a new national 
space policy that would establish when the shuttle would be retired.  The Board’s criticism 
that NASA was likely to spurn reform led to the creation of the Return to Flight Task Group, 
whose mission was to verify the shuttle program’s compliance.  Despite all these things, the 
Columbia investigation’s critique of the way in which NASA is embedded in social 
ideologies and political relationships was insufficient to prevent their action from continuing 
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to impinge upon safety considerations.  The period of therapeutic intervention that followed 
the investigation was ultimately less successful than its diagnostic phase. 
Without question, NASA made tremendous progress towards fulfilling the technical 
fixes mandated by the Columbia Board.  In the judgment of all observers, NASA satisfied 
twelve of the fifteen return-to-flight recommendations.  More broadly, the shuttle program 
initiated studies of its organizational culture and took steps to modify problematic aspects of 
it.  But NASA did not succeed on the crucial matter of the three technical recommendations 
that directly addressed the physical cause of the Columbia accident.  Many of the 
organizational pathologies noted by the Columbia Board re-appeared in engineering practice 
and management processes.   
 A number of findings about disaster investigations with far wider relevance than 
NASA can be discerned from the return to flight experience.  Most of them concern structural 
constraints placed on the Task Group.  At least four dynamics contributed to the Task 
Group’s inability to address the complete spectrum of ideological, political, and 
organizational forces influencing NASA’s technical decision-making.  On a technical level, 
the Task Group lacked an investigative staff or ability to call upon an independent technical 
authority.  In this way the Task Group was not an investigative commission per se, but rather 
an advisory panel dependent upon NASA to generate analysis in response to its queries.  It 
therefore lacked the tools that the Columbia investigation employed to reach its own 
conclusions about shuttle program claims and, if needed, to prove NASA technical arguments 
demonstrably false.   
The inability to confront NASA with independent analysis restricted the Task Group’s 
credibility in the eyes of shuttle program engineers and outside observers.  The dearth of 
investigative resources was in part a self-imposed restriction.  When Task Group members 
found NASA’s understanding of the mechanism of foam loss to be technically insufficient, 
their co-chair prevented them from commissioning an outside study that could have shed 
further light on what technical course of action would be best.  The co-chair was merely 
staying true to the Task Group’s stated charter as an advisory rather than an investigative 
body.  By design, the Task Group was obligated to request analysis from NASA, not conduct 
it themselves or commission others to do so.  
The Task Group, moreover, faced a different and more challenging epistemological 
problem than the Columbia investigation.  It was not undertaking a forensic reconstruction of 
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an accident sequence to identify a specific cause.  Its primary mission was to identify 
potential failure modes of a launch that had yet to occur.  Instead of searching backward to 
find a single cause, there were many possible future failure modes to investigate, and the 
Task Group lacked the resources to evaluate them all with the level of detail that the Board 
subjected the foam strike hypothesis.  With little agreement on how to focus their technical 
investigation of the re-engineered external tank surfaces, the Task Group was forced to 
spread its engineering resources widely.  Unlike the Columbia investigation, which 
confronted NASA with positive proof of its engineering error by smashing an RCC panel in a 
foam shot test, the Task Group lacked a smoking gun and could only confront NASA with a 
strongly worded dissent.  The lack of independent testing capabilities and presence of 
multiple potential failure modes precluded the evidentiary clarity the Columbia investigation 
was able to achieve.  
At the organizational level, the Task Group had a seemingly simpler mission than the 
Columbia Board.  Problematic aspects of NASA’s organizational culture and political 
environment had already been identified.  In some sense the Task Group functioned like a 
parole officer, monitoring its subject for compliance.  Yet it was mostly unable to carry out 
this mission.  It was not that the Task Group did not suspect NASA of improper behavior.  
The powerfully written dissent illustrates that the Task Group indeed had evidence at its 
disposal that NASA had exhibited problematic patterns of behavior.  The inability of the Task 
Group as a whole to mount an organizational or ideological critique was partly the result of 
the reluctance of its co-chairs to move beyond technical matters.  Their insistence upon 
focusing strictly on the return to flight recommendations meant, in the words of the seven 
dissenters, that the Task Group “missed opportunities to address enduring themes of 
dysfunctional organizational behavior that CAIB and other external evaluators repeatedly 
have found.”339   
The Task Group was also hindered by its very position as a temporary advisory body 
confronting an institution that held a privileged position in the national imagination.  The 
political and symbolic economy that surrounds the human spaceflight program fueled a desire 
both within NASA and across the nation to see the shuttle return to flight.  The President 
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himself tapped into this political currency with his campaign-like announcement of the 
Vision for Space Exploration, and sent First Lady Laura Bush to view the launch.  All of 
these dynamics together meant that not even so stark a disaster as the Columbia accident, the 
ensuing media and congressional attention, and the efforts of the Task Group were able to rid 
the shuttle program of problematic behaviors.  NASA got safer, but not safe enough.  The 
Return to Flight Task Group thus illustrates limits to procedural notions of accountability in 
verifying reform.  
 
Chapter 4 
 
The Iraq Study Group 
 
Virginia’s 10th Congressional District runs west from suburban Washington, 
D.C. to the rural Shenandoah valley, where peach and apple orchards carry on an 
agricultural tradition that dates to pre-revolutionary times.340  Established in 1789, the 
district today encompasses Civil War battlefields, one of the East Coast’s most visited 
national parks, and the grounds of the Central Intelligence Agency.  Representing this 
diverse stretch of Northern Virginia in the 109th Congress was Frank Wolf, a sixty-six 
year old former Army reservist and lawyer who first won election in 1980.  As one of 
the most vocal human rights supporters in Congress, Wolf was elected chairman of 
the House Appropriations Subcommittee with oversight for the Departments of State 
and Justice.  It was in his capacity as committee chair that Wolf made his third trip to 
Iraq in August 2005.341 
The occupation was in its third year.  Mounting casualties from insurgent 
violence and sectarian tensions had driven public support for the war to a new low.  
Although President George W. Bush’s approval rating had reached 90 percent in the 
aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, it had fallen to 40 percent by the time of Wolf’s trip.342  
The apparent lack of progress in Iraq was by now deeply troubling to the public and 
policymakers alike.  Republican congressmen, a year away from midterm elections in 
which the war would be deeply unpopular with voters, began challenging White 
House assertions that the U.S. was successfully reconstructing Iraq’s infrastructure 
and fighting the insurgency that had arisen.  Shortly after Wolf returned from his trip, 
the once-hawkish Pennsylvania Democrat John Murtha broke with the President and 
called for a withdrawal of U.S. forces, a defection that led many other congressman to 
change their views on the war.343 
Wolf later recounted that his own moment of doubt occurred as he toured a 
maternity ward in Tikrit, Saddam’s hometown in the violent Sunni triangle northeast 
of Baghdad.  When Wolf was told he wouldn’t be allowed in to see the mothers and 
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newborns without the presence of armed guards—a measure that caused him to call 
off the visit—he concluded that U.S. policy had failed.344  “We can’t be successful if 
we’re going in [a maternity ward] with pistols and weapons,” Wolf said.345 
Wolf wrote in his trip notes that “the Bush administration needs to face the 
reality that a growing number of Americans are becoming skeptical” of its 
management of the war, and that, as Nixon said thirty years before, “mistakes have 
been made.”346  Wolf became convinced that a wide-ranging review of Iraq policy 
was needed, and that the only credible way to undertake it was to form an 
independent group insulated from the partisanship and ideology that permeated the 
Iraq debate in Congress.347  “This group,” Wolf wrote, “would help examine each and 
every operation in Iraq—from how we are dealing with the insurgency to the status of 
the thousands of reconstruction projects being undertaken in Iraq to what we are 
doing to improve America’s image in the region.”348  Its goal would be to offer 
“different perspectives in addressing what is a very complex issue.”  He later framed 
his rationale for the review in medical terms, giving voice to the diagnostic analogy 
that underpins commissions.  “If you had a serious illness, and you weren’t 
completely comfortable that everything was going the way you hoped, you’d certainly 
want to get a second opinion,” Wolf said.349 
Fourteen months later, the Iraq Study Group—the second opinion Wolf called 
for—issued its report to the President in the cabinet room before announcing its 
findings before 250 journalists.350  Former Secretary of State James Baker and retired 
congressman Lee Hamilton served as its co-chairs.  Granted access by the 
administration to all Iraq intelligence and senior civilian and military officials from 
the President on down, the study group effectively constituted a parallel foreign 
policy apparatus whose staff and volunteer advisory teams were equivalent in size to 
the National Security Council’s own Iraq directorate.  The anticipation of its report 
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spurred the White House and Joint Chiefs of Staff to undertake their most detailed 
review of Iraq policy to date.351  A month after the study group released its findings, 
the President ordered the war’s most significant reversal of strategy.352  
Rarely has a commission so profoundly influenced the paramount foreign 
policy issue facing the nation.  When its report was released, more Americans 
approved of the Iraq Study Group’s prescriptions than the President’s policies, with 
an astonishing 79 percent supporting its key recommendation to gradually withdraw 
troops and reorient the U.S. mission to train Iraq’s security forces.353  
Despite its power to capture popular support, the study group’s primary 
recommendations were soon superseded by the President’s own plan, an escalation of 
troops known as the “surge.”354  The surge disregarded key study group conclusions 
and led several of its members to view their efforts as a failure.355  Congress, 
however, wrote into law some of its other 70-plus recommendations, while the 
administration implemented still more—creating a complex picture of the study 
group’s ultimate influence on U.S. policy.  
How did an independent review called for by a single member of Congress 
gain power over an administration notoriously hostile to infringements upon 
executive power?  What led the President, who knew the study group report 
commanded vast public support, to override its key recommendation?  Most critically 
for the wider study of disaster investigations, how did the political dynamics of 
President Bush’s second term, as well the study group’s internal politics, shape its 
inquiry, its diagnosis of what had failed, and its recommendations for what could be 
salvaged from a war gone wrong?   
In what will emerge as a major finding about the determinants of success in 
disaster investigations, the study group’s lack of a robust staff would impose limits to 
its capacity to identify the political dynamics in Iraq that were to become 
consequential and to characterize the likely effects of increased U.S. military 
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intervention on them.  The study group furthermore became entangled in a series of 
partisan debates about its obligation to reveal preliminary conclusions in the run up to 
mid-term elections.  As will become clear, the compromise that led to its formation 
placed political limits on its inquiry that members publicly observed but privately 
disregarded.  The study group’s ability to maintain a partial disconnect between the 
public and private framing of its mandate was a defining aspect of its success, 
illustrating how the diagnostic and democratic functions of commissions are at times 
in tension.  
 
4.1 Advent of the Iraq Study Group  
 
Turning Representative Wolf’s call for an independent assessment of war 
strategy into an actual review of executive branch policy was not trivial; its success 
was by no means preordained.  Congressional calls for high-level policy reviews are 
so frequent they hardly constitute news in Washington.  The Bush administration’s 
commitment to information control and executive prerogative, on full display during 
the 9/11 Commission proceedings, disposed it to be especially resistant to 
congressional scrutiny.  Nor was Wolf an especially powerful member of the House.  
The relatively unknown Republican congressman who voted with his own party 88 
percent of the time was not in control of a committee whose inherent power could 
compel the administration to immediately accede to such a review.356  How, then, did 
Wolf succeed, and what does this reveal about the politics of commissions 
investigating policy failures? 
The political environment in late 2005 provided Wolf an opening.  For the 
first time since the 2003 invasion, deteriorating conditions in Iraq, which sharply 
contrasted the Administration narrative of progress, solidified large-scale opposition 
to the war among democrats and independents.  With U.S. casualties averaging close 
to 100 per month, the President’s flagging political fortunes were a problem not only 
for Republicans generally but especially for members of the House and Senate facing 
re-election the next year.  If Iraq were not to turn around in the near term, many 
members of Congress who supported the war were in danger of being voted out of 
                                                 
356 Open Congress, “Rep. Frank Wolf, Voting Trend Analysis,” 110th Congress.  Online at: 
http://www.opencongress.org/person/show/400435_frank_wolf, accessed November 25, 2008. 
 105
office.  (Wolf was himself a moderate Republican in a district that was increasingly 
tilting Democratic.)   
At the same time, a sense of general incompetence surrounded the Bush 
Administration.  The bungled emergency response to Hurricane Katrina and handling 
of the fallout from 9/11 dove poll numbers to the lowest of his Presidency and opened 
the door to charges that the visible failures in Iraq resulted from policy 
mismanagement.357  These conditions, together with the muddled state of affairs in 
Iraq, raised the incentive for Congress to challenge the President over his war policy.  
Beyond the political dynamics in Iraq and in the U.S. domestic sphere, Wolf’s 
sheer motivation was certainly also a factor in the study group’s success.  Underlying 
Wolf’s interest in Iraq policy was a fierce devotion to human rights in conflict zones 
the world over.  During his congressional career he frequently traveled to refugee 
camps and visited hot spots—Darfur, Chechnya, and Algeria among them—to see 
conditions first hand, a trait that burnished his reputation among colleagues and 
helped earn him his chairman slot.  Wolf had in fact traveled to Iraq twice before.  
Unlike his congressional colleagues, on those trips he traveled without military escort, 
hiding his identity to make use of the freedom of movement enjoyed by NGOs, who 
quietly took him places off-limits to official security details.358  “We dressed in old 
clothes.  We lived with Iraqis. We went to all parts of the country,” Wolf said of his 
first two trips.359  The authenticity of his experience on these unauthorized tours gave 
him credibility to speak of the human costs of events transpiring abroad.  He had been 
places and seen things that his colleagues never would. 
 The willingness to witness events first hand was not the only propensity that 
brought credibility to Wolf’s calls for a review.  During Clinton’s second term, Wolf 
authored legislating creating the National Commission on Terrorism, an independent 
review of U.S. counterterrorism policy under the leadership of Paul Bremer, the State 
Department ambassador who later became U.S. proconsul in Iraq.  The findings of 
this commission found special relevance after 9/11.  Wolf had already demonstrated 
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to his colleagues how an independent review could rise above partisanship and reach 
serviceable conclusions that become the basis for new policy—that deliberation by 
independent experts, the hallmark of commissions, can produce results. 
Of course, not everyone shared Wolf’s faith in the utility of independent 
reviews, and the commission he envisioned for Iraq initially seemed unlikely to 
transpire.  Wolf first aired the idea in a September 2005 Washington Post op-ed.360  
Seeking to elevate the issue further, he and five other congressman wrote President 
Bush in November 2005 asking for an independent panel to “perform a 
comprehensive review” of the administration’s Iraq plan.361  The letter triggered more 
of a response.  The White House invited Wolf to meet privately with members of the 
administration, including Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, Secretary of Defense 
Donald Rumsfeld, and Vice President Dick Cheney.  “Reaction was mixed,” Wolf 
said of his meetings with members of Bush’s national security team.  “Initially there 
was not a lot of support for the idea.”362  Unsurprisingly, given his views on 
Executive power, Vice President Cheney was most resistant.363   
By November 2005, Wolf’s plan appeared to be dead in the water.  Although 
he had received a hearing at the highest levels of the administration and garnered a 
modest amount of congressional support, the Vice President himself had announced 
his opposition to any sort of independent review.  No one bought Wolf’s argument 
that, “If you’re so confident it’s going well, why are you so afraid for someone else to 
take a look at it?”364  
 Stymied by the administration, Wolf turned to Washington’s foreign policy 
establishment for help, pitching his idea for a review at prominent think tanks and 
research institutions.  Among those Wolf consulted, David Abshire stepped forward 
to help.  Abshire, who led the Center for the Study of the Presidency and Congress, 
was a longtime Washington insider who had served in several administrations as well 
as on one prominent commission.  He called upon two of his colleagues to help lobby 
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for the review, John Hamre, president of the Center for Strategic and International 
Studies, and Richard Solomon, president of the United States Institute for Peace, a 
congressionally-chartered research institute.365   
The three men began searching for ways to overcome the administration’s 
reluctance.  “We were creating the study group to build a political middle,” Solomon 
later said.366  Their idea was to attract two co-chairman with unimpeachable 
reputations, palatable to both the administration and Congress.  The criteria were code 
for selecting consummate insiders.  It is part of the culture of national security that 
only those with proven loyalties can be trusted to examine the inner workings of the 
military and foreign policy apparatus.  With “safe” chairman selected, the review 
might be better received.   
 The three settled on asking Lee Hamilton, who had served in Congress for 
seventeen terms and successfully piloted the 9/11 Commission as its vice chairman, 
and James Baker, the former Secretary of State and Bush family confidant.  Hamilton 
was seen as a sensible moderate trusted by both Republicans and Democrats, while 
Baker, who headed the legal battle during the Florida recount that secured the 
presidency for Bush, was perhaps the only Republican who could ensure White House 
cooperation.367  In preliminary inquiries that November, Hamilton reportedly 
accepted the overture immediately, while Baker said he would have to check with th
White House fi
e 
rst.368 
                                                
 By the end of November, the review had still not won favor with the 
administration.  The quiet lobbying by Abshire, Hamre, and Solomon did not produce 
consensus.  Nor were skeptical administration officials won over by the tentative 
agreement by Baker and Hamilton to serve as co-chairs.  Without White House 
consent, the proposed review would not be granted access to administration 
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documents and officials it would need to succeed.  “They could have stonewalled it,” 
Abshire said, “They could have killed it.”369  
 
Serving Rice’s Purposes  
 
On November 29, 2005, at the very moment Abshire, Hamre, and Solomon 
were poised to conclude their efforts, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice summoned 
them to her office.370  Abshire, Hamre and Solomon pitched the idea of the Iraq 
review, and the names of the co-chairs.  Although Rice had expressed skepticism in 
her earlier meeting with Wolf, this time she agreed to take the idea to the President.  
She did, however, impose one condition for her support: the group’s mandate had to 
look forward, not backward, keeping out of its purview the administration’s 
controversial early decisions about troop strength and postwar planning.371  When the 
three men were departing her office, one of Rice’s aides added a second caveat.  
Under no circumstances, he said, was anyone at the Pentagon to be informed that Rice 
was taking their proposal to the President.  The aide said that if Rumsfeld caught wind 
of developments, he and Cheney would scuttle the review before Rice could make the 
pitch.372 
 The aide’s instructions shed light on the increasingly strained relationship 
between Rice, Cheney, and Rumsfeld, and hinted at one of Rice’s motivations for 
pledging her support.  That very month the war cabinet was locked in a disagreement 
over U.S. policy in Iraq.  Secretary Rumsfeld, Vice President Cheney, and General 
George Casey, the long-serving ground commander, had supported a strategy of 
transition for more than a year, in which the military focused primarily on training 
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Iraqi security forces in hopes that the U.S. presence could be reduced as the Iraqi 
army and police matured.  The persistence of the insurgency, however, led many 
strategists to suggest that the U.S. step up its security presence, rather than ready to 
leave.  In their view, the transition to Iraqi control could only be achieved once the 
insurgency was defeated.  
By the fall of 2005, high-level backing for a more aggressive 
counterinsurgency strategy materialized in the National Security Council and in the 
Office of the Secretary of State.  The strategy became known as “clear-hold-build,” 
after a description of the succession of offensive and stability operations that would 
bring both military and civilian resources to bear in neighborhoods controlled by 
insurgents.373  Secretary Rumsfeld and General Casey opposed this strategy because it 
would require that a greater number of American troops assume an offensive posture, 
with higher casualties, and would shift the military’s focus away from transitioning 
security responsibility to Iraqi forces.  In their view, only the Iraqis could now solve 
the security problem gripping the country.   
The policy choice was an unmistakable recapitulation of earlier ideological 
debates, both before the war and during its early phases, about the extent to which the 
U.S. should engage in a sustained nation-building campaign versus liberating the 
Iraqis and then quickly withdrawing.  The debate between “nation-builders” and 
“advocates of liberation” once again split the war cabinet and left overall U.S. 
strategy at an impasse, revealing that the fundamental axis that had riven the 
administration since the war’s beginning was still largely intact.374  
In a bid to break the logjam, Secretary Rice testified in favor of the clear-hold-
build approach before the Senate on October 19, 2005.  The testimony was 
extraordinary.  A sitting Secretary of State publicly broke with existing administration 
policy.375  Secretary Rumsfeld quickly rebutted Rice’s assertion, exposing in the 
process how the two cabinet members most responsible for managing the war had 
irreconcilable views on the way forward.  “Anyone who takes those three words,” 
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Rumsfeld said at a Pentagon press conference, “and thinks it means the United States 
should clear and the United States should hold and the United States should build 
doesn't understand the situation.  It is the Iraqis' country. They've got 28 million 
people there.  They are clearing, they are holding, they are building.  They're going to 
be the ones doing the reconstruction in that country.”376 
The President ultimately sided with Rice and put his seal of approval on the 
clear-hold-build strategy in a Veterans Day speech on November 11, 2005.  Bush 
justified the new strategy as an adjustment in tactics that would help realize the 
strategic goal of a stable Iraq.377  The new strategy was slow to take hold, however, 
and continuing disagreements between key advisors in the Departments of State and 
Defense impeded its implementation.378  The White House had announced “Clear-
Hold-Build” as official policy in the document “National Strategy for Victory in Iraq” 
the day after the Abshire-Hamre-Solomon meeting with Rice.379  But in the view of 
many commentators, the strategy was not sufficiently resourced, with adequate 
numbers of troops and funding for civilian operations, to be effective.380  Rice had 
won the debate only to lose control of the policy. 
 Only when seen in this context can the underlying politics that enabled the 
creation of an independent review be understood.  Rice’s alliance with Wolf, Hamre, 
Solomon, and Abshire was driven by much more than whether she thought the 
independent review they proposed would be helpful to the country at large.  Rice was 
primarily motivated by an internal power struggle between cabinet members who 
were at loggerheads.  She elected to enroll an independent review as an accessory in 
her own policy battle to deepen the U.S. nation-building posture in Iraq.  The 
congressionally-inspired effort to seek out a new way forward on Iraq policy thus 
became an agent of Rice’s policy ambitions, based on her knowledge that the 
counterinsurgency experts resident at CSIS and other think tanks largely agreed with 
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her view of what U.S. strategy should be.381  “We supported [the study group] 
strongly, especially during the formative period in late 2005 and into early 2006,” 
State Department Counselor Philip Zelikow said.  “We thought that [it] could bring 
some other political forces into play that might help Congress and the American 
people understand the kind of commitment we might need to make to see this 
through.”382 
The political dynamics between Congress and the Executive that provided 
Wolf’s original motive were not in themselves sufficient for the administration to 
capitulate to a review.  Rice’s nascent opposition of the Cheney-Rumsfeld axis on 
Iraq policy proved to be a key precursor to the study group’s successful launch.  Her 
backing of its creation constituted an insider-outsider linkage designed to enroll new 
allies in her bid to re-frame U.S. strategy.  “Had she not bought into it,” Wolf said 
frankly, “it certainly wouldn’t have taken place.”383  
 
From Earmark to Announcement 
 
 The day after the Abshire-Hamre-Solomon meeting, Rice persuaded the 
President by suggesting that it was in his interest to get behind an independent review 
that was likely to occur in any event.384  With the President’s approval, Wolf moved 
forward on the congressional front, working to establish legislation that would 
provide funding for the review.  Rep. Christopher Shays, Sen. Joseph Biden, and Sen. 
John Warner, the powerful chair of the Senate Armed Services Committee, joined 
with more than twenty of their colleagues to support the study group’s creation.385 
Despite bipartisan support in Congress for an independent review of Iraq 
policy, its institutional form took peculiar shape.  Rather than establish a 
congressional commission by law, backed with power of subpoena and provisions for 
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a robust staff, the study group got its start as a budgetary earmark.  To avoid a 
prolonged and potentially problematic negotiation over the study group’s authorities 
and mandate, Wolf simply inserted two sentences into a supplemental appropriation 
bill funding the war that passed the house on March 13, 2006.386  The clause reads: 
“For an additional amount for `Diplomatic and Consular Programs', $1,380,500,000, 
to remain available until September 30, 2007: Provided that of the amount made 
available under this heading, $1,326,000 shall be available for transfer to the United 
States Institute of Peace.” 387   
 The earmark looked nothing like the impending review of U.S. Iraq policy it 
funded in practice.  To an uninformed observer, it appeared to be a run-of-the-mill 
grant to the U.S. Institute of Peace, one of the three institutions in alliance with Rep. 
Wolf.  Funding the Iraq Study Group in this way had a number of consequences that 
would ultimately constitute the group’s single largest shortcoming.  Not defining the 
study group’s mission in statute meant that it would lack the legal and administrative 
edifice of a federal commission and have no official standing in U.S. law.  The 
commission would be part of neither the legislative nor the executive branch, would 
not have subpoena power, and would not be governed by any of the legislative or 
administrative regulations that apply to independent inquires.  Neither Congressman 
nor members of the Executive branch would be eligible to nominate its members or 
formally oversee its activities in any way.  Instead, the study group would be an 
initiative run by a congressionally-chartered research institute with no legal means of 
accountability beyond the rules that govern federal grants.388  It was a development 
that would prove to have far reaching implications for understanding what makes 
disaster investigations successful. 
Two days after Congress passed the supplemental, the study group announced 
its existence in a March 15, 2006 press conference in the Senate Armed Services 
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Committee hearing room.389  In addition to two co-chairs, the group’s membership 
included eight prominent public figures—four Democrats and four Republicans each 
of sterling reputation, all of who had retired from public office.  In keeping with 
panels that examine the national security state, it would be a prototypical commission 
of “wise persons” with unquestionable reputation and loyalty.390  
 
Democrats 
x Vernon E. Jordan, Jr., former advisor to President Clinton 
x Sandra Day O’Conner, former Justice of the Supreme Court 
x Leon Panetta, former White House Chief of Staff  
x William J. Perry, former Secretary of Defense 
 
Republicans 
x Robert Gates, former Director, Central Intelligence Agency 
x Rudy Giuliani, former mayor of New York City 
x Charles S. Robb, former Senator from Virginia 
x Alan K. Simpson, former Senator from Wyoming  
 
Settling on the eight members had been difficult.  Baker and Hamilton rejected 
every name proposed by Abshire, Hamre, and Solomon, and selected members 
entirely by themselves.391  “You had to get a group not connected to the 
administration, people who were not going to be campaigning and who could come to 
a consensus,” Rep. Wolf said. "We wanted a bipartisan group, people senior enough 
that they weren't looking to get placed in a law firm or good job.”392  
Highlighting connections between who is chosen to see on behalf of the public 
and what is seen, the group’s membership foreshadowed its focus on defects in U.S. 
institutions over engagement with Iraqis and the politics produced by the occupation.  
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Of its ten members, only Baker had substantial experience in the Middle East.  Five 
had no significant foreign policy experience at all.  Ideological divisions in the 
foreign policy community were also visible.  Neoconservative advisors who had 
served as the war’s intellectual vanguard were conspicuously absent, leading 
commentators to speculate that the group would reassert the views of the ‘realist’ 
school of international relations associated with the President George H. W. Bush.393 
Lacking the hiring authority and budget of a federal commission, the study 
group drew its institutional support from an unusual public-private collaboration.  The 
U.S. Institute of Peace partnered with Hamre’s Center for Strategic and International 
Studies (CSIS) and Abshire’s Center for the Study of the Presidency, as well as the 
James A. Baker Center for Public Policy at Rice University.  Washington had never 
before seen sensitive national security policy, let alone war strategy, investigated 
outside an official framework sanctioned by Congress or the Executive branch.  At 
the press conference announcing the group, Senator Joe Biden emphasized its peculiar 
nature.  “This is not a congressional commission.  It is not an administration study 
group.  It’s an independent study group,” Biden said.394  This hybrid structure was to 
have distinct consequences that only became apparent later. 
That same day, Wolf repeated his unreconstructed optimism in the efficacy of 
independent reviews.  “I am hopeful that this panel, comprised of honest, ethical, and 
experienced patriots will offer a realistic and frank assessment of the situation in Iraq, 
and will ultimately lead us to common ground from which we can move forward as a 
nation,” Wolf said.395  Wolf was also unabashed in his view that the political 
dynamics in Washington made it unlikely that Republicans and Democrats would 
reach compromise by themselves.  “It saddens me that in my 26 years of public 
service I do not think I have ever seen the country more divided, or Washington more 
partisan,” Wolf said.  The study group would become the antidote for the poisonous 
atmosphere Wolf described.  “We need a bipartisan group of men and women of 
honor who love their country more than their political party to go to Iraq and provide 
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an independent assessment.  This panel,” he concluded, “is good for the country and 
good for the American people.”396 
At the press conference, James Baker made clear that the effort had the 
blessing of the White House.  “The administration as we understand it will welcome 
the effort.  They will cooperate with our effort in terms of people and documents,” 
Baker said.397  Baker himself had sought permission from President Bush in person 
before formally agreeing to become co-chair.398  Baker and Hamilton then spelled out 
their mandate, as they viewed it.  In an act of bounding the inquiry’s politics, their 
first point was to emphasize the study group’s forward-looking nature.  “We will not 
be visiting past debates about Iraq,” Hamilton said. “We will leave that to the 
historians.”399 To try and “answer the question of what’s next in Iraq,” the group 
would focus its inquiry in four areas: 
 
x The strategic environment in Iraq and the region; 
x The security of Iraq and key challenges to enhancing security within the 
country; 
x Political developments within Iraq following the elections and formation of 
the new government; 
x The economy and reconstruction.400 
 
The bargain struck with Rice had stuck.  The study group would not, as part of 
its stated mandate, examine pre-war planning or early decisions about military 
strategy and troop strength.  The adoption of this forward-looking frame, however, 
left the group in the difficult position of ignoring, or at least remaining officially 
ignorant of, the ideological split between the “liberators” and the “nation-builders” 
that had defined war policy from its inception and continued to underlie present 
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strategy debates.  In this way political realities impinged upon the group’s official 
diagnostic purview, limiting or at least appearing to limit its democratic obligation to 
secure an unmediated view of the state on the people’s behalf. 
 
4.2 Iraq Study Group at Work 
 
With its funding and membership secured, Baker and Hamilton set about 
organizing the study group’s staff and devising a means for supplying it with 
expertise, within their budgetary limitations.  Not being a federal entity meant 
agencies and Congress could not assign government employees to work on a 
temporary basis.  All of the group’s staff would have to be hired or work as 
volunteers; some of them would require security clearances.  The earmark of just 
more than $1.3 million meant that after paying office rental fees and member travel 
expenses, little would be left for staff salaries.  By comparison, the 9/11 Commission 
was funded by over $15 million and included a staff of 80.401  The Columbia 
Accident Investigation Board was even larger, with a direct budget of $17 million and 
a staff of more than 100.402  
                                                
With funds provided by the earmark, Baker and Hamilton hired a core staff of 
14, not all of whom worked full time on study group business.  The core staff 
consisted of two senior advisors and two special assistants drawn from Hamilton and 
Baker’s personal staffs, three other advisors, and assistants for congressional 
relations, communications, and administration.403  Two of the staff had previously 
worked on the 9/11 Commission.404  The core staff would primarily tend to 
administrative responsibilities and the needs of the two co-chairs.  It was not designed 
to conduct in-depth analysis in support of the study group’s deliberations. 
 
401 Notably, the 9/11 Commission’s initial funding was far lower and its request for further funds 
became a political issue in Congress, subjecting the Commission to Congressional control even after its 
formation.  National Commission on the Terrorists Attacks on the United States, “Frequently Asked 
Questions About the 9/11 Commission,” 2004 and Mark Fenster, “Designing Transparency: The 9/11 
Commission and Institutional Form,” Whitepaper, 38.  Available online at: 
http://works.bepress.com/mark_fenster/6/, accessed November 23, 2008. 
402 NASA Office of the Inspector General IG-04-013, “Final Report on Internal Controls Over 
Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB),” March 16, 2004. 
403 James A. Baker III, Lee H. Hamilton, et al., The Iraq Study Group Report (New York: Vintage, 
2006), issued December 6, 2006, 142. 
404 Ben Rhodes and Chris Kojm, two of Lee Hamilton’s assistants, both worked as professional staff 
members to the 9/11 Commission. 
 117
 With a bare bones contingent of paid employees too small to perform needed 
research, Baker and Hamilton had to devise another means to generate the analysis 
and background papers necessary for an assessment of Iraq policy.  This was achieved 
by the formation of expert groups on each of the four topics identified by Baker and 
Hamilton: Iraq’s strategic environment, military and security issues, political 
development, and economy and reconstruction.  A fifth group of retired flag officers 
from the military was also added.  These expert panels, drawn heavily from staff at 
the four participating organizations, ultimately contributed 31 policy papers for the 
study group’s review.405  The study group also expanded its core staff to include 
secretariats to each of the expert groups.  Both study group members and the 44 
members of the expert groups served without compensation.406 
The arrangement had both advantages and drawbacks.  On the one hand, the 
prestige of the review meant that it could attract some of Washington’s top talent, 
who would willingly work without pay for the sake of being associated with the study 
group’s efforts.  Indeed, very few policy experts contacted by Baker and Hamilton 
turned down spots on the working groups.  Relying mostly on personnel from outside 
government imposed limitations as well.  Only a few of those in the expert working 
groups had spent substantial time in Iraq, and fewer still had regular access to the 
classified military and diplomatic reporting that those inside government rely upon as 
a primary source of information about the war.  The groups also had few Arabic 
speakers or native Iraqis and largely replicated the study group’s own disposition 
towards expertise in American government rather than Iraqi politics and culture.  
Nevertheless, the expert groups met the study group’s early need for information on 
Iraq and gave them access to analytical resources far beyond what their budget could 
have paid for.  
   
Secrecy in Theory and Practice  
 
 The study group’s working arrangements and relationship with the public also 
had to be defined.  In contrast to the 9/11 Commission and Columbia investigation, 
the study group held no open hearings and gave no regular updates to the media or 
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public.  From the beginning, Baker and Hamilton were frank about their intention to 
work mostly behind closed doors.  “We will conduct our study in the months ahead 
largely in private, though we do not rule out issuing interim reports or holding public 
meetings,” they wrote in a letter to Congress shortly after the study group’s 
formation.407  “We have not set a deadline for completion of our work, recognizing in 
part the fluidity of the situation in Iraq, but we will work expeditiously, and anticipate 
reporting to the Congress, the President, and the American people within a year.”408 
To ensure that study group deliberations remained confidential, Baker 
imposed an “ironclad” gag order preventing all participants from commenting 
publicly.409  A regime of strict control existed, with information flowing up from the 
expert groups to the study group members but not back down from the members to 
the expert groups.  Those working on the study group’s behalf had little idea of its 
deliberations or direction.410  “He’s very secretive,” one observer said of Baker.  “He 
keeps his distance, and he compartmentalizes everything, which is not a bad way to 
organize a political conspiracy.”411  The gag order at first extended to members of the 
expert groups working on a pro-bono basis.  “Initially they wanted us to end all of our 
contacts with the media, make no statements, write no op-eds—in other words, 
become monks,” one working group member recalled.  “Then they realized, how can 
you take the entire community of Iraq experts in the United States and have them all 
stop talking?"412  A revised rule forbid members and volunteer advisors from 
commenting about Iraq in any way that would reveal study group deliberations. 
Under Baker and Hamilton’s leadership, a particular set of commission norms 
was at work in the Iraq Study Group.  As legal scholars note, competing visions of 
how advisory commissions should function give rise to alternative prescriptions about 
their deliberative process.  One model, embodied in part by the Federal Advisory 
Committee Act, suggests that open meetings and full disclosure of group membership 
and potential conflicts of interest, as well as committee debates, are the best way to 
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realize the public good.  Transparency in this model is both procedural, in terms of 
processes used to schedule and run meetings, and disclosure based, in what parts of 
themselves and their business relationships advisory board members are required to 
make public.413   
Critics of the act, however, view its excessive formalities and requirements for 
disclosure as antithetical to the ability of advisory panels to deliberate and fact find 
outside the usual pressures of politics that so often curb the ability of government 
bodies to act.414  In this alternative prescription of commission norms, imposing 
excessive transparency upon already distinguished public servants only handicaps 
their ability to swiftly and objectively consider issues and form a durable consensus 
about how to dispose them.  The latter model emphasizes a commission’s diagnostic 
function, giving maximum flexibility to its ability to see outwards without constraint.  
The former model emphasizes the need in democracies for citizens to see into the 
instrument of diagnosis, to ensure that a commission is truly seeing on their behalf.   
The Iraq Study Group was caught between the need to see, and to be seen, in 
its evaluation of U.S. Iraq policy.  The two imperatives of course are not unrelated.  
As was the case with 9/11 and the Columbia Board, being seen by the public helps 
cultivate a commission’s legitimacy.  Indeed, when asked whether the study group 
would carry the same weight as the 9/11 Commission, Hamilton replied, “I don’t 
think any study group has immediate credibility.  I think you have to earn it, and we’ll 
do our best to earn that.”415  
Congressman Wolf himself privileged the study group’s need to “see” over its 
need to “be seen,” and spoke out in support of Baker and Hamilton’s decision to 
remove its deliberations from the public eye.  "If they had held open hearings or gone 
on television talk shows, like the 9/11 Commission, they would have been forced into 
positions by the very nature of the questions,” Wolf said.  “They would have lost their 
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independence.”416  The assumption that removing the group from day-to-day 
pressures ensured a better outcome than a fully transparent process nevertheless 
imposed limitations to the group’s ability to build credibility, and therefore 
legitimacy, among outside audiences.  As will become apparent, the tight regime of 
control also curtailed information flow to the study group in crucial ways.   
 
Deliberating as Iraq Deteriorates  
 
With study group membership, staff, and operations finalized, Baker and 
Hamilton set about their task.  Study group members, with a handful of staff in the 
room, held plenary sessions on nine occasions, usually convening in a conference 
room at the U.S. Institute for Peace for two days at a time.417  When not in plenary 
sessions, Baker and Hamilton and their core staff consulted with a broader array of 
officials and experts than the full group received.418  
The protective veil Baker and Hamilton constructed around their activities was 
remarkably successful at preventing disclosures that have marked other high-profile 
policy reviews.419  Not only did the group’s deliberations remain largely secret until 
their report was released, barring a few notable leaks in the final weeks, but the 
identity of who was meeting with the group also remained unknown until Hamilton 
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and Baker released a list of consultations in mid-September.420  The list, which read 
as a “who’s who” of key figures on Iraq policy, was perhaps the best signal yet that 
the study group was realizing its ambitions for a high-level review.  Releasing the list 
to the public in advance of the report’s release demonstrated that the study group had 
successfully gained access to officials, including the President, who were directly 
responsible for the formulation of military, reconstruction, and diplomatic policy.  
The presence of so many former officials indicated that the group’s review extended 
years into the past, even to the pre-war period. 
In keeping with the norm of wide-ranging inquiry Baker and Hamilton set out 
for the group, the consultations with each witness were long, usually an hour or hour 
and a half, and allowed for extensive questioning and open discussion.  Behind closed 
doors, Baker and Hamilton violated at least one of their own tenets.  Although they 
pledged that their report would be forward looking, they often delved into past 
decisions while meeting with figures associated with early policy choices.  During the 
meeting with former Secretary of State Colin Powell, Baker opened the session by 
asking why the U.S. invaded Iraq with so few troops—perhaps the most controversial 
decision made by Bush after the decision to go to war itself.421  The focus on prior 
administration decisions demonstrated how the political boundaries that applied to the 
study group’s inquiry in public did not prevail in its own deliberations.  Put 
differently, there was at least a partial disconnect between the public and the private 
framing of the study group’s investigative mission.  
 Events in Iraq soon began to exert their own framing power.  As the study 
group’s deliberations began in the late spring of 2006, conditions in Iraq took a turn 
for the worse.  The unraveling relations between Iraq’s Shi’a and Sunni communities 
profoundly influenced the group’s critique of U.S. policy and its recommendations for 
a way forward.  Understanding the sequence of events in Iraq and its impact on the 
study group is essential to grasping how its members missed other dynamics that were 
strategically significant, and why the President ultimately rejected its primary 
recommendation. 
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December 1, 2006. 
421 Bob Woodward, The War Within: A Secret White House History 2006-2008 (New York: Simon & 
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Figure 4.1 
 
Partial List of 
Iraq Study Group Consultations 
 
* denotes meeting held in Iraq. 
 
Iraqi Officials and Representatives  
* Jalal Talabani - President  
* Tareq al-Hashemi - Vice President  
* Adil Abd al-Mahdi - Vice President  
* Nouri Kamal al-Maliki - Prime Minister  
* Salaam al-Zawbai - Deputy Prime Minister  
* Barham Salih - Deputy Prime Minister  
* Mahmoud al-Mashhadani - Speaker of the 
Parliament  
* Mowaffak al-Rubaie - National Security 
Advisor  
* Jawad Kadem al-Bolani - Minister of Interior  
* Abdul Qader Al-Obeidi - Minister of 
Defense  
* Hoshyar Zebari - Minister of Foreign Affairs  
* Bayan Jabr - Minister of Finance  
* Hussein al-Shahristani - Minster of Oil  
* Karim Waheed - Minister of Electricity  
* Akram al-Hakim - Minister of State for 
National Reconciliation Affairs    
* Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim - Shi’a Coalition 
Leader  
 
Current U.S. Administration Officials  
Senior Administration Officials    
George W. Bush - President   
Richard B. Cheney - Vice President   
Condoleezza Rice - Secretary of State  
Donald H. Rumsfeld - Secretary of Defense  
Stephen J. Hadley - National Security Advisor    
Joshua B. Bolten - White House Chief of Staff  
Department of Defense / Military   
General Peter Pace - Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff  
General John Abizaid - Commander, United 
States Central Command  
* General George W. Casey, Jr. - 
Commanding General, Multi-National Forces 
Iraq  
R. Nicholas Burns - Under Secretary of State 
for Political Affairs  
Philip Zelikow - Counselor to the Department 
of State  
*Stuart Bowen - Special Inspector General for 
Iraqi Reconstruction   
James Jeffrey - Senior Advisor to Secretary 
Rice and Coordinator for Iraq Policy  
David Satterfield - Senior Advisor to Secretary 
Rice and Coordinator for Iraq Policy  
Zalmay Khalilzad - U.S. Ambassador to Iraq  
 
Intelligence Community  
John D. Negroponte - Director of National 
Intelligence  
General Michael V. Hayden - Director, Central 
Intelligence Agency  
 
Members of Congress   
Senator William Frist (R-N) - Majority Leader  
Senators Harry Reid (D-NV) - Minority 
Leader  
Representative Nancy Pelosi (D-CA) - 
Minority Leader   
 
Foreign Officials   
Kofi Annan - Secretary-General of the United 
Nations  
Tony Blair - Prime Minister of the United 
Kingdom  
 
Former Officials and Experts   
Bill Clinton - former President of the United 
States  
Warren Christopher - former United States 
Secretary of State  
Henry Kissinger - former United States 
Secretary of State  
Colin Powell - former United States Secretary 
of State  
George P. Schultz - former United States 
Secretary of State  
Samuel R. Berger - former United States 
National Security Advisor  
Zbigniew Brzezinski – former United States 
National Security Advisor
 
The event that cast a pall over study group deliberations took place three 
weeks before it was announced.  On February 22, 2006, Al-Qa'ida terrorists destroyed 
the golden dome of the al-Askari mosque in Samarra, the revered Shi'a holy site on 
the east bank of the Tigris river.  The bombing plunged Iraq into a frenzy of sectarian 
killing that claimed the lives of at least 1,300 Iraqis, mostly Sunni.  In the month after 
Samarra, the rise in execution-style killings, which caused eight times the amount of 
deaths due to insurgent attacks, indicated a shift in the war toward civil conflict 
between Iraq’s sects.422  Iraq’s history could be read in the hacked bodies of the dead.  
Tribal codes of retributive justice drove revenge killings, while the methods of torture 
and execution—power drills and severed heads—echoed Ba'athist practices.423   
The spike in violence drew attention to the seemingly intractable hostility 
among Iraq’s sectarian and ethnic political parties.  The bombing came amid a 
deadlock over seating the new government.  Members of the Shi'a, Sunni, and 
Kurdish factions, elected to Parliament under Iraq’s newly ratified constitution, could 
not agree who should be named ministers.  The United States, hoping to foster 
reconciliation between Shi’a and Sunni, refused to sanction the selection of Ibrahim 
Ja'afari, a divisive figure, as Prime Minister.424  As a result, the government remained 
unformed during the study group’s opening months, diminishing still further the 
possibility that U.S. aims of a stable and self-governing Iraq could be achieved at all.  
The bombing also highlighted the inability of the U.S. military to keep order in a 
country roughly the size of California.  The sectarian violence drove a quarter of a 
million Iraqis from their homes, hastening the segregation of Baghdad and south-
central Iraq into separate Sunni and Shi'a enclaves.425  
It was amid these deteriorating conditions that the study group convened.  The 
possibility of civil war between Sunni and Shi’a loomed, the war’s consequences 
mounted, and the military proved unable to contain the rising tide of violence—all 
during a period of open clashes between militias who were responsible for increasing 
bloodshed across the country.  The diplomatic and military reporting from Iraq made 
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it difficult to imagine more hopeful scenarios, forcing study group members to 
consider not only the best way to achieve U.S. strategic aims, but whether success in 
Iraq was possible on any terms.  Events pushed the framing of the study group’s 
inquiry from a technocratic evaluation of reconstruction and counterinsurgent tactics 
to the broader strategic question of whether or not to withdraw.  The study group 
began to debate not only how U.S. power in Iraq should be exercised, but whether it 
could usefully be exercised at all. 
 
Recommending Withdrawal 
 
 The study group’s increasing concern about deteriorating conditions in Iraq 
soon collided with more optimistic assessments by administration officials.  President 
Bush received the study group on June 13, 2006, the morning after he made a surprise 
visit to Baghdad to meet with Nouri al-Maliki, who was elected Prime Minister after a 
long period of stalemate.  In his hour long meeting with study group members, Bush 
did not significantly move beyond what he had said about the war publicly and voiced 
almost no doubt about the course he was pursuing.426  Echoing the administration’s 
“stay the course” war strategy, he told the assembled study group members, “it’s 
going to work.”427  
The study group members themselves were less sanguine about the prospect 
for success.  Robert Gates expressed concern that so much of U.S. policy depended 
upon Maliki taking actions potentially against his own interests.  Alan Simpson, the 
plainspoken former Senator from Wyoming, asked the President whether he could 
find some way to talk with the governments of Syria and Iran.  “Not talking doesn’t 
work,” Simpson told the President.  “Doesn’t work in marriages, doesn’t work 
between governments.”  428  Although they found the meeting fairly uninformative, the 
group did coax a surprising concession from Bush.  When asked whether he would be 
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open to study group findings, Bush insisted his administration would cooperate fully 
with the group’s recommendations.429  It was a pledge the President would not keep. 
The congressional leadership was more receptive to the study group’s 
skepticism toward current policy.  In a remarkably frank exchange, Senate Majority 
Leader Mitch McConnell told study group members that “I’d settle for Egypt,” in 
reference to the U.S. client state whose autocratic government was certainly far from 
the vibrant democracy imagined for Iraq at the war’s beginning.430    
 The study group’s investigation phase culminated in a three-day trip to Iraq in 
late August 2006.  It proved to be an experience that injected still further doubt into 
members’ assessment of whether U.S. troops could succeed in bringing about a truce 
between the warring factions and achieve the strategic goal of a democratic, self-
reliant Iraq.   
Seeing the occupation first-hand jarred study group members.  Blast walls, 
gun emplacements, bunkers, and armed guards, even in the middle of the U.S.-
secured Green Zone, spoke to the ongoing threat of attack.  The study group arrived in 
Baghdad at a time when a new coalition plan to contain the explosion of sectarian 
violence in Baghdad appeared to be failing.  In September, the levels of violence 
moved military officials to begin digging a ditch around Baghdad’s sixty-mile 
circumference to control entry to the city through 28 checkpoints.431   
To many of its members, the series of meetings held by the study group in Iraq 
illustrated the inability of Iraqi politicians to grapple with the problems they faced.  
Prime Minister Maliki asserted—improbably—that the terrorists were on the run.  
National Security Advisor Mowaffak al-Rubaie essentially condoned violence by 
Shi’a militias as a necessary defense against Sunni insurgents.  Deputy Prime-
Minister Barhim Salih blamed Iraq’s woes on Iranian involvement.  Minister of 
Finance Bayan Jabr alleged that corruption was no longer a problem.  The 
reconciliation between Shi’a and Sunnis seen as necessary for success by the U.S. 
military leadership was viewed by Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, leader of the largest Shi’a 
party, as not urgent and potentially not possible.  The interview with Hakim raised 
concerns among study group members about the extent to which Iraqi politicians 
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viewed violence as an inevitable tool of politics, opening a window onto why the U.S. 
effort was bogged down three years into an occupation that the Bush administration 
had never fully anticipated.432   
The most revealing moment of the study group’s trip came after one of its 
members left the safety of the Green Zone.  Charles Robb, who served two tours in 
Vietnam, and who was the only study group member to depart the ground of a U.S. 
base, returned from a tour of Baghdad astonished at the lack of discipline in both the 
Iraqi police and army.  The extent to which U.S. troops provided support to Iraqi 
forces and the fact that the Iraqi people trusted U.S. forces more than their Iraqi 
counterparts shocked Robb, who expressed his concerns in study group meetings.433  
To the former Marine platoon leader, the effort to secure Iraq seemed even more 
daunting than his mission in Vietnam.  Hamilton returned to the U.S. thinking that 
there wasn’t an optimist among them—that intractable Iraqi political issues, 
underperforming U.S. institutions, and geopolitical dynamics had doomed the U.S. 
effort.434  Events forced the commission initially chartered to troubleshoot the 
execution of the U.S. approach in Iraq to contemplate the scope and pace of a 
withdrawal.  
 
4.3 “Keeping Out of Politics” 
 
Reframing the Iraq problem around the question of withdrawal triggered a 
dilemma for the study group.  By the time members returned from their trip to Iraq, 
the mid-term election cycle was in full swing.  The President and his war cabinet were 
by now continually fending off attacks levied by Democrats and a growing number of 
Republicans who viewed White House mismanagement of the war as the primary 
reason for the U.S. predicament in Iraq.  Many more congressmen championed 
withdrawal as a necessary step than when the study group began.    
As its members retired to deliberate, it was clear that their view of Iraq 
strategy was at odds with the White House.  However their final recommendations 
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took shape, the therapeutic interventions they were likely to prescribe would be 
unpalatable to the President, and possibly also electorally devastating to congressional 
Republicans, if made publicly known.  The study group’s function as a diagnostic 
instrument, meant to discern the best course for U.S. policy, was once again in tension 
with its democratic function as a body that sees on behalf, and reports to, the public.  
Amidst the electoral fervor, Baker and Hamilton called a press conference on 
September 19, 2006 to brief the public on their trip to Iraq.  At stake was the 
possibility that the study group would signal its position on whether it would suggest 
withdrawal.  Any indication that the study group disagreed with the President’s “stay 
the course” policy would have electoral consequences.  As Baker and Hamilton took 
the podium at the U.S. Institute of Peace, all of official Washington tuned in. 
 From the outset of their press conference, Baker and Hamilton moved to 
cordon off questions about the substance of the study group’s findings and 
deliberations. “Primarily this press conference is intended to give you an update on 
procedure and on process,” Baker said.  Hamilton did read a brief statement of steps 
the study group hoped the government of Iraq would take in coming weeks, and the 
U.S. Institute of Peace released a list of the individuals the study group had met with.  
But for the duration of the press conference, Baker and Hamilton stuck to their script 
of revealing nothing about their coming report’s findings or recommendations.  They 
also made clear that the report would only be released after the mid-term elections.   
Baker and Hamilton’s rhetoric deliberately positioned the inherently political 
institution they led as an entity that needed to remain “apolitical” to be effective.  
Baker couched the decision to release the report only after midterm elections as a 
matter of “keeping out of politics.”  “We think it’s important that whatever report we 
bring forward is taken, to the extent we can take it, out of domestic politics,” Baker 
said.  “We think it is extremely important that this not be seen a political exercise.” 435   
The study group of course did not exist outside politics—rather Baker and 
Hamilton were trying to frame the study group as above the usual partisan give and 
take between the President and opposition party.  In so doing, they were servicing the 
political needs of congressional Republicans even as they endeavored to provide a 
national solution to the Iraq debate.  The original bargain struck with Secretary Rice 
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not to use the inquiry to persecute the administration proved to endure almost a year 
later, and also to extend to the President’s political equities vis-à-vis Congress. 
   Not everyone received Baker and Hamilton’s refusal to discuss their 
deliberations as an understandable or even acceptable way of discharging their 
responsibilities.  “As a general rule, it's a bad idea to call a news conference if you 
have nothing to say,” the noted journalist Dana Milbank wrote in the next day’s 
Washington Post.  “It's worse if you announce that answers are urgently needed but 
then decline to provide any.”436   
Political commentators were not the only ones who viewed Baker and 
Hamilton’s attempt to take the study group “out of politics” as itself a political act.  
After Baker spoke about Iraq in a round of high-profile media interviews marketing 
his autobiography, artfully titled “Work Hard, Study…and Keep Out Of Politics!,” 
Senator Barbara Boxer (D-Calif.) suggested that he disclose the study group’s 
preliminary recommendations before the election.437  “Judging by recent interviews 
you have given in the press, it appears that the Iraq Study Group has made some 
initial judgments that would be a departure from the administration's failed policies,” 
Boxer wrote Baker. “If this is indeed the case, I urge you, in the strongest possible 
terms, to publicly release them so that the administration can see that the status quo is 
unacceptable. This could be done through an interim report or through public 
meetings—both of which were contemplated by the Iraq Study Group in its April 
letter to Congress.”438  
After Baker declined, Senator Boxer intensified her appeal in a second letter 
that made an argument from the national interest.  “The Iraq Study Group is 
contemplating important policy changes that could immediately begin to save lives in 
Iraq.  Even if the Iraq Study Group has not yet achieved a final consensus on these 
policy changes, any idea that could save the life of just one American soldier in Iraq 
should be shared with the White House as soon as possible”   
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“Clearly,” Boxer added, “it is time for the ten members of the Iraq Study 
Group to brief the President on its work thus far to formulate recommendations for a 
new course in Iraq.”439 
As pressure intensified to release interim findings, Baker and Hamilton 
continued to rationalize withholding their preliminary conclusions as a necessary 
precaution against undue politicization, which would prejudice the ability of their 
report to bridge the partisan divide on Iraq.  In further statements through the fall, 
Baker and Hamilton implied that the Iraq Study Group’s refusal to show its hand was 
in keeping with the normative and procedural values of an independent review.  In 
drawing the boundary around their deliberations in this way, they avoided the wrath 
of the White House even as they angered the Democratic leadership in Congress.  As 
a result of this careful balancing act, the study group now had at least six more weeks 
in which to conduct final deliberations.  Once again, it disappeared from public view.   
 
November Elections and Final Consultations 
 
The mid-term elections, held on November 7, 2006, realized the fear of 
Republicans who suspected public dissatisfaction with the war would lead to large 
losses in both congressional chambers.  The day after Republicans lost 27 seats in the 
House and six in the Senate, the White House announced the resignation of Secretary 
of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and named Robert Gates, a member of the study group, 
as his replacement.  The summary firing of Rumsfeld and elevation of Gates was 
widely perceived in Washington as a precursor to a major change in Iraq policy that 
would draw on the study group’s emerging conclusions.440  The move further 
underwrote the study group’s credibility and raised expectations that its report would 
chart a new course, to be carried out by Gates, who would soon be in place inside the 
Pentagon.441 
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The election at first seemed to foster a new political mood in the White House.  
In a press conference held the day after voters carried their dissatisfaction into the 
voting booth, the President signaled his willingness to consider new options in Iraq.  
He was “looking forward” to consulting with the congressional leadership and Iraq 
Study Group over war strategy and was willing to “listen to their views on the way 
forward.”442  It was a striking moment for a President who rarely communicated self-
doubt in public settings. 
 It was in this altered political atmosphere that the study group held a final 
consultation with the President on November 13.443  Vice President Cheney, National 
Security Advisor Stephen Hadley, and White House Chief of Staff Josh Bolton joined 
the session.  Unlike his demeanor at the press conference a week before, the President 
was defensive of his war strategy and signaled an unwillingness to entertain new 
views.  He did not reveal to study group members or to the press that he would soon 
order the National Security Council and Joint Chiefs to begin their own detailed 
strategy reviews, unconstrained by any limits on what could be considered, including 
withdrawal.444  “He was not seeking advice from us,” former Secretary of Defense 
Bill Perry said of the meeting.  “He was telling us his view of the war.”445  However, 
“staying the course” was by now felt by study group members to come at too high a 
cost. 
The study group was also briefed that day by CIA Director Michael Hayden, 
Secretary Rumsfeld, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Peter Pace, Ambassador to Iraq 
Zalmay Khalilzad, and Secretary Rice, who had helped launch the study group one 
year before.  Rice left them with a powerful final thought that reflected American 
impatience with Iraq’s sectarian politics.  “These are people who wanted to be 
united,” she said of the Iraqi political leadership, “but they don’t want to be left in a 
room with each other.”446 After their long day at the White House, the study group 
retired to work on their draft report and discuss the remaining differences between 
them before settling upon final recommendations. 
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 4.4 Iraq Study Group and the Politics of Policy Disaster 
 
In little more than a year, the study group journeyed from the unsupported 
idea of a single congressman to a powerful political force of its own.  The call for an 
independent review of Iraq policy had shot through a number of key passage points, 
any one of which could have prevented it from being realized. The first was a moment 
of great public doubt in the war strategy and in the competence of the President 
himself, giving Congress an opening to challenge the Administration.  The respect 
accorded to Representative Wolf for his human rights activism, Rice’s struggles in the 
cabinet, and the selection of two consummate insiders as co-chairs, together with this 
widespread discontent, enabled the realization of a historically improbable intrusion 
into the Executive branch’s conduct of foreign policy.   
The study group’s success at undertaking a high-level review displays a 
number of features with broader relevance to the understanding of commissions and 
their investigation of policy failure.  The experience of the study group foremost 
demonstrates remarkable flexibility in the ways commissions can operate.  As the 
creation of an earmark, not an act of Congress, the study group had few formal 
powers.  It nevertheless obtained full access to wartime intelligence and the 
administration policymakers who mattered.  Unlike either the 9/11 Commission or the 
Columbia Board, the study group was able to command the public’s attention even as 
it deliberately worked behind closed doors.  
The study group’s inquiry, although successful on many levels, was not 
without limits.  The politics of its formation consisted of a bargain: the review could 
go forward, but the study group could not use its influence to publicly investigate 
prior administration decisions or to voice emerging opinions about war strategy 
during the highly-charged electoral season in which its deliberations occurred.  The 
result of this bargain was an enduring tension between the study group’s diagnostic 
and democratic functions.   
The politics of policy disaster nevertheless exerted their own force.  The 
public framing of the study group as a forward-looking body did not hold in private, 
and its members immediately moved to uncover the ideological and historical 
underpinnings of the administration’s decision-making.  Iraq’s decent into sectarian 
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violence ultimately pushed members beyond the group’s original framing as a re-
evaluation of strategy and into a broader debate about whether to recommend a 
withdrawal.  The administration, and the President especially, resisted this shift and 
continued to insist that the study group focus on prescribing closer-in corrections to 
tactics and implementation.   
On the eve of issuing its report the study group appeared poised to recommend 
a dramatic shift from the President’s “stay the course” mentality.  Although the final 
test of its policy influence lay ahead, Baker and Hamilton managed to create a 
perception in Washington—helped along by events—that their report would be 
groundbreaking, perhaps even a turning point in the war.  They were also able to 
maintain the cloak of secrecy until nearly the end.  News of the report’s release came 
less than a week before the press conference at which it was rolled out.447  The 
limitations of the study group’s recommendations would become apparent almost 
immediately. 
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 Chapter 5 
 
The Iraq Study Group’s Policy Influence 
 
 Fourteen months after Representative Frank Wolf called for an independent 
review of U.S. policy in Iraq, members of the Iraq Study Group walked into the White 
House with their report in hand.  It was just after sunrise on December 6, 2006.  The 
President received them in the cabinet room.    
 The study group’s call to begin a drawdown of troops would dominate 
Washington for more than a year.  Even more so than its recommendation to begin a 
withdrawal, the study group’s diagnosis of conditions in Iraq markedly reframed the 
national debate.  The President, however, ultimately charted a course that the study 
group did not seriously consider, raising questions about whether it sufficiently 
explored all available policy options.     
The report’s reception unfolded at two levels.  As the Congress and the 
President fought over whether or not to execute a withdrawal, familiar ideological 
divides, and ways of framing the war, reasserted themselves around the most 
contentious study group recommendations.  At the same time the grand debate played 
out around the question of withdrawal, a number of the study group’s other 
recommendations generated consensus, both among Republicans and Democrats and 
between Congress and the Executive branch.  The implementation of these consensus 
recommendations nevertheless ran into varying degrees of resistance, and those that 
were implemented did not always produce the effect they were designed to achieve.   
To arrive at an assessment of the study group’s overall policy influence, and 
what its experience reveals about the politics of commission-driven reform, this 
chapter will trace the debate over withdrawal and the attempt to implement the study 
group’s consensus recommendations.  Three key findings will emerge: the importance 
of a robust professional staff to diagnose subtle but consequential political dynamics 
and predict the impact of further military interventions upon them; the path-dependent 
effects of the political compromise that establish independent reviews; and the limited 
ability of commissions to influence the policies and practices of something as large as 
the executive branch. 
 
 Spectacle of Release 
 
The release of a high-profile commission report is by now a well-worn 
Washington ritual.  Precisely staged photo-ops and obligatory pledges to give the 
report due consideration constitute visible symbols of the political leadership’s 
receptivity to change.  “This report will give us all an opportunity to find common 
ground…not for the good of the Republican Party or the Democratic Party, but for the 
good of the country,” President Bush told reporters after being briefed on the report’s 
conclusions.448   
After meeting with the President on December 6, study group members 
traveled to Congress.  Conscious of the spectacle playing out before them, capitol 
police “shooed away” a workman caulking the sidewalk so Baker and his entourage 
could pass unimpeded.449  “Congress and the administration must carefully review the 
recommendations and implement those that offer the best opportunity to improve U.S. 
engagement in the Middle East,” the chairman of the House Intelligence Committee 
said.450  Underwriting the spectacle was the tacit assumption that the study group’s 
report could function as a major turning point in the war.  “There is almost a biblical 
thing about wise elderly people,” Representative Wolf commented that day.  “They 
can speak truth.”451   
After a press conference held before hundreds of journalists, the report was 
made available for download on the U.S. Institute of Peace website and put on sale at 
bookstores nationwide.  It was the second time a private press published an authorized 
version of a government report on the days of its release.452  Replicating the 9/11 
Commission’s masterly use of a commercial publishing house as a political tool, the 
study group contracted with Random House to pre-position copies of its 142-page 
report in bookstores nationwide, to be sold for $10.95.  The move enabled a wider 
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distribution than the Government Printing Office could achieve, ensuring that 
Americans had the opportunity to see and read the report the day its release generated 
headlines.  By making its report accessible to a wide audience, the study group 
intended to gain popular support and thereby political force for its findings and 
recommendations.   
The Iraq Study Group report even looked like the 9/11 Commission report.  
The replication of the 9/11 Commission’s cover design had a powerful visual effect, 
establishing something of a brand identity for trenchant government reports.  The 
graphic handiwork was the deliberate creation of study group staffers who had 
previously worked on the 9/11 Commission.453 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1 The 9/11 Commission and Iraq Study Group report covers. 
 
The spectacle that played out on December 6, 2006 did not materialize on its 
own. Like other commissions who used the release of their report to generate political 
influence, the stagecraft was the deliberate creation of study group staff.  More than 
40 staff members from the public relations firm Edelman International supported the 
study group on the day of the release.454  The blue-chip firm had also been hired by 
the 9/11 Commission.  Media handlers and former presidential advance personnel 
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helped plot the study group’s every move that day, down to the rented black vans that 
ferried members around town.  The study group members themselves had laid the 
groundwork for the report’s reception weeks earlier when they elected to meet with 
prominent members of the political media, all of whom later wrote about the report’s 
release or mentioned it in their role as broadcast commentators.  William Kristol of 
the Weekly Standard, Washington Post columnist George Will, New York Times 
columnist Tom Friedman, Mark Danner of the New York Review of Books, the New 
Yorker’s George Packer, and Washington Post military correspondent Thomas Ricks 
each had a private audience with the full study group in the month before the report’s 
release.455   The unusually transparent effort at reaching elite opinion-makers, who do 
not normally serve as witnesses before high-level commissions, showcases the 
importance of public relations and media management in generating momentum for 
commission recommendations.  Commissions exert influence not only through direct 
interaction with policymakers, but also by convincing media elites, and the public, of 
the correctness of their views. 
The aggressive marketing strategy, all part of the study group’s choreographed 
release, succeeded at drawing attention.  Initial sales were so great that Random 
House resorted to using its own employees to ferry books from a Maryland warehouse 
to Washington bookstores.456  By 4 p.m. on December 6, 400,000 copies of the report 
had been downloaded and thousands sold.457  A month after its release, the report 
ranked fifth on the New York Times best-seller list for non-fiction paperbacks.458   
 
5.1 The Report’s Assessment and Recommendations 
 
Understanding what the study group’s experience reveals about the politics of 
disaster investigation requires a close examination of its diagnosis of Iraq, and the 
errors of interpretation contained within it.  The report that descended upon official 
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Washington began with an unusually blunt declaration: “The situation in Iraq is grave 
and deteriorating.  There is no path that can guarantee success.”459  In the twenty-nine 
page assessment of the war that followed, the study group contradicted the 
administration’s narrative of slow but continual progress.  On the security front, the 
study group found that U.S. forces did not have the upper hand on the insurgency.  
Although the U.S. could successfully “clear” neighborhoods, not enough U.S. or Iraqi 
troops were in country to “hold” them.460  Nor had the Iraqi government taken action 
on key elements of national reconciliation that might foster peace.  Low-level Baath 
party members had not been integrated back into government and new provincial 
elections had not been scheduled. 
Moreover, violence was significantly underreported by official U.S. sources.  
On a day the Pentagon reported 93 attacks, the study group noted the actual number 
exceeded 1,100.461  As a consequence of the occupation, 79 percent of Iraqis had a 
“mostly negative” view of the United States, and an astonishing 61 percent approved 
of attacks on U.S. forces.  “If Iraqis continue to perceive Americans as representing 
an occupying force,” the report noted, “the United States could become its own worst 
enemy in a land it liberated from tyranny.”462  Nor was the U.S. in a diplomatic 
position to reverse its bad fortunes.  Of the three vital powers brokers in the Shi’a 
community, “the United States is unable to talk directly with one (Grand Ayatollah 
Ali as-Sistani) and does not talk with another (Moqtada al-Sadr).”463  
The study group essentially concluded that the U.S. was not winning because 
it was not up to the challenge it faced.  On the crucial task of preparing Iraq’s security 
forces, “there is no clear Iraqi or U.S. agreement on the character and mission of the 
police.”  The Facilities Protection Service, a security force the U.S. established to 
protect critical infrastructure, was described as “incompetent, dysfunctional, 
subversive,” akin to a “militia.”464  A mere 33 of 1,000 embassy employees speak 
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Arabic, only six fluently.  Similarly, the Defense Intelligence Agency has fewer than 
ten analysts with more than two years of experience evaluating the insurgency.465  
Lacking resources and political will, U.S. agencies and their personnel were simply 
overwhelmed by the challenges of building a new Iraqi state amid a violent 
insurgency. 
After summarizing the study group’s assessment of conditions in Iraq, the 
report described four courses of action then under discussion in policy circles: 
precipitate withdrawal, staying the course, more troops for Iraq, and devolution of the 
country to separate Shi’a, Sunni, and Kurdish regions.  The study group rejected each 
of them for various reasons and then made clear that no easy solution was at hand.  
“Put aside those silver bullets,” the co-author of the report commented after its 
release. “There is no one thing that can be done in Iraq to right the situation.”466  A 
fifth option, called “The Way Forward-A New Approach,” presented the study 
group’s 79 recommendations on how to retool the U.S. approach.  
 Tellingly, the study group’s first eighteen recommendations do not concern 
Iraq, but rather the notion that success is predicated upon “building an international 
consensus” for the U.S. mission there.  The study group’s sweeping geopolitical 
analysis identified the stalled peace process between Israel and Palestine as a root 
cause of anti-U.S. sentiment and called for newly invigorated regional diplomacy in 
service of Iraqi stability.  The study group decisively broke with administration policy 
of insisting upon preconditions before engaging states it finds objectionable.  With 
foreign fighters and material entering Iraq and Iraqi refugees flooding neighboring 
countries, the study group singled out the administration’s unilateralist diplomatic 
philosophy as part of the reason why it was failing to achieve U.S. objectives in Iraq.  
It suggested that the administration undertake a “new diplomatic offensive” to engage 
a variety of actors, and listed Iran, Syria, the United Nations, and the European 
diplomatic community as potential partners in a new “Iraq Support Group.”467  
The second subsection, “The Internal Approach: Helping Iraqis Help 
Themselves,” concerns the domestic scene in Iraq.  Following its analysis of Iraqi 
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politics, the study group identified national reconciliation as crucial to peace but then 
suggested that Iraqis are unlikely to resolve political differences on their own.   The 
report recommended a carrot and stick approach in which milestones are identified for 
the Iraqi government to achieve, with their fulfillment being a condition of continued 
U.S. support.  Milestones include the passage of laws to divide petroleum revenues, 
the reverse of de-Baathification, the approval an amnesty agreement, and the holding 
of provincial elections.468  Each milestone was aimed at accelerating the resolution of 
fundamental political impasses perceived by the study group to be driving sectarian 
aggression.    
Most consequentially, the study group called for the gradual withdrawal of 
troops and reorientation of the U.S. military mission toward training and equipping 
Iraqi security forces, and away from the public order duties that at that time consumed 
most of the force.  The study group depicted a possible future in which combat 
brigades would begin to depart in the near term, even as the number of U.S. trainers 
increased.  The study group imagined the training mission would conclude in the first 
quarter of 2008, after which U.S. forces would rapidly depart the country.469  To help 
ready the Iraqi government for its transition to self-reliance, it recommended a further 
commitment of $5 billion in economic assistance per year focused on capacity 
development and job creation.   
Twenty-nine additional recommendations concerned the underperformance of 
U.S. institutions.  The report documented shortcomings in reconstruction, economic 
policy, and military operations.  As was the case with the Columbia Board’s findings, 
not all of its recommendations were technocratic or organizational in nature.  Some 
were deeply cultural and political.  The study group, for instance, cited a culture of 
mistrust at the Pentagon and the need for greater transparency in reporting the costs of 
the war and the violence it generated.  So strong was the study group’s language that 
the New York Times editorial board characterized it a reprimand to the Bush 
administration.  The Times summarized recommendations 46, 72 and 78 as 
“Government officials should not lie to the public or each other, especially in matters 
of war.”470  Although the study group called for significant adjustments in the 
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organization of U.S. government efforts in Iraq, it presented the recommendations 
directed at agency performance as secondary to the overarching imperative of 
regional diplomacy, milestones for the Iraqi government, and a drawdown of combat 
brigades enabled by accelerated training of Iraqi security forces. 
Figure 5.2 The Iraq Study Group’s three major recommendations: 
 
1. “The United States, working with the Iraqi Government, should launch the 
comprehensive New Diplomatic Offensive to deal with the problem of 
Iraq and of the region.  This new diplomatic offensive should be launched 
before December 31, 2006.” 
 
21. “If the Iraqi government does not make substantial progress toward the 
achievement of milestones on national reconciliation, security, and 
governance, the United States should reduce its political, military, or 
economic support for the Iraqi government.” 
 
43. “Military priorities in Iraq must change, with the highest priority given to 
the training, equipping, advising, and support missions and to 
counterterrorism operations.” 
 
 
The Study Group’s Theory of Failure  
 
It was a stunning diagnosis, and a sweeping indictment of the administration’s 
foreign policy.  “Iraq Panel Proposes a Major Strategy Shift,” the Washington Post 
reported.  The New York Times headlined “Panel Urges Basic Shift in U.S. Policy in 
Iraq.”471  As one commentator said succinctly, the report “has set in motion the logic 
of withdrawal.”472 
No other recent commission offered so numerous or detailed a set of 
prescriptions.  Reflecting the breadth of national security institutions involved in the 
occupation, the study group nearly makes commission history with its total of 
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seventy-nine separate recommendations, many of which run more than a page in 
length and have seven or eight sub-clauses.473  By comparison, the 9/11 Commission 
offered forty-one; the Columbia Accident Investigation Board twenty-nine. 
The recommendations fall into four categories: geopolitical considerations, 
political dynamics at work in Iraq, the U.S. strategic direction in Iraq, and the 
performance of U.S. institutions assisting the Iraqi government.  
 
Figure 5.2 Recommendations by Category 
 
 
      Category                         (# total)        Recommendation Number 
 
Geopolitics     (18)        1-18  
Iraqi Politics & Institutions   (14)        26-33, 50-54, 59  
U.S. Strategy     (18)        19-25, 34-37, 40-43, 64-66  
Agency underperformance   (29)        38-39, 44, 45-49, 55-58, 60-63, 67-79 
 
 
 
The theory of failure implicit in the study group’s report reflected the dramatic 
events in Iraq that overshadowed its deliberations as well as the dynamics members 
witnessed first hand on their trip to Baghdad.  High-levels of sectarian violence forced 
members to focus on Iraq’s seemingly intractable political conflicts.  Senator Robb’s 
trip outside the Green Zone brought urgency to the need for the U.S. to increase its 
training of the Iraq security forces.  Perhaps most of all, the inability of the U.S. 
military to stem the explosion of violence during the study group’s nine-month tenure, 
despite multiple plans employing different approaches, is clearly reflected in the study 
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group’s judgment that U.S. forces alone cannot end the strife between Iraq’s ethnic 
groups. 
 At the same time that the study group’s theory of failure singled out the 
violence generated by Iraqi politics as a cause of the occupation’s failure, it also 
implicated U.S. institutions.  The largest subset of recommendations targeted 
underperforming U.S. agencies.  At every turn, government institutions carrying out 
the nation-building mission seemed constitutionally incapable of doing their job.  
Iraqi dysfunction, in this way, was partly conceived of as a consequence of U.S. 
failure.  The study group’s focus on perfecting U.S. bureaucratic process revealed a 
faith in the interventionist capability of the national security state that not all critics 
shared.  Advancing bureaucratic failure as a powerful explanatory factor over and 
above other dynamics, such as the inherent difficulty of occupying a foreign land, is 
in keeping with the known tendency of expert commissions to suggest technocratic 
solutions to what are at root political problems.474 
 
5.2 Grand Politics of the Report’s Reception 
 
 The study group’s report touched off a political firestorm.  By forcefully 
legitimating the views of those who doubted the prospects for success in Iraq, the 
study group appeared to create an opening for a major policy shift.  “The report’s 
assessment of where things stand in Iraq…destroys the credibility of the ‘we are 
winning’ White House school of thought and opens the door to an honest 
consideration of policy,” the president emeritus of the Council on Foreign Relations 
wrote.475  To some, the report evoked Walter Cronkite’s famous voicing of doubt on 
America’s role in the Vietnam war.476  “We have been too often disappointed by the 
optimism of the American leaders, both in Vietnam and Washington, to have faith any 
longer in the silver linings they find in the darkest cloud,” Cronkite told the American 
public in 1968.  Although the study group did not use the word “stalemate,” its report 
                                                 
474 Sheila Jasanoff, ed. Learning from Disaster: Risk Management After Bhopal (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1994). 
475 Leslie Gelb, “Good Politics, No Strategy: A Roundtable on the Iraq Study Group Report,” Foreign 
Affairs, online roundtable, December 7, 2006. 
476 James Fallows, “A Turning Point,” The Atlantic Monthly Online, December 7, 2006. 
 143
implied that Cronkite’s assessment from the front lines of Vietnam applied to Iraq in 
2006 as well.477 
The question was now whether the report’s description of policy disaster 
would catalyze policy change.  All signs indicated that a shift was possible.  Popular 
support was on the study group’s side.  Seventy-nine percent of the public agreed with 
its recommendation to begin a gradual withdrawal and reorient the U.S. mission to 
train Iraq’s security services.478  The day the Iraq Study Group released its report, the 
Senate confirmed Robert Gates as Secretary of Defense by a 95-2 vote, placing one of 
its own members at the helm of the department with the greatest ability to influence 
war strategy.479  Yet study group members themselves voiced awareness that their 
claim on the determination of events was limited.  “This is not an ongoing 
commission,” Justice Sandra Day O’Connor commented at the December 6 press 
conference.  “It really is out of our hands.”480  Added Hamilton, “the policymakers 
have to take over at this point.”481 
 The policymaker-in-chief had in fact already weighed in, and the President’s 
ability to reframe the situation soon exerted itself.  Responding to a leak of the 
report’s conclusions while meeting with Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki on November 
20, Bush said “this business about graceful exit just simply has no realism to it at 
all.”482  The President thus signaled his resistance to the report’s overarching 
recommendation even before it was released.   
Bush’s insistence on seeing the war through surfaced again in his first press 
conference after receiving the report, held jointly with British Prime Minister Tony 
Blair on December 7, 2006.  In contrast to Bush’s contrite demeanor after the 
midterm elections one month before, when he signaled a willingness to consider new 
views, he largely repudiated study group recommendations.  Although he said he had 
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“read it,” he went on to say that “Congress isn’t going to accept every 
recommendation in the report, and neither will the administration.”483  
The next day, Bush clearly signaled his intentions to pivot away from the 
study group’s recommended course of action.  “My administration is reviewing the 
report, and we will seriously consider every recommendation,” Bush said.  “At the 
same time, the Pentagon, the State Department, and the National Security Council are 
finishing work on their own reviews of our strategy in Iraq.  I look forward to 
receiving their recommendations.  I want to hear all advice as I make the decisions to 
start a new course in Iraq.”484 
The President was not alone in his disavowal of the report’s call for 
withdrawal.  Neoconservatives stridently dismissed the report as a “surrender 
document.”485 “Iraq Panel Urges U.S. to Give Up,” headlined the conservative New 
York Post, which superimposed the faces of Lee Hamilton and James Baker on two 
chimpanzees labeled “surrender monkeys.”486  One of its columnists went so far as to 
compare James Baker to Pontius Pilate, the Roman prefect who ordered the 
crucifixion of Christ.  "The difference is that Pilate just wanted to wash his hands of 
an annoyance, while Baker would wash his hands in the blood of our troops,” Post 
columnist Ralph Peters wrote.487  
Accusations of surrender emanating from partisan Republicans was not the 
only reading of the report to emerge.  Conservative commentators who opposed the 
study group’s call to restart the Arab-Israeli peace process charged that a report on 
Iraq is no place to advance proposals for how to handle Hamas and Hezbollah and the 
return of the Golan Heights to Syrian control.488  “The simplistic connection the ISG 
report makes between building peace in Baghdad and building peace in Jerusalem 
does not stand up to serious scrutiny,” a Heritage Foundation analysis concluded.489  
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Conservative commentators were in essence rejecting the relevance of U.S. 
engagement in the Middle East to success in the Iraq occupation.490  Locating 
responsibility for failures in Iraq in the administration’s diplomatic policies was thus 
contested along familiar ideological lines, with supporters of the administration and 
Israel being least inclined to agree with the study group’s views.   
The report’s embracement of a classically realpolitik ends-means calculation 
over the evangelical promotion of democracy pioneered by the Bush administration 
constituted yet a third ideological divide across which the report’s reception differed.  
Couching the report as a new front in an old war between competing schools of 
foreign policy, the Washington Post commented, “the Iraq Study Group report 
released yesterday might well be titled "The Realist Manifesto.”491  James Baker 
himself encouraged the report to be viewed as expressing the ideological viewpoints 
of an earlier generation of foreign policy officials who favored wide diplomatic 
consultation without precondition and careful thinking about the costs of U.S. 
engagement.  “For 40 years we talked to the Soviet Union during a time when they 
were committed to wiping us off the face of the earth,” Baker told reporters.492 
As the White House continued to signal its rejection of the study group’s call 
for gradual withdrawal, the media narrative changed rapidly.  What had been a chorus 
hailing the report as a turning point in the war on December 6th turned on December 
7th into a story about how nothing was likely to change at all.  “Bush Expresses 
Caution on Key Points in Iraq Panel’s Report,” the New York Times headlined.493  “I 
don’t think I’ve ever seen politicians walk away from something faster,” a former 
defense official said.494   
At the same time that Bush was distancing himself form the study group’s 
central recommendations, Baker was maneuvering in front of Congress, telling the 
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations that the White House should not treat the 
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report “like a fruit salad.”495  Yet a day after the report’s release, the President’s 
reluctance to embrace its key recommendation entrenched the partisan way in which 
it was being received.  The prominent military scholar Steven Biddle put his finger on 
the fundamental issue.  “If the President is adamant about refusing to exit absent 
success as he defines it,” Biddle said, “no commission report or interagency review 
will make much difference.”496  
The window for policy change that the study group appeared to open had 
seemingly slammed shut in less than 24 hours.  “Part of the problem is that the 
expectation was so high,” panel member Vernon Jordan said.  “The problem is there 
is no absolute correct answer.”497  Still another commentator suggested that 
expectations had been artificially raised by the mid-term elections.  "No one paid 
attention to this until the fall when it became clear that the Republican majority was 
going to fall and Iraq was the issue over which Republicans would lose,” a Brookings 
Institution scholar said.498   
Members of the Iraqi political leadership similarly viewed the report as a 
product of and for the U.S. political process.  “It is a report to solve American 
problems, and not to solve Iraq’s problems,” said Ayad al-Sammarai, a Sunni 
politician.499  Iraqis particularly rejected the framing of success in Iraq as a product of 
the efforts of both the U.S. and Iraqi government, rather than as the primary 
responsibility of the country who began the occupation in the first place.  As one 
commentator shrewdly observed, by setting out milestones for the Iraqi government 
to meet, the report subtly shifted responsibility for the decision to withdraw from 
Americans to Iraqis.500  The report could function in this way to rationalize a 
bipartisan decision to withdraw when the fragile Iraqi government proved unable to 
achieve the ambitious goals set out for it. 
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Over the course of a single 24-hour news cycle, the study group’s much-
anticipated report was effectively taken out of play by a few well-placed presidential 
remarks.  As Washington awaited the results of the White House and Pentagon Iraq 
strategy reviews, conventional wisdom held that the study group’s report was “dead 
on arrival.”501  Although the report would go on to have quite a life of its own, White 
House manipulation of expectations at the critical moment just before and after the 
report’s release helped foster the widespread perception, in the media and in foreign 
policy circles, that little would come of the study group’s efforts.  The rapid swing in 
reception is thus a study in the exercise of presidential power and illustrative of how 
quickly deterministic narratives can form around commission reports.  The pending 
announcement of Iraq strategy was to come just after the New Year. 
 
Surge as Study Group “Blindspot” 
 
The President unveiled his new Iraq strategy on January 10, 2007, a day after 
fierce fighting broke out off Haifa Street in Baghdad, 1,000 yards from the Green 
Zone.502  In a nationally televised speech, President Bush announced a surge of 
20,000 troops whose primary mission would be to establish order in the troubled 
capital.503  The new focus on population security was premised on the notion that 
stemming sectarian violence would enable Iraq’s leaders to negotiate an enduring 
reconciliation.504  The addition of two Marine battalions in Anbar and five Army 
brigades in Baghdad would raise U.S. troop levels to 160,000—100,000 more than 
the study group envisioned remaining in Iraq by the end of 2007.505   
The President’s surge plan was in many respects a muscular fulfillment of the 
“clear-hold-build” strategy that Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice had mobilized 
the study group to help support after her disagreement with Secretary Rumsfeld in the 
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war cabinet in November 2005.  The President’s turnabout caused an ironic inversion.  
Contrary to Rice’s expectations, the study group had not, in the end, advocated for the 
strategy she supported, on account of the substantial rise in levels of violence in the 
year since it was first proposed.  Instead, the study group’s views most closely 
approximated those held by Rumsfeld and General George Casey, the Iraq ground 
commander, who saw the intrusive Amercan military presence as counterproductive 
to solving Iraq’s underlying political and security problems.506  
Study group members expressed dismay when briefed by National Security 
Advisor Stephen Hadley minutes before the President announced the surge plan.  
Leon Panetta interrupted Hadley to say that of their recommendations, “three were the 
heart and soul,”—gradual withdrawal, milestones, engagement of Syria and Iran—
and that the President’s plan disregarded each of them.  “The gesture of respect failed 
to disguise the rebuff,” concluded one report of the phone conference. 507 
Not only did the President dismiss the study group report even before it was 
released, he elected to follow a strategy that the study group acknowledged as being 
discussed in policy circles but one that it did not seriously consider.  Although it 
would not be apparent for nearly a year and a half, the President’s surge strategy was 
ultimately effective in reducing levels of violence.  It was not the only factor that led 
to success in Iraq, but early histories of the occupation deem it to be a turning 
point.508   
How did such a distinguished group of public figures, given access to the 
same intelligence the administration consumed, fail to describe the surge plan in their 
report as a viable option?  What led the study group to miss seeing the emerging 
security dynamics that led the President’s national security adviser to recommend an 
escalation of U.S. forces?  How were the wise men caught by surprise, and what does 
this portend for the ability of commissions to diagnose problems, and recommend 
interventions, in the complex systems of the national security state?   
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The study group did briefly debate the concept of a surge.  Senator Robb had 
been an early proponent of increasing troop levels, and insisted that it be mentioned as 
an option in the final report.509  However, the study group as a whole remained 
unconvinced that escalation would lead to wide-scale success, and it did not conduct a 
detailed analysis of whether the presence of additional troops would make the U.S. 
more effective in fulfilling its stated mission.  The outcome of the debate between 
Robb and his fellow members is captured in the report’s discussion of strategic 
options.  In describing option three, “More Troops for Iraq,” the study group clearly 
states its opposition to a sustained increase in force levels.  “U.S. troops may help 
limit violence in a highly localized area,” the report said.  “However, past experience 
indicates that the violence would simply rekindle as soon as U.S. forces are moved to 
another area.”510  The study group’s collective judgment was that a surge of troops, of 
whatever size and with whatever level of coordination with civilian reconstructions 
strategy, would not produce enduring effects or substantially impact national 
reconciliation.   
What is striking in this study group’s reading of political dynamics is not so 
much that it failed to predict the future course of political and military events in Iraq.  
Indeed, it did identify the pivotal development—national reconciliation—that had to 
occur for Iraq to stabilize, and a primary lever that policymakers could pull—a surge 
of troops—to try and achieve it.  Rather, what is striking is that the study group did 
not consider the possible broader, symbolic effects a surge may have on other 
political processes playing out in Iraq and elsewhere, and how these together might be 
far more consequential to achieving a lasting stability between Iraq’s warring political 
groups than the extra troops themselves.   
In conceiving of the surge as primarily a projection of top-down military 
power, the study group missed how the renewed U.S. commitment articulated by 
President Bush could become a symbolic tipping point—much like President Ronald 
Reagan’s famous invocation to “tear down this wall, Mr. Gorbachev”—that could 
help catalyze stability and reconciliation from the bottom-up.511  To the extent that the 
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utility of crisis commissions stems from their ability to reread local circumstances in 
ways different than other observers, whether distant or near, the particular 
circumstances behind the study group’s narrow and negative reading of the surge are 
worth exploring. 
 At least four factors contributed to the study group’s failure to anticipate the 
surge as a plausible policy option or to imagine its broader implications on the 
political and security dynamics at play.  The first and most obvious is that few serious 
observers of Iraq in 2006 imagined success would be possible there in any terms.  
Although the surge ultimately proved to be an intervention that, together with the 
Sunni awakening and Sadr cease-fire, brought greater levels of security to Iraq, it was 
a counterintuitive strategy that went against the instincts of analysts who had tried 
without success for three years to pacify Iraq, only to watch levels of violence careen 
further and further out of control.  In this way the study group’s views reflected 
conventional wisdom in the foreign policy establishment. 
Nevertheless, several highly placed officials argued that a surge might work, 
suggesting that President Bush’s decision to dispatch troops was more than an 
uninformed gamble.  Importantly for establishing what makes commissions 
successful diagnostic instruments, the vantage point of surge proponents was different 
from the study group’s in several respects.  The example of Jack Keane is particularly 
instructive.  A retired Marine general who went on record supporting the surge in 
2006, Keane was its most vocal military advocate.512  In his capacity as a member of 
the Department of Defense Policy Board and confidential advisor to senior officials, 
Keane visited the front lines in Iraq several times a year.  It was during these trips that 
he witnessed first hand the success of the military’s counterinsurgency campaign in 
Tal Afar under Col. H.R. McMaster, whose tactical approach later formed the basis 
for the surge strategy.  On the basis of this experience, Keane came to believe a 
country-wide surge of troops, as part of an expanded counterinsurgency strategy, 
might be effective in turning the tide of violence.   
It is important to note that study group members were briefed about the 
campaign in Tal Afar.  President Bush had publicly praised McMaster’s example, and 
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the local success he achieved was featured prominently in media accounts.513  But 
unlike study group members, Keane had witnessed events in Tal Afar up close, rather 
than through briefing documents, and in Keane’s opinion the modest dip in violence 
in a tiny town in Western Iraq took on a larger significance than the study group was 
willing to attribute it.514  Structural constraints denied study group members this same 
vantage point, and it is here that the group’s diagnostic shortcomings, and their larger 
implications for understanding crisis commissions, come into view.  
 The stature of the group’s members, which served so many purposes in 
Washington, introduced restrictions to their information gathering in Iraq.  Because 
elaborate security details would be necessary for trips beyond the Green Zone, its 
members were strongly discouraged from leaving U.S. bases or visiting places where 
combat was occurring.  These security constraints caused Hamilton and Baker to 
demur from traveling across Iraq or interacting with military commanders in areas 
where aggressive counterinsurgency operations were underway.  As a result, only a 
single member of the study group—Charles Robb—left the Green Zone during the 
group’s three-day Iraq visit.   
The inability to move freely around Iraq constrained the study group’s ability 
to investigate another emerging trend that proved crucial to the success of the surge.  
In the late summer of 2006, it looked to some observers like a realignment of Sunni 
tribes in Anbar province was beginning, and that their loyalty was up for grabs.  
Popular dissatisfaction with al-Qaeda’s brutal tactics, along with its infringement on 
traditional tribal prerogatives, appeared to generate a willingness among Sunni tribes 
to forge an alliance with the coalition.  Exploring this emerging political alliance, or 
the potential symbolic effects of a troop surge on other actors whose loyalty was 
wavering, was not among the topics examined in detail by the study group on its trip 
to Iraq.  The group did not meet with a single Sunni sheik who became part of the 
influential “awakening” movement of U.S.-aligned tribes in Anbar province.   
 The study group’s lack of a large professional staff further curtailed its ability 
to assess the surge strategy, and it is here that the weaknesses of the public-private 
partnership that supported the study group’s analysis can be seen most clearly.  
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Lacking in-house military analysts, the study group did not have the expertise to 
conduct a rigorous troop-to-task assessment that might have extrapolated the Tal Afar 
data to illustrate the potential benefits of a greater US security presence.  Nor did its 
staff or members persuasively articulate scenarios in which potential security benefits 
from the surge would reinforce other processes, such as the awakening moment, that 
contributed to national reconciliation.  The lack of a large professional staff also 
meant the group could not dispatch proxies to travel around Iraq on its members’ 
behalf.   As a result, the study group was less able to question the assessment of 
others, including General Casey, the ground commander in Iraq, who believed that 
more U.S. troops would not enable a successful counterinsurgency strategy. 
The timing of the administration’s own consideration of the surge was a final 
factor that precluded the study group’s awareness of its emergence as a serious 
candidate strategy.  The administration reviews of Iraq strategy by the National 
Security Council and Joint Chiefs did not begin in earnest until after the study group 
had retired to deliberate, and the surge was not seriously considered during the initial 
phases of either.  Indeed, at the outset of the concurrent reviews, many of the 
administration’s most senior military and foreign policy officials articulated the very 
theory of failure later explicated in the study group’s report.  In the White House 
review, State Department counselor Philip Zelikow and Iraq coordinator David 
Satterfield argued that U.S. forces were unable to influence Iraqi political dynamics, 
and that consequently “the future of the country must now be made by Iraqis.”515  
Senior Defense Department officials offered a similar assessment.  A surge was not 
among options initially considered by the team of colonels leading the Joint Staff 
review.516  The plan that later became the surge was not outlined in detail until days 
before the White House’s own internal deadline.517   
The outlines of the surge strategy, furthermore, were not generated in house, 
but rather developed externally and then tendered for consideration by Jack Keane 
and Fredrick Kagan of the American Enterprise Institute, two outside advisors invited 
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to brief the President and Hadley separate from the ongoing reviews.518  It was only 
after the President expressed interest in the possible escalation of forces suggested by 
Keane and Kagan that the internal review teams seriously considered the feasibility of 
bringing more troops into theater.  Although Keane served on the board of retired 
military officers advising the study group, the expert working groups primarily 
functioned to provide background analyses in the study group’s early stages, and were 
not consulted during late deliberations or given the chance to comment on drafts of 
the final report.  Baker’s penchant for secrecy thus effectively kept the late breaking 
enthusiasm for the surge off the study group’s radar. 
 The study group’s failure to seriously consider the strategy the President 
elected to follow was thus in part the result of its constitution as an advisory body 
rather than a full investigative commission.  As an entity of “wise men” advised by 
groups of volunteer experts but not a large professional staff, the study group was ill-
equipped to notice the subtle dynamics that were later melded into a successful 
strategy.  Similar to NASA’s Return to Flight Task Group, the study group’s 
diagnostic vision was predicated upon analysis being provided to it by request.  Little 
independent, generative thinking was done in house.  As a result, it was more difficult 
for the study group to challenge received thinking.  The experience of the Iraq Study 
Group and the Return to Flight Task Group suggests that staffing structures make a 
pervasive difference in the ability of commissions to diagnose complex systems.  In 
general, investigative commissions with large staffs appear to reach more accurate 
conclusions than advisory panels that lack investigative resources. 
 
Iraq Study Group Becomes ‘Plan B’ 
 
The study group’s primary recommendation may have been dead on arrival 
from the President’s perspective, and reported as so in the media, but the debate in 
Congress over the surge plan illustrates that the study group’s conclusions were very 
much alive.  Tracing the study group’s impact on the unfolding Iraq debate and to 
tangible changes in administration policy reveals both the unique influence 
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commissions are able to wield and the bureaucratic and political limitations to their 
ability to order events.   
For more than a year after the study group issued its report, those who 
opposed the surge fought what became a rearguard battle to legislate the report’s 
conclusions into law.  The efforts by Congress to forcibly shape U.S. foreign policy in 
Iraq by legislative and budgetary means illustrates how the study group’s conclusions 
framed the debate over possible courses of action and provided specific conditions 
written into legislation.  Far from bring “dead-on-arrival,” as conventional wisdom 
would have it, the study group’s conclusions on Iraq policy touched off a fierce tug-
of-war between the government’s legislative and executive branches that lasted until 
the inauguration of President Barack Obama in January 2009. 
With the President in control of the execution of foreign policy, and Congress 
primarily able to challenge Executive branch prerogative through budget resolutions, 
the first major legislative debates over the surge occurred in March 2007, when 
Congress considered the emergency supplemental to fund Iraq operations.  
Congressional support for the surge at first broke down along partisan lines, with 
Republicans generally supporting the White House and Democrats mostly favoring 
the course charted by the study group.  A more nuanced picture soon emerged as 
Republicans began to break from President Bush.  The rebellion was led in part by 
Lamar Alexander (R-TN), who petitioned the President to take the study group report 
“down off the shelf and use it for something other than a bookend.”519   
As opposition to the surge intensified, Colorado Senator Ken Salazar took the 
extraordinary step of introducing legislation that would compel the President to 
produce a formal plan to implement the study group’s recommendations.  The “Iraq 
Study Group Recommendations Implementation Act of 2007” (S-1545), as Salazar 
titled the bill, aimed to create a legislative basis for the study group recommendations 
to become the future U.S. strategy in Iraq.  The bill spelled out 62 separate 
diplomatic, military, policy conditions in more than 3,000 words of text that closely 
approximated the language of the study group report.520  Conservative critics attacked 
the bill as they did the study group, characterizing it as “mandating a cut and run 
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strategy” that would lead to defeat.521  Salazar’s bill attracted 12 co-sponsors, both 
Democrat and Republican, but never passed committee.  Salazar re-introduced the bill 
on July 10, 2007 as an amendment to the Department of Defense appropriation, but 
this too failed.522 
Members of Congress who opposed the surge plan continued their attempt to 
legislate the study group’s recommendations.  Although Salazar proved unable to 
write them into law en masse, the Democratic leadership did succeed in inserting a 
smaller subset into the first supplemental passed by the House and Senate in late April 
2007.  The measure wrote into law a phased redeployment of troops, to begin no later 
than October 1, 2007, with the end goal of removing all combat forces by April 1, 
2008.  The President, however, vetoed the bill on May 1, saying in a speech that 
Congress had “passed a bill that substitutes the opinions of politicians for the 
judgment of our military commanders.”523  
The President’s attempts to frame the issue of who gets to decide on strategy 
as a question of expertise in military matters, rather than a political judgment to be 
made by democratically elected representatives, is a classic and historically successful 
maneuver undertaken by embattled executives.  Opponents of the surge argued that 
the study group is itself a body of experts, but they ultimately lost the political fight.  
After the veto, congressional leadership removed the section mandating a timeline for 
withdrawal but kept in a variety of other study group recommendations.  Foremost 
among these were eighteen benchmarks the President had to certify the Iraqi 
government was making progress toward before further support from the Economic 
Support Fund would be disbursed, absent a presidential waiver of the requirement.524  
Using its power of the purse, Congress did succeed in implementing the milestone 
approach recommended by the study group.  Getting the administration to strictly 
adhere to them was another matter entirely. 
 With the benchmarks written into law, debate shifted over the summer of 2007 
to what constituted their fulfillment, much as the Return to Flight Task Group was 
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forced to debate whether NASA had complied with the Columbia Board’s 
recommendations.  An initial White House assessment in July 2007 found that few of 
the benchmarks had been fulfilled, but declared that satisfactory progress was being 
made.525  A later Government Accountability Office audit found that the Iraqi 
government had met three benchmarks,  partially met another four, and not met 
eleven others.526  In view of this dismal record, the administration cited continued 
Iraqi progress toward fulfilling the benchmarks as reason enough for the coalition to 
continue the surge.527  Congressional leaders were ultimately reluctant to pass 
legislation that would end funding for Iraq operations.  Once again, the power of the 
executive and its ability to define the parameters of success blunted congressional 
attempts to enforce the measures of accountability defined by the study group.  
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Figure 5. 2 GAO Assessment of Congressional Benchmarks. 
 
 
Although months had passed since its report was issued, the study group 
remained a touchstone in congressional debate on both sides of the aisle.  In the sum 
of 2007, House Republicans even pressured the President to reconvene the study 
group so that it could issue an updated assessment of Iraq and report on the extent to 
 158
which the administration had fulfilled its recommendations.528  It was a move 
reminiscent of Senator Barbara Mikulski’s request to have the chair of the Columbia 
investigation review NASA’s decision to cancel the Hubble repair mission.  Neither 
the Columbia Board nor the Iraq Study Group ultimately reconvened, perhaps 
indicating an inability of Congress to resurrect expert bodies to referee subsequent 
policy debates.  Nevertheless, the threat of reconstituting the study group remained 
symbolically potent for its implicit suggestion that the administration was 
contravening the study group’s recommendations.  In an attempt to pacify critics, 
senior administration officials hinted post-surge policies closely resembling a “Baker-
Hamilton” solution were in the works.529 
In the wake of the President’s selection of the surge, the Iraq Study Group 
report functioned both as a rallying point for the opposition and as a kind of “Plan B,” 
a holding place for a set of policies that might serve as a useful fallback if the surge 
failed, or even if it succeeded.  Indeed, by the summer of 2007, some members of the 
Iraq Study Group staff remarked at the potential irony of their recommendations 
being implemented on a timescale a year behind what their report called for.530 
 
5.3 Process-Tracing Consensus Recommendations 
  
As the grand battle over whether to withdraw was fought by congressional 
leaders and the White House, secondary scuttles concerning the bulk of the study 
group’s recommendations took place largely out of public sight.  Many of its 79 
recommendations were received without objection and implemented to varying 
degrees as 2007 progressed.  By passing unimpeded from elected leaders to heads of 
agencies to implement, these politically uncontroversial recommendations are 
interesting objects of study to scholars interested in the policy influence of 
commissions and the dynamics of reform that occur in their wake.  The extent to 
which these “consensus” recommendations catalyze desired policy ends constitutes a 
crucial test of the ability of the U.S. federal system to implement corrections in the 
absence of debate over policy direction.  Importantly for this study, tracing their 
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implementation builds an empirical basis for theorizing about the mechanisms that 
drive commission-led reform, as well as the countervailing forces that limit 
commission influence.  The following section provides an overview of these 
recommendations and closely examines the fate of three of them.  
The most significant of the study group’s consensus recommendations 
proposed an expansion of resources for training the Iraqi security forces.  The 
administration implemented them fully.  Additional allotments of funding in 2007 and 
early 2008 expanded the Iraqi Security Forces Fund to more than $17 billion.531  
Coupled with $4.97 billion in other allocations, spending on the Iraqi security sector 
in the year after the study group report grew larger than U.S. spending on all other 
sectors combined.532  The administration also implemented a number of financially 
modest recommendations with little complication, including increased support for 
Iraqi ministries, the continuation of substantial economic assistance, redoubling 
efforts to establish functioning police and courts systems, and the strengthening of 
U.S. capabilities to undertake contingency operations abroad.  As Lee Hamilton 
commented in July 2007, in many cases “you see progress toward our 
recommendations but not fully incorporating them.”533   
More interesting yet are those consensus recommendations that languished, 
despite being supported by Congress and the White House.  A closer look at the 
struggle to implement three of the more crucial ones—two on U.S. bureaucratic 
process, one targeted at Iraqi politics—reveals the very real difficulty of applying 
therapeutic interventions recommended by commissions even when political 
consensus to do so exists.   
 
The Search for Policy Coordination  
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x Recommendation 67: The President should create a Senior Advisor for Economic 
Reconstruction in Iraq.534 
 
 As the study group met with the Bush administration’s national security team, 
Leon Panetta, former chief of staff under President William Clinton, asked a simple 
question: “Who in the administration is the central authority for dealing with Iraq’s 
politics?”  He got few clear answers.535  Neither the President’s National Security 
Advisor nor the Secretaries of Defense or State articulated a clear system of control 
for managing engagement with Iraqi leadership or, more broadly, U.S. policy in Iraq.  
The question of who was in charge, both in Washington and in Baghdad, was fiercely 
contested in the occupation’s early years.  In mid-2006, policy coordination still 
seemed to be everyone’s job—and therefore, in the eyes of the study group, the 
responsibility of no one in particular. 
The lack of executive authority in the execution of Iraq policy was especially 
problematic in the reconstruction effort, which involved offices from 62 agencies or 
sub-agencies, each of which reported through different chains of command.536  In the 
words of the study group, the result was that “coordination of assistance programs by 
the Defense Department, State Department, United States Agency for International 
Development, and other agencies has been ineffective.”  The study group noted that 
“there are no clear lines establishing who is in charge of reconstruction,” and “no 
single official is responsible or held accountable for the overall reconstruction 
effort.”537  Agencies “follow conflicting strategies,” leading to “duplicate or 
uncoordinated efforts.”538  
To remedy this failure of policy coordination, the study group called for the 
appointment of a Senior Advisor for Economic Reconstruction.  Recommendation 
No. 67 specified that the senior advisor should report to the President and chair an 
interagency group in the National Security Council consisting of the senior 
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leadership—either assistant secretary or above—of all agencies involved.539  Only by 
wielding the authority implicit in being the President’s personal representative did 
study group members judge that the necessary level of coordination between agencies 
could be achieved.   
The study group was not the only observer to notice the lack of cohesion in 
administration policies.  By fall 2006, the idea of appointing an “Iraq czar” as a 
remedy for policy coordination failures was widely discussed.  The consensus among 
those outside the administration was that a czar was desperately needed.540  
Strikingly, at no point in 2006 did the President’s advisors seriously advance the idea 
of appointing an Iraq coordinator, either for overall policy or for reconstruction.  It 
was the President himself who forced the issue in the days preceding the 
announcement of the surge plan.541   
Ambassador David Satterfield, the State Department’s Iraq coordinator, was 
working with the President on the surge speech he was to deliver on January 10, 2007.  
While looking over economic and reconstruction programs being announced in the 
speech, the President turned to Satterfield and asked, “Who is going to coordinate all 
this?”542  In the ensuing exchange, the idea of creating a coordinator position gained 
momentum.  After consulting with Secretary Rice, Satterfield returned to the 
President with the suggestion that the position be titled the “Coordinator for 
Economic Transition in Iraq,” or CETI, and that the coordinator be appointed by the 
Secretary of State.   
The President’s desire to announce the new position in his speech announcing 
the surge touched off a scramble to identify a person to fill it.  Satterfield’s executive 
assistant recommended Ambassador Timothy Carney, who had just stepped down as 
Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, a new State Department post 
designed to manage the mobilization of civilian agencies in post-conflict missions.543  
A veteran diplomat with experience in Vietnam, Cambodia, South Africa, Indonesia, 
Somalia, Sudan and Haiti, Carney had initially served in Iraq in the occupation’s 
initial months but left Iraq, as did the future Ambassador Ryan Crocker, soon after 
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Ambassador Bremer took charge of the Coalition Provisional Authority.  An urgent 
call was placed asking Carney to come in and see Secretary Rice the next day.  
 The entire process—from the President’s suggestion to Carney’s 
appointment—played out in just over 48 hours.  Carney learned of his role only just 
before Bush announced the new Iraq policy, the economic aspects of which he would 
be asked to carry out.  Because the specifics of his position hadn’t been yet been 
established, Bush referred to Carney’s role in vague terms, saying that “Secretary 
Rice will soon appoint a reconstruction coordinator in Baghdad to ensure better 
results for economic assistance being spent in Iraq.”544  Rice made the formal 
announcement appointing Carney two days later.545  
The position Carney found himself occupying was not what the Iraq Study 
Group had envisioned.  He did not report to the President or have a leadership role in 
the National Security Council.  Rather than being based in Washington with Cabinet 
level rank, as the study group recommended, Rice’s statement specified that Carney 
would report to the Ambassador in Baghdad.  He had few enumerated powers, other 
than to “coordinate” the Embassy’s approach to economic and reconstruction affairs 
and to “work with” the military.546  Carney would be an appointee of the State 
Department, rather than a representative of the President.  As such, he would have no 
command or tasking authority over other agencies or military offices.  Those working 
in the reconstruction immediately saw that the coordinator position originally called 
for by the study group had no teeth by the time Rice announced it.547 
Arriving in Baghdad, Ambassador Carney faced the question of how to define 
his role within the framework announced by Rice.  Some advised him that the status 
endowed in his position by the President and Secretary of State meant he could 
assume a greater posture of authority than he might technically have, building his role 
into an Iraq-based version of the reconstruction czar the study group and others had 
called for.  To achieve this, he could regularly invoke the authority of the President, 
who he interfaced with alongside the Ambassador in weekly videoconferences.548  
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Carney, however, was not inclined to embrace a wider conception of his 
responsibilities.  A number of logistical and functional constraints, including his 
failure to gain a sufficient staff and to establish a relationship with top military 
commanders, ultimately led him to leave his role modestly defined.549  
As a result of very practical restrictions to his administrative reach and his 
own reluctance to carve out a larger portfolio, Carney was in many respects unable to 
fulfill even the modest role spelled out in his official charge.  Although he served as 
the senior liaison to the Iraqi cabinet on matters of economic affairs and chaired 
coordination meetings inside the Embassy, Carney did not wield direct authority over 
any entity not in the State Department chain of command.  This left the vast majority 
of reconstruction offices—including the military’s reconstruction efforts and offices 
run by other U.S. departments—outside his formal control.  In just over three months, 
Carney departed Baghdad.  His position, originally suggested by the President 
himself, ultimately extended little beyond supporting the Ambassador.550   
 With the study group’s call for a strong coordinator only marginally fulfilled, 
critics outside the administration—and a few highly placed officials within it—
continued to suggest that an Iraq coordinator be installed in the White House.  
Admiral William J. Fallon, who the President nominated as CENTCOM commander, 
the military’s combatant command with responsibility for the Middle East, was one of 
the most strident advocates of the new position.  Fallon thought that a coordination 
role for reconstruction and other matters was desperately needed and began lobbying 
National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley to appoint a fully empowered “Iraq czar.”  
In Fallon’s estimation, Hadley “log-rolled” him and the candidates he recommended, 
giving lip service to Fallon’s suggestion but never acting decisively on it.  Fallon’s 
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personal view was that Hadley was unwilling to cede control of the Iraq portfolio.  
“They didn’t want a big guy with the connections and knowledge not afraid to say 
‘bullshit’ and bang heads,” Fallon said.551 
Four months after Fallon started his lobbying, and half a year after the study 
group released its report, Hadley agreed to create the position.  In the spring of 2007 
the search began for a “war czar” with broad coordination authority for all policy 
matters relating to Iraq.  The White House approached three senior generals.  Each, 
however, rejected the job, viewing its stated powers as insufficient to overcome the 
years of bad management that had produced intractable conditions in Iraq. "The very 
fundamental issue is, they don't know where the hell they're going," said retired 
Marine Gen. John J. Sheehan, one of those offered the post.552   
Many in Washington shared Sheehan’s caution that an organizational 
reshuffling would be insufficient to improve the U.S. position in Iraq.  Both Carlos 
Pascual, former State Department coordinator of Iraq reconstruction, and David 
Rothkopf, a historian of national security, spoke against the study group’s implicit 
assumption that a new bureaucratic position would have much effect.  “An individual 
can't fix a failed policy," Pascual commented.553 Rothkopf further enunciated a 
historically determinist view of sectarian conflict in Iraq that was beginning to take 
hold in official Washington.  “This is a problem of Sunnis and Shiites, and it is not 
about Republicans and Democrats or the rank of officials or bureaucratic rivalry,” 
Rothkopf said.  “The Sunnis started fighting the Shiites a thousand years before we 
got to Plymouth Rock, and it’s hard to create a new special implementer to deal with 
that.”554  
After the White House failed to find a four-star officer willing to take the post, 
three-star General Douglas Lute eventually took the job.  Lute, however, was the 
protégé of the outgoing CENTCOM commander John Abizaid, who was a critic of 
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the surge.  Military and civilian officials carrying out the President’s surge plan 
initially viewed Lute’s appointment with skepticism.555   
The search for a policy coordinator thus illustrates many obstacles faced by 
commissions that advance bureaucratic correctives as part of their recommendations.  
Even though many observers outside the administration, and even the President 
himself, concurred with the study group’s call for enhanced policy coordination in 
reconstruction, a number of factors conspired to prevent the coordinator role from 
being fully realized.  To being with, the separate command relationships in the 
military and in civilian agencies inherently resist coordination.556   Insiders also 
moved to protect turf and historical prerogatives.  Even when the position was 
created, several qualified individuals declined to serve in the coordinator role.  The 
failure to create an effective reconstruction coordinator thus illustrates the difficulty 
of moving from a diagnosis made by outsiders to a successful therapeutic intervention 
carried out by insiders.  
 
Developing a Civilian Rapid Reconstruction Fund 
 
x Recommendation 68: The Chief of Mission in Iraq should have the authority to 
spend significant funds through a program structured along the lines of the 
Commander’s Emergency Response Program, and should have the authority to 
rescind funding from programs and projects in which the government of Iraq is 
not demonstrating effective partnership.557 
 
Just as the study group found executive authority lacking in the reconstruction, 
it also found funding sources for reconstruction projects overly constrained by 
conditions for their expenditure.  Missing was a flexible funding source that could be 
rapidly allocated by reconstruction personnel according to changing needs and 
variations in Iraqi cooperation.  In response to the study group’s recommendation, the 
embassy eventually developed the “quick response fund.”   At over $100 million, the 
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fund was to be the surge’s signature civilian resource—the primary financial means 
by which Provincial Reconstruction Teams could independently undertake short-term 
development projects in their areas.558 
 Despite the fund’s stated goals, its rules were anything but flexible.  Initial 
procedures governing the fund’s distribution for projects larger than $25,000 entailed 
three stages of review.559  After the Provincial Reconstruction Teams completed a 
seven-page grant application and a five-page summary, a technical committee at the 
embassy reviewed the proposal.560  From there, proposals went to Washington for a 
separate review.  The quick response funds were thus initially saddled with 
administrative requirements that far exceeded the military’s parallel development 
program, in which a brigade commander could unilaterally approve expenditures up 
to $200,000.   
Multiple review committees were not the only obstacles for applicants to the 
fund to overcome.  Once these operational hurdles were cleared, a new requirement 
mandated that applications be reviewed by the U.S. Embassy’s Regional Security 
Office, which had not before played an active role in vetting recipients of grant funds.  
The insertion into the review process of the notoriously inept and risk-averse security 
bureaucracy did not bode well for the grant program, which personnel began 
nicknaming the “Quagmire Response Fund.”561   
 After an outcry from reconstruction officials, the rules were eventually 
streamlined.  Micro-purchases would not need prior approval, and the embassy could 
approve projects up to $25,000.  Only those larger than $25,000 would be sent to 
Washington for review.  Nevertheless, the dispute over procedures limited total 
disbursements in the program’s first five months to just $3.5 million.562 As a 
consequence, Provincial Reconstruction Teams initially lost much of their “surge” 
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capacity to engage provincial governments, missing opportunities for progress during 
early lulls in violence.563 
 Once again, it proved difficult to correct a deficit in civilian reconstruction 
funding that both the study group and administration viewed as problematic.  Despite 
identifying a critical need, implementing the study group’s recommendation in an 
efficient and effective manner at first proved beyond the capability of the State 
Department.  Only after a prolonged period was the study group’s original intent 
realized. 
 
The Struggle to Hold Provincial Elections 
 
x Recommendation 29: Provincial elections should be held at the earliest possible 
date.564 
 
Several of the study group’s consensus recommendations concerned Iraqi 
politics, a subject that was in many ways more difficult for outsiders to diagnosis and 
intervene in than U.S. bureaucratic process.  The study group had convened in a year 
of extraordinary tension between Iraq’s Shi’a and Sunni communities, when levels of 
sectarian violence approached that of civil war.  Coaxing Sunni and Shi’a parties to 
resolve fundamental political impasses driving sectarian aggression had become the 
most important U.S. objective.   
The study group issued a series of recommendations designed to provide a 
comprehensive approach to bridging Iraqi divides.  Of these, the study group judged 
that holding provincial elections was most pressing.  The imbalance of power that had 
resulted from the 2005 elections, which Sunnis boycotted after coalition military 
action in Fallujah, had left Shi’a politicians holding a disproportionate amount of 
power.  The failure of Sunnis to be proportionally represented in government was a 
key factor driving the violence.  For over a year, Sunni political parties had called for 
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a new round of provincial elections that would allow them to establish representation 
in accordance with their share of the population.  
Despite the study group’s identification of new elections as one of the most 
pressing issues facing Iraq, and despite Congress legislating elections one of eighteen 
performance benchmarks, three years would pass before they were scheduled.  It was 
not that U.S. officials in Iraq were unaware of the issue, or did not try to bring about a 
solution.  It was that practical limits existed to ability of the U.S. to influence Iraqi 
politics. 
Solving the elections issue involved the Iraqi parliament passing two 
interlinked laws, one demarking how power would be shared between the provinces 
and Iraq’s central government and another concerning the process of holding elections 
themselves.  In the initial months after the release of the study group report, U.S. 
officials were hopeful that the Iraqi parliament could pass both laws simultaneously 
and that elections could soon be held.  The politics of each issue however became so 
complex that parliamentary leaders believed they could not pass both laws 
simultaneously, and progress slowed.  Shi’a reluctance also played a part. 
The intransigence of the ruling Shi’a coalition to cede power, as would 
inevitably happen after new elections, was not the only factor retarding progress.  The 
U.S. Embassy was also ill-positioned to advocate for different results.  The U.S. had 
not formulated an internal position on the key matter of the provincial powers law—
whether the provincial council or governor should be the dominant local authority—
and was content to let the Iraqi political process sort out the difficult questions on how 
Iraqi federalism was to function.565  Internal staffing issues also diminished the 
Embassy’s ability to see through a legislative solution to provincial elections.  The 
political section, staffed by just over a dozen officials, were overburdened with 
coordinating ongoing military operations.  Marshalling a concerted effort to liaise 
with legislators was impossible.  Turnover in the U.S. Embassy also led a new cadre 
of officials to lose sight of law’s importance.566 The year 2007 thus slipped to a close 
with parliament little closer to an agreement than when it began.  
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The legislative logjam persisted for the better part of a year more.  Parliament 
passed both laws in late 2008 after a significant lobbying push by Ambassador Croker 
and President Bush himself, and local elections were finally held in January 2009.567  
The long delay, however, left political conflicts simmering across the country at a 
time when many U.S. troops were being killed or wounded.  Once again, the study 
group’s call for action on a divisive Iraqi political question proved exceedingly 
difficult to realize in practice, even on an issue on which the White House was 
supportive.  Iraqi politics, U.S. bureaucratic deficits, and competing priorities meant 
progress was slower than hoped. 
 
5.4 Iraq Study Group and the Politics of Reform 
 
The day after the Iraq Study Group released its report, President Bush repeated 
a truism about expert commissions at a press conference with British Prime Minister 
Tony Blair.  “Some reports are issued and just gather dust,” the President said.  “And 
truth of the matter is, a lot of reports in Washington are never read by anyone.”568   
One and a half years after the study group issued its findings, what can be said 
of its policy influence?  More broadly, what more general dynamics of disaster and 
reform are evident in the study group’s evaluation of an unpopular and possibly un-
winnable war, and the administration’s reception of a suggested strategy for what to 
do about it?  How did the politics of Bush’s second term shape the boundaries of the 
study group’s inquiry and way it assigned blame for the failure of U.S. policy in Iraq?  
What, ultimately, does the experience of the Iraq Study Group suggest about the 
nature of national security commissions?  
Perhaps most significantly, the study group’s report brought closure to the 
three-year debate over whether administration policies were succeeding in Iraq.  
Before the study group issued its report, the President and his war cabinet repeatedly 
maintained that progress was occurring, and that the war was being won, even if 
slowly and in ways that were not always apparent to a public deluged with media 
coverage biased toward “bad news.”  After the study group report, the question was 
not whether existing policies were failing, but rather what should be done about them.  
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“Their description of how bad the situation was,” State Department counselor Philip 
Zelikow said, “was trenchant and helpful in galvanizing the need for action.”569  By 
bringing closure to the public debate about the failure of U.S. policy in Iraq, the study 
group proved itself a more credible and accepted messenger than either the President 
or the Democratic opposition. 
The study group also spurred the White House to undertake a full-scale review 
of war policy in mid-November 2006, in which all options, including withdrawal, 
were for the first time on the table.  In contrast to earlier strategy reviews, the 
President himself and all the key players, both military and civilian, participated.570  
In this way the Iraq Study Group served as a catalyst, pushing the White House to do 
something that it could otherwise not bring itself to do. 
 Importantly for theorizing the politics of disaster investigation and reform, the 
ultimate incorrectness of some of the study group’s recommendations sheds light on 
its own diagnostic limitations as well as general differences between investigative and 
advisory commissions.  The President’s decision to pursue a strategy that the study 
group acknowledged but did not seriously consider illustrates practical limits on the 
policy detail achieved by independent reviews when they are not outfitted with their 
own investigative staff.  Lacking this capability, the study group largely took at face 
value the assessment of Iraqis security dynamics by senior military leaders, not 
realizing that it would be overturned by the analysis of others in the days before the 
study group went public with its report.  Lines of vision also mattered.  Concerns 
about providing security for the study group’s VIP members meant that the group 
could not travel widely across Iraq, denying its members a chance to grasp first-hand 
the very strategic developments that mattered in the end.  A larger professional staff 
may have led the study group to ascertain the significance of the Anbar awakening 
and more seriously entertain the surge strategy, which ultimately proved the correct, if 
counterintuitive, policy choice. 
In this way the political bargain that gave rise to the Iraq Study Group 
ultimately blinkered its vision.  What could have been a robustly staffed commission 
of the executive or legislative branch was instead created as an earmark to a federal 
research institution.  The desire to avoid a prolonged debate over the review’s 
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mandate and authority ultimately stripped it of the very capacity it needed to make the 
correct judgment.  Understanding how the study group’s initial framing affected its 
constitution of expertise, and how this, in turn, contributed to its failure to see and 
take seriously the strategy the President ultimately followed in Iraq, establishes a 
powerful connection between a commission’s diagnostic capability and therapeutic 
utility.     
  
Chapter 6 
 
 Theorizing Disaster, Investigation & Reform 
 
The 9/11 Commission, Columbia Accident Investigation Board, and Iraq 
Study Group constitute paradigmatic instances of crisis commissions, a standard 
remedy in the U.S. federal system for restoring the integrity of government in the 
aftermath of disaster or dramatic policy failure.  Each was formed in response to an 
event too traumatizing for the usual political mechanisms to bring closure.  Though 
vested interests initially maneuvered to avoid investigation, the 9/11 attacks, 
Columbia accident, and the failure of U.S. strategy in Iraq ultimately triggered official 
inquiries that grew into powerful institutions in their own right.  Each commission 
came to clear, if contested, diagnoses of what had failed and why.  Each was only 
partially successful in bringing government policies and institutions in line with its 
recommendations.  The three together—two studied in detail in this dissertation, the 
third employed comparatively—illustrate the unique facility commissions exhibit, as 
one-shot diagnostic and therapeutic instruments, in addressing breakdowns of the 
national security state, whose technology-laden systems present new challenges to 
democratic governance.  Tracing their investigations and the countervailing forces 
that acted against them opens a window onto what gives commissions power and how 
they can catalyze enduring change, as well as limits to their analytical reach and the 
reforms they recommend.   
Although each of the three commissions exhibited notable limitations, on the 
whole they proved better equipped to understand and learn from volatile and 
unsettling failures than standing political institutions, which lacked the political will 
and range of expertise to discern the ideological, organizational, and technical factors 
that led to disaster.  The 9/11 Commission picked up where an incomplete and 
politicized congressional investigation left off, faced down a hostile administration, 
and exposed structural weaknesses in counterterrorism and national preparedness that 
Congress, the media, and the administration itself were unable to ferret out on their 
own.  NASA, true to its own vision of accident investigation, was poised to mount a 
narrow technical inquiry that would have left unexplored the political and 
organizational dynamics that led to the Columbia accident.  Had the Columbia Board 
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not broken free of NASA’s control, the U.S. space program would have been left 
vulnerable to the same political and budgetary pressures that led to the loss of two of 
its orbiters.  The Iraq Study Group similarly did what Congress could not: its 
assessment of conditions in Iraq exploded the White House narrative of steady 
progress, forcing a fundamental reconsideration of war strategy and the acceleration 
of institutional changes to how the U.S. conceives of and fights war.  Although the 
study group’s diagnostic limitations blinded it to the specific strategy that ultimately 
succeeded, its investigation was a critical catalyst to the successful turnaround of the 
U.S. effort in Iraq. 
As muscular actors in the U.S. political process, these three commissions 
demonstrate the continuing relevance of ad hoc panels as a general form of public 
reason in the first decade of the 21st century, as well as their unique suitability to 
investigating the complex systems of the national security state.  Border security, 
space launch and recovery, and the invasion and rebuilding of a foreign country are 
achieved by the deployment of systems that interlink a complex assemblage of human 
and technological elements.  To operate effectively, they require the ongoing 
application of specialized expertise and policy guidance that blurs traditional 
distinctions between the political and technical realms.  These systems are 
increasingly essential to the exercise of state power, yet inherently vulnerable to 
breakdown.  Governing them is no easy task. 
When suicidal terrorists plotted to turn planes into weapons, the 9/11 
Commission found it was not enough to deploy screening technologies in airports 
designed to prevent bombings and hijackings—a slippage between threat and 
countermeasures that revealed blindness, at the government’s highest levels, to the 
intentions of al-Qaeda.  The Columbia investigation similarly observed how the 
ideologies of spaceflight held in policy circles became embedded in the technical 
systems NASA used to evaluate shuttle safety.  Top-level vision of what the shuttle 
ought to be influenced engineering decisions many levels down, allowing a known 
technical problem to lead to the loss of an orbiter and crew.  In yet another striking 
parallel between the cases, the Iraq Study Group observed how the vision of war and 
diplomacy favored by the administration—and the technical and organizational 
systems that support it—were ill-suited to achieving U.S. goals in Iraq.  A 
misalignment between the ideology, organization, and technology of occupation 
deployed by the national security state produced quagmire. 
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  Though far from perfect instruments, the three commissions profiled in this 
dissertation helped the U.S. political system come to grips with failures across 
different domains of state power.  Although the subjects of their investigations were 
removed from one another, the nature of the breakdowns they sought to correct were 
remarkably similar.  The national security state, to an increasing extent, depends upon 
the interlinking of political and material technologies at almost all levels of operation.  
Pinpointing what had gone wrong in each case required the commissions to 
disaggregate how ideology, organizations, and advanced technologies are coupled to 
each other within the institutions of state, and to issue correctives aimed at each of 
these elements of system operation.  Although the three commissions reached varying 
levels of insight, and a number of their recommendations were ultimately disregarded 
or even proved wrong, each nevertheless performed a valuable democratic service by 
directly improving the functioning of government or by serving as a catalyst for its 
reform.  Drawing together lessons from this study yields new theorizations of 
investigation and reform, and points to the important role commissions are likely to 
play in the years ahead. 
 
Theorizing Investigation 
  
 How do commissions see accurately on behalf of the public, and what gives 
their findings power?  The two original case studies in this dissertation and 
established literature on the 9/11 Commission strongly suggest that the key to 
investigating complex systems is seeing their operations clearly at three levels: 
ideology, organization, and technology.  Only by disaggregating systems in this way, 
and thereby making visible social and political values encoded in institutional 
practice, were these three commissions able to arrive at compelling explanations for 
what caused system breakdowns.    
In each case, achieving a comprehensive diagnosis was difficult, and the 
progression from disaster to investigation to the reform of institutionalized power was 
not smooth.  The call for outside inquiry had to pass through a web of obstacles 
before commissions even got started.  Countervailing forces acted at every turn.  The 
organs of government under scrutiny, not least the Executive branch and its agencies, 
moved to limit each commission’s scope and deny them resources to develop a robust 
 175
analytic capacity.  As a result, the struggle to carry out a thorough investigation 
consumed each commission for its duration.  The case studies further show that 
commissions are not powerless in the face of political pressure but rather have sources 
of agency to draw from.  Through building coalitions with lawmakers and the media, 
and through appealing to the values of democratic constitutionalism, the three 
commissions were able to fight attempts to curtail their investigation.  
Limitations to seeing clearly at all three causal levels did not stem solely from 
external forces.  They also emerged from within the commissions themselves, which 
the case studies portray as unstable institutions defined by power struggles over how 
to carry out investigations and over what conclusions they yield.  Pushing past 
received ways of viewing the world required an ethic of openness and analytic 
discipline that not all commissions were able to muster.  Commissions also had to 
recognize when they needed outside expertise.  The case studies suggest that 
successful commissions often serve as a bridging mechanism between government 
and the academy.  By contrast, commissions unable to acquire a robust staff or the 
ability to augment internal findings with analysis by external consultants were 
noticeably less able to reach penetrating insights or to demonstrate the correctness of 
their views.    
The case studies also show that making a diagnosis at each of the three causal 
levels was not sufficient to give power to commission findings.  Each commission 
had to use the knowledge it generated to prove the state wrong.  The 9/11 
Commission confronted administration mistruths by cross-examining the President’s 
advisors on national television.  The Columbia investigation staged a forensic test that 
exploded NASA’s insistence that a piece of foam could not harm the orbiter, much 
like the physicist Richard Feynman’s canonic O-ring experiment during the Rogers 
Commission investigation in 1986.  Similarly, the Iraq Study Group rebutted the 
administration’s characterization of the war in a report that became a bestselling book 
distributed nationwide on the day of its release.  Only through these visible 
demonstrations of commission expertise did their findings take hold in the national 
imagination.  Successful commissions not only strove to see on the public’s behalf.  
They also positioned themselves to be seen holding the state accountable.   
Such tight coupling between a commission’s investigatory capacity and its 
public credibility suggests that crisis commissions are employing expertise in a more 
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complex way than is commonly recognized.  In the classic scenario described in 
political science literature, lawmakers turn to a commission either to forge a 
consensus that they themselves cannot reach or in cases where they lack sufficient 
information to make a policy decision.571  Commissions, in this view, are important 
mediators of expertise that function to harness the “independence, stature, and 
ideological diversity” of their members to reach and make visible politically 
acceptable compromises.  The primary reason why lawmakers call upon them is to 
serve as a “distinct form of political credibility” that enables the construction of 
policy focal points, which in turn prompt policy makers and the public to take 
action.572 
The example of the 9/11 Commission, Columbia investigation, and Iraq Study 
Group, however, reveals a different story about the production of expert knowledge 
and its use to catalyze policy change.  As we have seen, the credibility of crisis 
commissions is not merely an essentialist trait that derives a priori from the inherent 
stature of their members.  Rather, credibility is in part the product of interactions that 
occur during the investigative phase as commissions identify, compile, and make 
known errors made by the state.  Especially during the Columbia investigation and 
9/11 Commission, the investigation phase was not characterized by dispassionate fact-
findings but was rather a deeply combative process through which each commission 
demonstrated their relevance to policymakers and the public at large.  Credibility, in 
this way, is the output of performance.  Successful commissions do not find facts in 
the conventional sense.  Instead it is only through their labors that the facts are 
constituted specifically as facts in the first place.  Given their location at the nexus 
between politics and expertise, this requires the politician’s carefully choreographed 
public demonstrations of credibility just as much as it does the scientific expert’s 
esoteric technical know-how. 
Taking on board this new understanding of credibility allows us to see how a 
commission’s expertise is also its most essential political resource.  The production of 
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original expert knowledge gives commissions power.  By producing expert 
knowledge that proves agencies and at times even the President wrong, commissions 
buttress their own standing as diagnostic instruments fit to issue policy 
recommendations.  Commissions’ expertise and credibility, in the words of social 
theory, are co-produced.573  The credibility of crisis commissions, then, is to a very 
great deal the product of what I will term the “performance of expertise,” in which 
expertise is instrumentally employed both to discover facts and to further a 
commission’s standing in the public eye.  
Three corollaries follow from this intertwining of expertise and credibility at 
work in crisis commissions investigating the national security state.  First, the view of 
commissions primarily as “consensus machines” has led some scholars to suggest that 
when selecting commissions, the Executive branch and legislature should “prioritize 
political credibility over expertise in selecting commissioners.”574  This finding may 
well hold for commissions tackling issues that are primarily ideological, and in cases 
when an understanding of facts and circumstances of a policy breakdown is 
established and uncontested.  But the case studies suggest that the nature of exploring 
unknown causes of breakdowns in the national security state entails a different set of 
challenges.  When complex systems are the objects of investigation, analytical 
expertise matters a great deal.  Whether present on the investigation staff or in the 
ranks of its members, commissions must be equipped to pursue an investigation at all 
three causal levels. 
Second, given the role expertise plays in generating political power, it is 
important to distinguish crisis commissions that have robust investigative capacity 
from those that do not.  The presence of a large staff on both the 9/11 Commission 
and Columbia Board proved essential to rebutting explanations advanced by the 
agencies they were investigating.  Both had staffs larger than three times the size of 
the average twenty or so professional investigators employed by congressional 
committees.  Both also had the ability to hire consultants and fund external analysis.  
This level of investigative resources, which I will term “super staffs,” is rare in the 
U.S. federal system.  RAND and the National Academies typically assign only a few 
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staff members to studies.  Staff on congressional investigations rarely numbers more 
than thirty.  “Super staffs” of crisis commissions thus constitute a concentration of 
expertise greater than regularly deployed by almost any other government or quasi-
governmental entity.  Critically, “super staffs” provide a commission with the 
intellectual and political resources that enable them to forcefully confront the agencies 
they are investigating. 
The importance of “super staffs” can be discerned by examining what happens 
in their absence.  Not having a “super staff” hampered the Iraq Study Group and 
NASA’s Return to Flight Task Group.  Denied a budget by the NASA Administrator 
to conduct independent physical tests, the Task Group was unable to disprove the 
shuttle program’s engineering rationale for what caused foam loss, even though its 
members had a strong intuition that the rationale was wrong.  Likewise, the Iraq 
Study Group was unable to challenge received thinking about the utility of a troop 
surge because the political compromise that enabled its formation precluded the hiring 
of a robust staff of military analysts.  The lack of a professional staff that could travel 
widely across Iraq introduced still more difficulty into the study group’s ability to 
ascertain emerging political and military dynamics, such as the Anbar awakening, that 
proved essential to the success of the surge strategy the President ultimately followed.  
Crisis commissions that lack their own robust investigative capacity are in 
essence consigned to the position of a consulting physician.  They are able to read the 
case file, but not directly examine the patient.  The accuracy of their diagnosis suffers 
as a result.  Interestingly, the centrality of staff and research to a commission’s 
success echoes some of the earliest findings on presidential commissions that 
intervening scholars have not further developed.575  It also underscores how political 
negotiations that give rise to crisis commissions exert a profound effect on their 
diagnostic powers.  Any theorization of commissions must recognize that the size, 
structure, and authority granted to a crisis commission is the product of compromises 
between those urging investigation and those being investigated.  Because the ability 
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of a commission to move beyond its original charter is limited, the outcome of these 
negotiations can exert path-dependent effects on an investigation’s entire course.   
A third corollary of this view of expertise is that the imperative for 
commissions to reach unanimity—so lauded by many scholars of commissions—
comes with a cost that should be weighed against what political advantages it may 
bring.  Conventional wisdom holds that releasing a commission report with written 
dissent is fatal to commission influence.  Mutually exclusive or equivocal views in a 
commission’s final analysis can be portrayed by critics in a negative light, possibly 
scuttling that commission’s policy influence altogether.   
While a unanimous report no doubt enhances political momentum behind a set 
of recommendations, the case studies suggest that unanimity should also be viewed 
with caution because commissions so often scale back their diagnostic ambitions to 
enable consensus to occur.  The 9/11 Commission notably “muted its interpretation” 
of the actions of two Presidents and their advisors so that its members could all sign 
off on its final report.576  Similarly, a disagreement between members of the Iraq 
Study Group about the utility of a troop surge was hidden within the text of its report 
rather than presented as an unresolved debate requiring further analysis and 
consideration.  The push for unanimity in each case had the effect of withholding 
important analytical insights from the reader of the commission report.  Dissent in 
commissions, as in the institutions they investigate, alerts others to the possibility of 
alternative interpretations and outstanding ambiguities.  Although unanimity is 
certainly a powerful political signal that undoubtedly advances commission influence, 
the effort to achieve it may also obscure crucial information.  Consensus should thus 
be viewed as a social practice that carries benefits as well as potential tradeoffs.  
 
Theorizing Reform 
 
In theorizing investigation, we have established how the negotiations that give 
rise to crisis commissions in part determine the analytic capacities they develop, and 
how this in turn shapes their ability to correctly diagnose the causes of failure as well 
as their ability to establish credibility in the public eye.  How then do crisis 
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commissions translate the moment of democratic reckoning they open up into long-
lasting reform?   
The case studies affirm that commissions are challenged by their task of 
reshaping the practices of public institutions that remain long after they themselves 
disband.  Classic barriers to change in the U.S. federal system, including the presence 
of multiple veto actors, super-majoritarian requirements, and exercise of presidential 
powers, blocked key reforms promulgated by all three commissions.  The 9/11 
Commission’s vision of a Director of National Intelligence with centralized control 
over the intelligence community was not fully realized.  The system of safety 
oversight advocated by the Columbia investigation did not reach full maturity inside 
the shuttle program.  The Iraq Study Group was perhaps least successful in achieving 
its most important policy objective, a drawdown of troops.   
In spite of this, each commission significantly broadened the public’s 
understanding of the failures they investigated and in so doing forcefully shaped the 
government’s approach to them.  As a measure of their immediate effectiveness, 
Congress and the Executive enacted a substantial number of their recommendations in 
the two years following the release of their reports, equaling if not bettering the 50 
percent success rate Jordan Tama has established as par for the course for national 
security commissions.577  But any assessment must also acknowledge the longer-term 
influence crisis commissions exert on the public consciousness.  Through adding to 
the historical understanding of the events they chronicled, thereby changing what was 
“known” or “presumed” about the breakdowns and their causes, each commission 
effectively revised the public narrative of a collective trauma.  This revised 
understanding effects how the Administration and Congress comprehend the failure 
and conceive of policy strategies to combat it, leaving a legacy that will shape public 
policy and government institutions for years to come. 
The case studies reveal several strategies commissions used to coax the state 
to reform.  First, successful commissions were mindful of their inherent limitations as 
temporary entities and sensitive to the politics playing out around them.  In what was 
perhaps the most rigorous attempt at grasping the limitations of the commission form, 
the Columbia investigation conducted a detailed review of the effect of prior 
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commissions on the shuttle program.  Aware that the recommendations of these 
reviews rarely stuck, investigators strategized how the measures they proposed could 
avoid a similar fate.  The Iraq Study Group and 9/11 Commission were less explicitly 
reflexive about the historical patterns of reform in the agencies they aimed to change, 
but they too employed a variety of strategies to ensure that their recommendations 
achieved the intended effect.  Just as the Columbia investigation mandated deadlines 
by which NASA had to perform certain actions in order to prevent the agency from 
undue delay, the Iraq Study Group proposed a set of benchmarks that future aid to 
Iraq would be legally conditioned upon.  The Iraq Study Group also wrote 79 separate 
recommendations, many with multiple subordinate clauses, in order to offer an 
unmistakably detailed roadmap for reform.   
Public relations also mattered.  The 9/11 Commission, Columbia 
investigation, and Iraq Study Group each built relationships with media elites and 
employed stagecraft to maximize the news coverage of their final reports.  The 9/11 
Commission went further, and created a private not-for-profit organization to lobby 
Congress after the commissions’ official disbandment.  Commissions that realize their 
vision for reform are thus highly reflexive about their own limitations and, because of 
that understanding, instrumental in shaping their investigations and recommendations 
to achieve maximal effect.  The process of building and maintaining public support, 
furthermore, entails trade-offs.  As demonstrated by the controversy surrounding the 
Iraq Study Group’s closed-door deliberative practices, commissions must balance the 
imperative to be seen carrying out their democratic responsibility before the public 
with their need to see clearly and at times privately into the apparatus of the state.  
Likewise, highly public exhibition of investigation findings, such as the testimony of 
Diane Vaughan during the Columbia investigation, can trigger hostile reactions in the 
agency under investigation, who resents being so publically taken to task. 
The case studies also highlight the importance of targeting recommendations 
at all elements of a complex system—technical, organizational, and ideological—
even if achieving this is no easy feat.  In all three cases, organizational and ideological 
correctives proved harder to imagine, and implement, than technical ones.  The 9/11 
Commissions offered highly specific recommendations on airport security, but made 
only the briefest comments on the relationship between U.S. policy in the Muslim 
world and Islamic terrorism.  The Columbia investigation likewise spent half of its 
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report enumerating the political and organizational causes of the accident but then 
issued many more technical recommendations than organizational and political ones.  
In a similar vein, the preponderance of the recommendations issued by the Iraq Study 
Group concerned the mechanics of U.S. internal bureaucratic process rather than 
specific ways to influence Iraqi politics or security dynamics.  The focus on technical 
and bureaucratic measures is in keeping with the known American tendency to prefer 
technical solutions to problems with underlying political causes.578  The cases suggest 
that the messiness of human relations and difficulty of cross-cultural understanding 
are indeed with us still.  Practitioners of public policy, it seems, need to read more 
Shakespeare and more history, and be mindful of this tendency to focus inward, on 
bureaucratic process, rather than outward, on political dynamics. 
Finally, a dynamic of power influenced each commission’s ability to coerce 
state behavior.  The Columbia investigation was largely able to corral NASA’s human 
spaceflight program, which constitutes one half of one agency of the Executive 
branch, into following its will.  The 9/11 Commission and Iraq Study Group were 
noticeably less successful at pursuing their reforms, likely because they directly 
challenged the prerogatives of the President and entailed changes within multiple 
executive agencies.  This suggests that while commissions may be capable of 
diagnosing complex systems of any size, their ability to coerce change is greatest at 
smaller scales, where political resistance can be more easily identified and 
counteracted.  A commission taking on the entire executive branch is likely to find 
itself outmatched. 
 
Commissions, Modernity & Democratic Theory 
 
The three commissions examined in this dissertation span the eight years of 
the George W. Bush administration and in many ways encompass the events that 
defined his presidency.  Yet the machinery of the state churns onward still, its 
complexity generating new challenges and uncertainties even as old problems are 
solved. 
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Six months after the January 2009 inauguration of President Barack Obama, 
NASA was once again wrestling with uncertainty.  The new administration, 
concerned about the viability of Bush’s “Vision for Space Exploration,” convened a 
panel to devise a new national space policy and to examine whether the shuttle’s 
retirement date should be extended beyond the 2010 deadline mandated by the 
Columbia investigation.579  Iraq, too, stubbornly refused to recede from the news.  
Violence flared as President Obama withdrew troops in accordance with his campaign 
pledge to carry out the Iraq Study Group’s recommendations.580  The very week that 
Obama’s Secretary of Defense visited Baghdad to assess the situation first hand, 9/11 
Commission members made what they said would be a final public report on the 
status of their recommendations.  At an event hosted by Secretary of Homeland 
Security Janet Napolitano, co-chairs Thomas Kean and Lee Hamilton noted that 
Congress had acted to some degree on 80 percent of their recommendations, but that 
several key measures—including a streamlined system of congressional oversight—
had yet to be adopted.581 
The ongoing complications in the three policy areas examined by this 
dissertation illustrate the extent to which commissions can bring order to the 
policymaking process, and to the wider world it aims to affect.  Although the ultimate 
influence of commissions is not absolute, they can and do perform vital functions that 
go beyond what the literature recognizes.  In the aftermath of disaster, crisis 
commissions have traditionally been thought of as instruments of retrospective 
analysis that ascertain the causes of policy failure and issue recommendations to 
correct them.  But when viewing the service they perform in wider terms, we can 
actually see them as democratic correctives that help re-establish the effective 
functioning of government when standing institutions lack the political will to repair 
themselves.  In the three instances examined in this dissertation, the concentration of 
expertise commissions mustered enabled them to see the world more clearly, in most 
respects, than the actors they investigated, and thereby to devise fair and prudent 
correctives to serious problems in the institutions of the state.  By cultivating greater 
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reflexivity about recurrent problems that would otherwise have gone unaddressed, 
they helped govern the national organizations that protect our security.  
At a still deeper level, commissions provide us a window into the age in which 
we live—an age in which few governmental tasks can be accomplished without 
mobilizing large socio-technical systems, and in which the efficient design, 
maintenance, and repair of such systems is a matter of enormous public importance.  
In this respect, the three commissions examined in this dissertation show the 
analytical dividends that accrue from treating the national security state as a socio-
technical system.  To the extent that technology plays an increasing part in the 
exercise of state power, analytical methods developed within science and technology 
studies and organizational sociology should become a more central part of policy 
analysis, as they have been here.   
 Finally, the unique ability of commissions to examine complex systems 
suggests that their role as regulators of the exercise of power and authority in 
advanced democracies will continue and perhaps even expand in years to come.  In 
this respect the continuing use of commissions to confront contemporary policy 
challenges represents the triumph of democratic ingenuity over the problems of the 
day.  Crisis commissions are one of our age’s most promising answers to the dilemma 
Madison spoke of in Federalist No. 51.  “The great difficulty,” he wrote in his 
celebrated passage on government as a reflection on human nature, “lies in this.”  
“You must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place 
oblige it to control itself.”  Commissions are effective instruments that aid in this 
eternal struggle. 
 
  
 
Methodological Appendix 
 
 
“In its broadest sense,” the sociologist Darin Weinberg writes, “the study of 
research methods is simply the study of what we are really doing, or should be doing, 
when we discover.”582  Writing against the notion of methodological archetypes that 
stand on their own, Weinberg sees social science methods as belonging to particular 
“dispute domains.”  These domains, defined as the “socio-historical and social 
situational contingencies” that inquiry takes places within, frame the “distinctive 
logics”—what counts as theory, method, and facts—that a study is built from.583  
Only by understanding the dispute domain in which one is intervening, Weinberg 
argues, can the strengths and weaknesses of a particular methodological approach be 
anticipated and addressed.  In his view, building the legitimacy of knowledge is a 
process of discovering, anticipating, and responding to how it is constructed. 
 In this spirit, I endeavor in this appendix to layout the way in which I 
approached and wrote this dissertation.  As described in the introduction, I set out to 
employ process tracing in a qualitative, small-n case study of disaster commissions.  
My reason for selecting this methodological approach was straightforward: the 
environment in which crisis commissions work and transmit their recommendations 
are filled with unobserved variables that shape thought and action.  Building a thick 
description of a commission’s history would enable me to identify key events and 
dynamics and thereby hypothesize causal mechanisms that account for the case’s 
particular trajectory.  Broader theorizations of the processes of social learning that 
occur in the wake of disasters and policy failures would emerge from within and 
between case analysis, highlighting social phenomena of interest to sociologists, 
political theorists, and scholars of science and technology studies.  
In this appendix, I discuss how I used sources and methods to build and 
analyze the case studies largely in accordance with the approach I outlined at the 
outset.  I also describe the unique collecting opportunities I make use of from two 
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stints of government service that interrupted my graduate education.  Opportunistic 
data collection from these experiences forms the evidentiary basis for a significant 
portion of both cases in this dissertation.  In the following sections, I describe the 
circumstances in which that opportunistic collection took place and what further 
research I undertook to contextualize and develop the arguments that emerge.  
 
Witness to Catastrophe and Commissions 
   
 My slumber in Kuala Lumpur came to an abrupt end on the morning of 
September 11, 2001, when my father’s friend pounded on the door not long after 
dawn.  It was by then early evening in New York.  My first encounter with 9/11 was 
not an image of the twin towers collapsing, which played on TV soon enough, but 
rather the voice of David Halberstam commentating on the day’s events.  I will 
always remember Halberstam’s profoundly hopeful observations on how societies 
rally after traumatic event as I absorbed what had transpired while I was asleep. 
 The beginnings of my own graduate study in social and political sciences three 
weeks later was marked by absorbing, on a personal and scholarly level, what it is like 
to experience, and live through, an epoch-making disaster.  Much of my reading over 
the next several years was focused on trying to understand what it means for 
civilizations to clash, what constitutes the reactionary politics that play out in 
disaster’s wake, and how the government failed to prevent the attacks.   
 9/11 was not, of course, the only large-scale government failure that marked 
my time in graduate school.  The Bush administration soon seemed uniquely capable 
of producing catastrophes: first came the 9/11 Commission’s revelations, then Iraq, 
then the hurricane Katrina disaster in New Orleans.  In the middle of this, I had my 
own first hand encounter a disaster investigation.  In 2003, I took leave from 
Cambridge University to serve on staff of the Columbia Accident Investigation 
Board.  As editor of the Board’s report, I was able to use my scholarly training in 
science and technology studies to help unravel a tragedy that riveted the nation.      
 The idea for this dissertation emerged as I watched NASA ready the shuttle 
for flight following the release of our investigation report.  I watched with rapt 
fascination as the organizational and technical recommendations we had prescribed 
for the shuttle program met all kinds of resistance, and in part fell by the wayside.  
When the accident we labored to prevent nearly repeated itself on the first post-
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accident launch, the question of what the investigation’s intervention in NASA had 
achieved, and where it had failed, naturally arose.  This dissertation is an attempt to 
answer that question, and to understand the more general role of commissions as 
diagnostic and therapeutic instruments that investigate dramatic disasters and policy 
failures.  
 
Space Shuttle Columbia Investigation 
 
 Serving as one of two editors on the Space Shuttle Columbia investigation 
provided a privileged perch from which to watch the investigation unfold.  I reported 
directly to the investigation’s chairman, and was included, at his insistence, in all 
investigative meetings, internal deliberations, and Board travel.  Watching the thirteen 
Board members grapple with the unfolding investigation for seven months allowed 
me to observe how the investigation organized itself, managed its relations with 
NASA, Congress, the White House, and other constituencies, and began assembling 
the facts and circumstances of the accident itself.  It was, without question, a rare 
chance to “be in the room” during what became the largest accident investigation in 
history.   
The ethnography that I was able to assemble allowed me to trace, among other 
phenomena, the social framing of the accident, the uptake of sociological theories 
among the Board’s investigators, the production of the investigation report, and the 
institutionalization of the accident’s explanation.  Importantly for my account in 
Chapter 2 of how the investigation’s focus evolved, I observed the debate between 
Board members over how to frame the accident’s casual explanation.  The 
observations I took away from this experience constitute rich material for exploring 
Goffman’s frontstage/backstage distinction in the commission’s construction of its 
public persona and projection of authority.  The ethnography also constitutes 
remarkable material for studying the micropolitics of persuasive and coercive power, 
as exercised in many varieties and ways: administrative, political, technical, even 
cultural.  
 Chapter 2 of this dissertation, then, is a scholarly recapitulation of my 
observations as a staff member on the shuttle investigation, further developed into 
arguments about social processes and made with extensive reference to the historical, 
sociological, and science and technology studies literature.  In constructing this 
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account I relied not only on memory, but also on a vast repository of documentary 
material that accrued from my staff role.  This included a set of contemporaneous 
personal notes I took almost daily to chronicle the investigation, investigation emails, 
news articles from our clipping service, and several boxes of investigation materials I 
was permitted to retain after the National Archives electronically harvested most of 
our files.   
This crucial documentary archive, which I reference throughout the Columbia 
case study, includes everything from draft report chapters and successive report 
outlines that illustrate the evolution of Board thinking to notes and meeting minutes 
from Board discussions and site visits.  One of the most unique artifacts I make use of 
is an oral history Dwayne Day and I took to explore the investigation’s early history 
with Admiral Gehman and four of the Board’s first staff members.  We did this for 
the benefit of future historians as well as to provide an evidentiary basis for report 
Appendix A, which documents the Board’s initial mobilization. 
 To ensure that my ethnography of the investigation is fully corroborated by 
the range of available evidence, and that the theories I generate from it are rooted in 
more than my personal observations, I augmented my personal papers and notes with 
a variety of primary and secondary sources and materials from interviews with key 
participants.  Foremost among these sources was the Board’s report itself.  The 
accident report and its extensive appendices contain much of the raw evidence the 
investigation used, as well as the complete set of transcripts from all public Board 
hearings.  Wherever I can, I situate observations made by the Board in the words of 
its own members, rather than my recollections. 
Scholarly commentary and journalistic coverage of the investigation is also 
abundant.  I gathered, sorted, and referenced a great deal of it in my research, mostly 
through targeted electronic searches of scholarly databases and online archives of 
several newspapers and the aviation press.  Because of my inside knowledge of the 
investigation, I primary use journalistic coverage to mark important investigative 
developments, trace the reaction to the Board’s actions, or illustrate the environment 
in which Board members worked.  Of available news accounts, I concentrate on those 
from the New York Times, whose correspondents, in my experience, provided the 
most accurate and comprehensive coverage of the unfolding investigation.  Accounts 
from Florida and Texas newspaper reporters who regularly cover the Kennedy and 
Johnson Space Centers were also helpful corroborating sources. 
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I also draw commentary from the specialty space press, including Aviation 
Weekly, Space News, The Space Review, and, to a lesser extent, the blog 
NASAWATCH.  The only book length account of the investigation yet written, 
Michael Cabbage and William Harwood’s Comm Check: The Final Flight of the 
Shuttle Columbia, was generally informative as a narrative of the investigation, but 
broke little new ground.  With the exception of the work of sociologist Diane 
Vaughan, articles published in several academic journals, as well as one edited 
volume, mostly concern the investigation’s approach to risk management, and 
therefore proved only marginally useful to theorizing the investigative processes 
explored in this dissertation. 
As I developed the case study in 2005 and 2006, and began to write my initial 
drafts of chapter 2, I spoke regularly to several investigation colleagues, including 
Lester Reingold, Ari Simon, Laura Brown, Diane Vaughan, and the noted space 
historian Dwayne Day.  My interaction Dwayne Day and Diane Vaughan merit 
special mention.  Dwayne was able to consult his meticulous investigation journal to 
clarify the general accuracy of my own recollections.  I am grateful for his patient 
work to help construct and verify the account I offer of several important Board 
decisions. 
  A series of informal dinners with Diane Vaughan in Boston as she wrote her 
own account of involvement in the investigation were particularly helpful in 
establishing the sociological motives and principles at stake in the Board’s adoption 
of social cause.  Early drafts of her autobiographical accounts, which I commented 
upon, as well as the final versions published in anthropology and sociology journals, 
were among the most important intellectual seeds for my own theorization of what 
occurred.   The similarity of our perspectives on the investigation’s eventual embrace 
of social cause thus stems from more than shared experience on the investigation 
itself.  By combining insights from our different vantage points on the investigation, 
we also, to a certain extent, jointly theorized how social cause rose to the prominence 
it did.  I was always the junior academic partner in these endeavors, but had the 
advantage of having been present for the investigation’s duration and been more 
centrally positioned in its staff hierarchy.  
The arguments I develop in Chapter 2 about the adoption of social cause and 
the investigation’s own agency thus emerged primarily from my ethnography of the 
Board, but were refined with the help of colleagues, and expanded by a variety of 
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documentary evidence, academic literature, interviews, and informal consultations.  
Drawing on these materials to trace the evolution of the investigation enabled me to 
identify key moments and dynamics, develop hypothesis about the causal mechanism 
driving events, and then to test these hypothesis against the body of data I gathered.  
As an additional measure of validation, I asked my investigation colleague Dwayne 
Day, a noted space historian, to review and comment upon a rough draft of the case 
study. 
 
The Return to Flight Task Group 
 
 My chronicle of the Return to Flight Task Group in chapter 3 returns me to the 
role of outside observer undertaking traditional documentary and interview research.  
I conducted no ethnographic observation of the Task Group and had no formal 
association with it.  I was nevertheless greatly aided in my research by two colleagues 
from the Columbia Board who went on to serve on the Task Group’s staff.  My status 
as a former member of the Columbia Board staff also helped open doors among those 
I interviewed.  To a certain extent, then, my gathering of data to evaluate the impact 
of the Columbia investigation’s recommendations was opportunistic. 
I began my research into the Return to Flight Task Group in the summer of 
2005, as NASA was readying the shuttle for its first post-accident launch.  The near-
catastrophic foam shedding incident on Discovery’s launch, which I witnessed from 
NASA’s Banana Creek viewing site, piqued my interest in developing the case and 
also spurred initial hypothesis on what may have happened.  My investigation 
colleague Dwayne Day and I published our thinking at the time in a Space Review 
article titled “Foam and the Limits of Foresight.”584  I also co-authored an op-ed in 
the Washington Times that previewed more general arguments about the politics
disaster and reform that I revised and expanded in the dissertation.
 of 
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shuttle program’s attempt to implement investigation recommendations.  While 
building this repository I concentrated especially on tracing the political, policy, and 
organizational environment program engineers worked within during the return to 
flight process.  An unpublished manuscript commissioned by the NASA History 
Office provided some useful background on NASA’s internal response to the 
investigation, and on the origins of the Return to Flight Task Group.  The manuscript, 
by the space historian Andrew Butrica, entered the NASA History Office review 
process but was never published.586  
The Return to Flight Task Group’s interim and final reports, as well as the 
dissent written by six of its members, highlighted specific matters to further examine.  
It became clear after digesting these materials that I should look closely at NASA’s 
decisions about implementing modifications to the external tank and at the combative 
interactions between Task Group members and NASA officials on whether the 
modifications NASA ultimately made fulfilled the Columbia Board 
recommendations.   
 As I developed initial lines of argument on the basis of these materials, I 
began exploring the nature of the Task Group with Lester Reingold and Dennis 
Jenkins, my investigation colleagues who went on to work on its staff.  Les served as 
editor of the Task Group report; Dennis as one of its lead technical advisors.  Through 
informal conversations in person and over the phone, insights from Dennis and Les 
were invaluable to helping me differentiate the Task Group’s organization, resources, 
culture, and decision-making style from that of the Columbia Board.  Dennis went 
further and recommended which members of the Task Group I might have the best 
luck approaching, and who in NASA’s technical ranks was involved in making the 
engineering decisions on the external tank I was by now interested in.  It was through 
his help that I initiated a series of interviews that established key lines of evidence. 
Using contacts provided by Dennis as well as other officials I had met during 
the investigation, I sought to conduct interviews with members from three groups: 
engineers from the external tank project; Task Group members that oversaw the 
implementation of the Columbia Board’s external tank recommendations; and Task 
Group members who signed the dissent included in the final report.  My goal was to 
examine how managers in the external tank project made engineering judgments, how 
                                                 
586 Andrew J. Butrica, “Recovering from Columbia: Learning from NASA’s Return to Flight,” draft 
manuscript, 2007. 
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the Task Group evaluated these decisions, and how organizational and cultural 
dynamics at play in the shuttle program influenced events.  By tracing NASA’s 
attempt to meet the Columbia Board’s recommendations on external tank debris, I 
would be able to explore my initial hypothesis that schedule pressure, generated by 
NASA’s internal conception of mission and by policy decisions from above, was a 
persuasive factor shaping the course of technical modifications undertaken by 
engineers.  
All told, I made about two-dozen inquires, just over half of which yielded 
interviews.  Several of these interviewees led me to other individuals, in the classic 
snowball method that I proposed employing from the outset.  I conducted all 
interviews by phone in March and April of 2006, with email correspondence as a 
frequent follow-up.  The interviews lasted anywhere from twenty minutes to over an 
hour and a half.  I prepared for each by writing a list of questions and reviewing 
relevant documents and sections of Task Group reports.  For several of my 
conversations with NASA engineers, Dennis Jenkins and Dwayne Day kindly talked 
me through some of the more complex engineering issues beforehand.  Of the 
interviews I conducted, those with Charles Daniel, Amy Donahue, and Neil Otte were 
most helpful to fleshing out my arguments.  These three individuals became 
something of my main informants.  I spoke and corresponded with all three multiple 
times.   
Dr. Daniel served on the Task Group’s technical panel, which was responsible 
for evaluating NASA’s implementation of Columbia Board recommendations 
involving flight hardware.  Neel Otte was a manager in the external Tank project who 
interfaced directly with the Task Group and himself oversaw key engineering 
decisions.  With Daniel and Otte, I explored the sequence of external tank project 
engineering decisions as well as their perception of the program and schedule 
pressures acting at different times during the return to flight process.  These 
interviews enabled me to confirm the existence of technical courses of action that 
would have likely further reduced foam shedding but whose implementation was 
ruled out by shuttle management, who made a corporate decision to set a launch date 
without first conducting an analysis of how long it would take to implement the 
Columbia recommendations.  
My interviews with Amy Donahue concerned her role in Task Group’s 
operational sub-panel, her feelings as a NASA outsider and social scientist joining the 
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astronaut-heavy Task Group, and her reasons for joining the dissenters to the Task 
Group’s final report.  Amy’s own scholarship on disaster management makes her an 
acute observer of organizational dynamics.  Her comments in this regard were helpful 
in bolstering my own exploration of the connection between NASA’s political 
environment during the Return to Flight process and the decision-making of shuttle 
managers and line engineers.587  Although I did not interview Task Group member 
Rosmary O’Leary, her published account of writing the dissent corroborated of what 
other Task Group members recounted orally.588 
The reconstruction of events drawn from these interviews and from the 
documentary evidence I gathered confirmed my initial hypothesis about how political 
and organizational forces influenced the adjudication of technical decisions in the 
external tank project.  The interviews also unearthed information about the constraints 
the Task Group worked under and how the group’s limited access to investigative 
resources made it more difficult for its members to confront the shuttle program.  It 
was my exploration of this issue that inspired my augments about the importance of 
robust investigative staffs. 
The case thus traces the cascading effects of the shuttle program’s decision to 
set a launch date before having a firm sense for how long engineering modifications 
might take, and how the small trade space engineers had to work within was further 
compressed by later organizational and political developments in the shuttle program 
and U.S. space policy.  In this way my analysis linked observations made by Task 
Group members and tank project engineers to larger structural forces whose presence 
I established through tracing policy decisions made by the President and high-ranking 
NASA officials.  In so doing, I developed the theory of failure showcased in the 
chapter.   
 
The Iraq Study Group and its Aftermath 
 
 My research of the dissertation’s second case on the Iraq Study Group was 
also facilitated by opportunistic collection.  In an illustration of the path dependency 
                                                 
587 See, for instance, Donahue, Amy K. and Robert V. Tuohy. “Lessons We Don't Learn: A Study of 
the Lessons of Disasters, Why We Repeat Them, and How We Can Learn Them.” Homeland Security 
Affairs II, no. 2 (July 2006) 
588 O’Leary, Rosemary, The Ethics of Dissent: Managing Guerrilla Government (Washington: CQ 
Press, 2006). 
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frequently at work in policy careers, I was asked, on the basis of having served as 
editor of the Space Shuttle Columbia investigation, to help write the U.S. 
government’s official history of Iraq reconstruction.  So began my second leave from 
Cambridge University in spring 2006.  The Special Inspector General for Iraq 
Reconstruction, a joint office of the U.S. Departments of State and Defense, published 
Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience, in February 2009.   
My interest in the Iraq Study Group arose as I observed its institutional life, 
and the propagation of its recommendations, form my perch inside government.  Once 
again, I found myself poised to collect data opportunistically.  Having access to the 
message traffic and officials of government agencies running the war effort, and 
having the chance to interview many of the experts the study group had consulted, I 
was perfectly placed to assemble a second case study of a crisis commission as it 
unfolded. 
In the summer and fall of 2006 I even had some first hand interaction with the 
study group itself.  On the basis of my own experience conducting field research in 
Iraq, I was asked to recommend how its members might maximize their upcoming 
site visit to Baghdad.  Later, at the request of my boss, the Special Inspector General 
for Iraq Reconstruction, I participated in a consultation with study group staff and 
authored memos under his name for the consideration of co-chairs James Baker and 
Lee Hamilton.   
These interactions, however, were narrowly focused on policy guidance for 
reconstruction strategy, which constituted only a small portion of the study group’s 
purview.  In addition, there were practical as well as legal limits to my ability to 
collect material for my own private purposes while in the government’s employ.  
Although I did make note of obvious linkages I ran across in my daily interactions 
with officials and in my research for the official history, I gathered most of the 
materials used to write the case study from documentary and interview research after 
leaving government service.  I nevertheless benefited tremendously from the working 
knowledge of Iraq policy I gained on the job and from the access I had to officials I 
sought to interview after returning to Cambridge.  Much of the case’s framing and 
arguments emerge from this insider access. 
A word here is needed on the consequences of this insider status on 
methodological conventions.  A careful reader of the Iraq Study Group case study will 
notice that my analysis is informed by insights and observations that are not fully 
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sourced in the text.  This is the inevitable by-product of applying a scholarly gaze to 
events one participated in as an actor rather than a researcher.  Indeed, for over three 
years I lived and breathed Iraq policy daily, in Washington and in theater as I traveled 
across Iraq in the summer of 2006 and summer and fall of 2007.  My role as an 
official historian analyzing the reconstruction granted me de facto participant-
observer status to the unfolding occupation and the policy apparatus that steered it.  
However, I only embraced this de facto status after the fact, once I decided out of 
government service to add the Iraq case study to this dissertation.  Where possible, I 
have added into the case study references for conversations, email exchanges, and 
personal observations drawn from my first-hand interaction with the reconstruction.  
But because many of those I spoke with in the context of my official position would 
not have agreed to speak on the record for an academic project, it is not possible to 
specifically source their insights here.  A more comprehensive record of the sources I 
had access to during this period is contained in the footnotes and methodological 
appendix for Hard Lessons.  
To gather an independent empirical foundation with which to trace the study 
group’s institutional life, I conducted a series of keyword searches of major 
newspapers, political magazines, and several blogs, concentrating mainly on the New 
York Times and Washington Post, as well as several investigative journalists who 
covered Iraq policy for the intellectual press.  My decision to focus first on these 
sources derives from my impression of their general accuracy reporting on national 
security affairs, gained from cross referencing what I read in the press with what I 
knew from governmental sources.  This group of journalists also proved more 
attentive than the rest of the media in their reporting of micro-details of process and 
prerogative that matter in the building of an account of how commissions as political 
institutions compete for power and influence over agencies of the executive branch.  I 
cite stories on CNN primarily to mark junctures at which the study group entered the 
national consciousness. 
The body of evidence I accumulated through media searches was problematic.  
Journalistic coverage and opinion pieces come with known methodological 
limitations, and this time, unlike during my service on the Columbia investigation, I 
was not positioned to sort informed reporting from speculation.  To ensure that my 
portrayal of the study group does not relay too heavily on journalistic and quasi-
journalistic sources, I cross checked them with information from official accounts and 
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interviews where possible.  A number of official sources aided this effort.  The study 
group’s official website, which includes a number of press releases, transcripts, and 
other written information about study group processes, usefully provided a 
documentary record of its activities, as did the study group report itself.  
Congressional committees and offices of individual senators and representatives also 
released correspondence related to study group business, as did think tanks and 
research institutions, such as Brookings and the Council on Foreign Relations.  
Somewhat surprisingly, I found little further insight from academic publications.  A 
search of several academic databases performed in the late spring of 2009 yielded no 
significant academic articles or books on the study group.  A short section in Jordan 
Tama’s Ph.D. dissertation is the only substantive academic analysis of the study 
group I managed to locate.  
These sources helped me assemble a detailed timeline of the study group’s 
activates and the fate of many of its recommendations.  They also helped me develop 
lines of questioning that I then used to generate an interview plan.  I was most 
interested in understanding how the study group’s primary recommendations were so 
quickly overturned by President Bush, what happened to the rest of the 
recommendations, and whether beginning life as an earmark rather than an official 
commission constrained its investigation.  
To understand how the study group organized itself and conduced its business, 
I spoke with Paul Hughes, who served as an executive secretariat to one of its four 
expert advisory panels, and Rick Barton, who served on its panel of reconstruction 
experts.  Both helped me understand the system of volunteer advisors put in place by 
Baker and Hamilton and the dynamics that existed between these expert groups and 
the study group itself.   Study group staff member Ben Rhodes, who was an executive 
assistant to co-chair Lee Hamilton, shared with me select impressions of how the 
study group conducted its affairs during the eight months it met.  In several 
conversations held long after the study group disbanded, Ben also shared how study 
group members and staffers viewed their ultimate effect on the policy making 
process.  My conversations with him informed my arguments about the nature of the 
access the study group enjoyed. 
Princeton doctoral candidate Jordan Tama was also a source.  He and I had 
several long conversations and traded emails in an effort to help each other grapple 
with our common dissertation topics of national security commissions.  Since Jordan 
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had mostly completed his research on the study group before I began the advanced 
stages of my own, his insights—especially about the study group’s impact on 
congressional debates—helped me more accurately process trace study group 
recommendations. 
To understand the administration’s reaction to the study group and the 
political ramifications of its report, I drew upon conversations with Philip Zelikow.  
During the study group’s tenure, Zelikow served as Counselor to the Secretary of 
State and was a member of the White House review team that eventually 
recommended the President overrule the study group’s primary recommendation.  He 
had already given extensive interviews of his views about the study group to the PBS 
program Frontline and to several journalists.  I am thankful for the opportunity to ask 
him additional questions.  His views solidified my understanding of what influenced 
the study group’s military recommendations and why they were rejected by the 
administration.  
 I conducted several final interviews to trace the impact of several of the study 
group’s lesser recommendations.  Ambassador Tim Carney spoke with me about his 
own role in carrying out the study group recommendation for greater coordination in 
economic policymaking.  I similarly interviewed Admiral William Fallon shortly after 
his resignation as CENTCOM commander to understand the resistance he faced in 
encouraging the administration to act on the study group’s recommendation to name a 
reconstruction czar.   
My most difficult task was assembling an account of the study group’s 
deliberations.  Although I was not able to interview a member of the study group 
itself, I did speak on an anonymous basis with two of its staff members who were 
present in the room for most of its final deliberations.  The argument I developed 
about the study group’s limited analytic reach stems from these discussions and my 
own sense, from conducting field research in Iraq, of the added value of the in-
country travel that the study group was unable to undertake.   
Bob Woodward’s account of the study group in The War Within: A Secret 
White House History (2006–2008) was perhaps the most problematic source I 
encountered in my attempt to understand the study group’s deliberations.  The work 
of Washington’s best known investigative reporter relies so heavily on the 
cooperation of a small number of anonymous sources that it is often likened to a 
flashlight shining into a dark room: one must be careful to remember that what lies in 
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darkness is much larger than that which is illuminated.  Nevertheless, several 
members of the study group granted Woodward wide-ranging interviews in which 
they discuss aspects of the study group covered by no other sources, including how it 
reached the conclusions showcased in its report.   So that I would not uncritically 
draw on Woodward’s sweeping analysis, I employ his account primarily to reference 
characterizations of study group dynamics made by its members who were quoted by 
name.   
My observations of the similarities and differences between the Iraq Study 
Group and 9/11 Commission emerged largely from informal discussions with 
Stephanie Kaplan, a close observer of the study group who served as the 9/11 
Commission’s managing editor. 
 The research for the Iraq Study Group case laid out in chapter 4 and 5 was 
methodologically similar to my work on the Return to Flight Task Group in chapter 3.  
Although I was not positioned as an insider able to offer a full ethnographic account, 
as I was in the Columbia case, I did have a number of evidentiary advantages that 
accrued from my position as a government official.   These advantages gave me a 
distinct sense for the political environment in which the study group operated and 
propagated its recommendations.  By combing my own sensibilities from my 
experience working Iraq policy with the documentary and interview research I 
undertook after leaving government, I was able to devise the arguments I ultimately 
make in chapter 4 and 5.  Theory generation occurred more productively in this case, 
perhaps because I was able to test and build upon preliminary hypotheses about 
commissions from the already-completed Columbia case.  To validate my 
conclusions, Jordan Tama read and commented upon a rough draft. 
 
Overall Theorizing 
 
 I arrived at a rough draft of both cases in the spring of 2009.  Although the 
broad outlines of my argument about commissions as unique instruments of 
democratic governance was beginning to emerge, the two cases as initially drafted 
allowed room for further and more detailed comparisons of specific phenomena, 
including the importance of investigative staff, the way in which credibility is 
constructed in situ, and how commissions approach the question of exerting influence 
after their disbandment.  I proceeded to spend the late spring and summer aligning the 
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cases so as to draw more structured comparisons about these issues, to cut extraneous 
material, and to draft a conclusion chapter that would illustrate my overall arguments.   
This process of within and between case analysis yielded further insights into 
the dynamics that influence commissions and their role in the political process.  It was 
during this iterative phase of maturing my thinking and writing that I reintroduced the 
9/11 Commission as a basis for further comparative theorizing.  I was pleased to see 
continuities between the conclusions of my own research in the two cases and the 
existing literature on the 9/11 Commission.  Specifically, the comparison brought out 
structural similarities, highlighted in the conclusion, between the Iraq Study Group 
and Return to Flight Task Group, and between the Columbia investigation and the 
9/11 Commission.  
 In late summer 2009 I wrote this methodological appendix and edited the 
dissertation to ensure that the general argument was sufficiently carried through the 
text.  Initial drafts suffered from a “trees obscuring the forest” effect in which 
evidentiary detail at times overwhelmed the overall argument.  Final adjustments 
were made in late September and early October 2009.  The dissertation was formally 
submitted in October 2009 and defended in June 2010 before Prof. Sheila Jasanoff 
(Harvard Kennedy School) and Dr. Glen Rangwala (Cambridge), who accepted it 
without substantial revision.  A bound copy for library deposit, with limited 
corrections, was submitted in September 2010. 
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